Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After defendant, the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, was convicted of mail fraud and wire fraud for the misuse of public assets, he filed a motion challenging the fairness of his trial on the grounds that a juror allegedly engaged in misconduct and was biased. The district court denied defendant's motion for a new trial, sentenced defendant to 24 months' imprisonment, and imposed a fine and restitution. In the present appeal, defendant challenged the district court's judgment dated February 25, 2019, alleging only that the district court abused its discretion in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing to investigate the juror's potential misconduct and bias.The Fourth Circuit rejected defendant's contention that a juror's use of social media during the trial constituted misconduct in violation of Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954), entitling him to an evidentiary hearing. In this case, the juror's Twitter activity related to football and did not refer to any facts about the case or the scandal at large. The court concluded that, at bottom, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for an evidentiary hearing under Remmer because defendant failed to make a credible allegation that an improper contact occurred. The court also held that because defendant has not made a colorable showing that the juror dishonestly answered material questions during voir dire, the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing to investigate McDonough bias. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing on actual bias. View "United States v. Loughry" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit vacated defendant's conviction of one count of employing, using, persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct "for the purpose of producing [a] visual depiction of such conduct" in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). The court agreed with defendant that the district court incorrectly instructed the jury that section 2251(a) merely requires filming to be "a purpose," which can arise at any time, of engaging in the sexual conduct. The court stated that the instructional error in this case—which was objected to and went to the absolute heart of the defense—is too much to overlook because it fundamentally misconstrued the statute, prejudicing defendant. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. McCauley" on Justia Law

In 2008, Homeland Security passed rules requiring that employers receive a favorable labor certification from Labor before obtaining a visa. Homeland Security and Labor jointly issued a new series of rules in 2015. Plaintiffs, a group of employers and associations whose members rely on H-2B visas, filed suit challenging Homeland Security's 2008 Rules and the joint 2015 Rules as exceeding the agencies' statutory authority.The Fourth Circuit held that there is standing to challenge the 2008 Rules but the challenge is time-barred; there is standing to challenge the 2015 Program and Wage Rules; and the 2015 Program and Wage Rules are valid exercises of Labor's implied delegation to rulemake as part of its duty as Homeland Security's chosen consulting agency. The court explained that this implied delegation is evident from the statutory circumstances in the Immigration and Nationality Act, including the requirement that Homeland Security engage in "consultation with appropriate agencies," the definition of H-2B, and Labor's rulemaking powers for similar visas. The court concluded that, while there are limits on which agencies Homeland Security can choose and on those agencies' ability to rulemake, Labor's 2015 Program and Wage Rules fall within both boundaries. View "Outdoor Amusement Business Association, Inc. v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Residents and businesses of Lumberton, North Carolina filed a putative class action alleging that CSX Transportation caused their property to be flooded during Hurricanes Matthew and Florence. The district court dismissed each claim as either insufficiently pleaded or preempted by federal law.The Fourth Circuit concluded that dismissal of the breach of contract claim was premature because plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the Tri-Party Agreement was intended to directly benefit the class of persons to which they belong—the residents and businesses of South and West Lumberton left vulnerable to flooding through the gap. However, the court's holding is limited to the Tri-Party Agreement. In this case, plaintiffs alleged the existence of a second, unnamed and undated agreement, but failed to produce it or to plead any of its essential terms. The court also concluded that plaintiffs' tort claims are preempted by the federal Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Edwards v. CSX Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant sought to appeal the district court's order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. The Fourth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether defendant's counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to assert a double jeopardy defense.The court affirmed the portion of the district court's order denying relief on defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court first joined its sister circuits in holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits imposition of cumulative punishments for 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and 924(j) convictions based on the same conduct. However, the court cannot conclude that the double jeopardy claim that defendant now presses was sufficiently foreshadowed at the time of trial to render his counsel's failure to raise it constitutionally deficient representation. The court denied a certificate of appealability as to the remaining issues and dismissed the remainder of the appeal. View "United States v. Palacios" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's order affirming the SSA's denial of plaintiff's application for disability insurance benefits, holding that the ALJ erred by determining that plaintiff was not disabled during the relevant period.The court concluded that the ALJ erred in discrediting plaintiff's subjective complaints by applying the wrong legal standard by effectively requiring plaintiff to provide objective medical evidence of her symptoms; improperly cherry-picking, misstating, and mischaracterizing facts from the record; and drawing various conclusions unsupported by substantial evidence and failing to explain them adequately. Furthermore, the ALJ's decision exhibits a pervasive misunderstanding of fibromyalgia. Applying its discretion to review the issue, the court concluded that the ALJ erred by according little weight to plaintiff's treating physician's opinion. In this case, the ALJ's treatment of the doctor's opinion contains several errors and is not supported by substantial evidence. The court held that the record as a whole clearly establishes plaintiff's disability and thus her legal entitlement to disability benefits. The court remanded to the Commissioner for calculation of disability benefits. View "Arakas v. Commissioner" on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks relief from his sentence, which was enhanced based on the "death results" provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, USSG 2D1.1(a)(1), based on the Supreme Court's decision in Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014). Petitioner argues that he meets the four-part test for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 from the court's decision in United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 2018). The district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the petition, concluding that because Burrage had not previously been applied to the Sentencing Guidelines, petitioner's invocation of Burrage was premature.The Fourth Circuit agreed and concluded that neither the Supreme Court nor this circuit had applied Burrage's statutory interpretation to the Sentencing Guidelines. However, the court now concludes that Burrage's interpretation does, in fact, apply to the "death results" provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, at least those in effect prior to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Accordingly, while the court found no fault with the district court's dismissal of the petition, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings based on its decision today. View "Young v. Antonelli" on Justia Law

In 28 U.S.C. 2241 proceedings, petitioner sought habeas corpus relief from his military court convictions and sentence, claiming violations of his Fifth Amendment right to due process and Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the section 2241 petition, but recognized that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is the proper basis for the dismissal of both claims. In regard to petitioner's contention that his Fifth Amendment due process claim was not accorded full and fair consideration by the military court, the court held that dismissal of the claim was proper where the propensity instruction given during his court-martial proceedings was insufficiently prejudicial to entitle him to habeas corpus relief. For similar reasons, dismissal of the Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance claim is proper. In this case, petitioner cannot show a reasonable probability that a challenge to the propensity instruction on direct appeal would have been successful. View "Ward v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that PDR Network violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by sending unsolicited advertisements by fax. The district court held that the Hobbs Act did not require it to adopt the FCC's interpretation of the TCPA (the 2006 FCC Rule) because the Hobbs Act does not control when no party "has challenged the validity of the FCC's interpretation of the TCPA." The district court concluded that, under the TCPA, unsolicited fax advertisements are not actionable unless they have a commercial purpose. The district court then determined that PDR Network's fax was not commercial in nature and dismissed the complaint without granting leave to amend.Plaintiff appealed and the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in conducting a Chevron analysis, and interpreted the 2006 FCC Rule to mean that a fax offering free goods and services qualifies as an "advertisement" under the TCPA, regardless of whether it has an underlying commercial purpose. PDR Network petitioned for certiorari and the Supreme Court granted review. The Supreme Court determined that to the extent to which the 2006 FCC Rule binds the lower courts may depend on the resolution of two preliminary sets of questions that were not aired before the Court of Appeals.On remand from the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit resolved the first five of seven issues submitted to the parties by concluding that a remand to the district court for discovery was not necessary; the relevant portions of the 2006 FCC Rule are interpretive rather than legislative; and thus the third, fourth, and fifth issues are moot. In regard to the sixth issue regarding what level of deference (if any) must the district court afford the 2006 FCC Rule, the court declined to decide in the first instance and remanded for the district court to have the first opportunity to perform the applicable analysis. Given the court's remand to the district court to consider what level of deference the court should afford the 2006 FCC Rule and what the proper meaning of "unsolicited advertisement" is in light of that deference, the court found it unnecessary to resolve the issue of whether the district court erred by failing to grant leave to amend. View "Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc. v. PDR Network, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Battalion Chiefs, filed suit against their employer, the City of Chesapeake Fire Department, for non-compliance with the overtime pay requirement of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Plaintiffs argue that none of the FLSA exemptions apply to them, both on their own terms and because the Battalion Chief position falls under a regulatory exception, 29 C.F.R. 541.3(b), that categorically withdraws certain first response workers from the exemptions' scope.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the fire department, holding that section 541.3(b) does not categorically except plaintiffs from the FLSA's system of exemptions, because plaintiffs are, first and foremost, managers within the fire department, not frontline firefighters. The court also held that plaintiffs satisfy all four prongs of the executive exemption and, as executive employees, are not due overtime pay under the FLSA. View "Emmons v. City of Chesapeake" on Justia Law