Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Leslie Atkinson purchased a 2003 Chevrolet Avalanche through a retail installment sales contract, which granted the seller a security interest in the vehicle. The seller assigned the sales contract and the security interest to Credit Acceptance Corporation. When Atkinson defaulted on her payments, Credit Acceptance hired Carolina Repo to repossess the vehicle. During the repossession, Atkinson attempted to drive off in the vehicle, leading to a confrontation with the Carolina Repo representative. The representative called the Harnett County Sheriff’s Office for assistance, and Deputy Brent Godfrey arrived on the scene. Godfrey ordered Atkinson out of the vehicle so that the Carolina Repo representative could repossess it.Atkinson sued Godfrey and Sheriff Wayne Coats under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. She claimed that Godfrey, in his individual capacity, violated her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures of property by facilitating Carolina Repo’s repossession. She also alleged that Coats, in his official capacity as the sheriff, failed to train officers and created policies that deprived her of the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable seizures of property.The defendants moved to dismiss Atkinson’s § 1983 claim, asserting that Atkinson did not allege facts showing they acted under color of law, that Godfrey was entitled to qualified immunity, and that, without an underlying constitutional violation, Atkinson failed to bring an actionable claim against the Sheriff’s Office through Coats in his official capacity. The district court denied the motion, finding it could not determine as a matter of law that Godfrey’s actions did not constitute state action, that Godfrey was entitled to qualified immunity, and that the Sheriff’s Office’s liability could be ruled out. Godfrey and Coats appealed the district court’s denial of their motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Godfrey’s motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The court found that neither the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit, the highest court of North Carolina, nor a consensus of other circuit courts of appeals had determined that conduct similar to that of Godfrey was unconstitutional. Therefore, the right alleged to be violated was not clearly established. The court remanded the case with instructions to grant Godfrey’s motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the appeal with respect to the claim against Coats, as the issues it presented were not inextricably intertwined with the resolution of the qualified immunity issues. View "Atkinson v. Godfrey" on Justia Law

The case involves three plaintiffs, Parker Wideman, Riley Draper, and William and Jessica Douglass, who were severely burned while cleaning a plant in Spartanburg, South Carolina. The plant, owned by Innovative Fibers LLC and Stein Fibers Ltd, converted recycled plastics into polyester fibers. The plaintiffs were employees of a third-party contractor, Advanced Environmental Options, hired to clean the plant. During the cleaning process, a fire broke out, causing severe injuries to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sued the plant owners for negligence under state common law.The case was initially filed in state court but was removed to federal court by the defendants. The defendants then moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the plaintiffs were "statutory employees" covered by South Carolina's Workers' Compensation Law. This law prohibits statutory employees from suing in tort in state courts and instead requires them to submit their claims to South Carolina’s Workers’ Compensation Commission. The district court agreed with the defendants and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court held that while state law can define the substantive rights asserted in federal diversity jurisdiction, it cannot strip federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over any category of claims. The court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the dispute satisfied all the requirements of diversity jurisdiction. View "Wideman v. Innovative Fibers LLC" on Justia Law

Andre Ricardo Briscoe was involved in the purchase and sale of narcotics in Baltimore. He learned from a contact, Kiara Haynes, that Jennifer Jeffrey had received a large supply of heroin. Briscoe and Haynes decided to rob Jeffrey. Briscoe went to Jeffrey’s house, robbed her of at least 80 grams of narcotics, shot and killed her, and shot and killed her seven-year-old son, K.B., whom Briscoe feared might testify against him. Briscoe was arrested and initially charged with possession with intent to distribute narcotics, conspiracy to distribute narcotics, and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. A later superseding indictment added three new counts: two counts of murder with a firearm during the commission of a drug trafficking crime and one count of killing a witness to prevent communication with law enforcement. After a twelve-day jury trial, Briscoe was convicted on all charges.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied Briscoe's motion to dismiss the indictment as barred by the statute of limitations, concluding that the indictment related back to the earlier filed information. The court also denied Briscoe's motion to suppress evidence obtained through the use of a cell site simulator, finding that the police had obtained a tracking order which authorized them to use the simulator. The court further found that the police had obtained consent to search the apartment where Briscoe was found and that their subsequent actions were part of a lawful protective sweep of the apartment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the government properly tolled the statute of limitations by filing an information within the five-year period and that the subsequent indictment related back to that filing. The court also held that the police had authority to use a cell site simulator to obtain Briscoe's location information and to search the apartment where he was found. The court rejected Briscoe's arguments that the government committed a Brady violation by failing to follow up on whether any footage was contained on a broken camera and that the government knowingly relied upon false testimony to secure his conviction. The court further held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Briscoe on all counts. View "United States v. Briscoe" on Justia Law

The defendant, Bobby Lee Minton, who has a history of mental illness and substance abuse, was convicted of possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony. The incident began when Minton knocked on a stranger's door asking for water and ended with him pulling out a gun. Minton appealed his conviction, arguing that the district court erred in not dismissing the indictment under the Speedy Trial Act.The district court had found Minton incompetent to stand trial on June 11, 2020, and his competency was restored on September 27, 2021. The dispute in this appeal was about how much of the 473-day period between these two dates should be included in the Speedy Trial Act calculation. Minton argued that 129 days of the incompetency period should be included, as he was not transported to a facility for competency restoration until 139 days after the court committed him to the Attorney General's custody. He based his argument on 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F), which presumes delays of more than 10 days in transporting a defendant to be unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed with Minton's argument. The court held that the entire period of Minton's legal incompetency was excluded from the Speedy Trial Act's 70-day trial clock under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(4), which excludes any period of delay resulting from the fact that the defendant is mentally incompetent or physically unable to stand trial. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the district court correctly denied Minton's motion to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act. View "United States v. Minton" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of Ghanaian investors who placed their funds with a Ghanaian private investment firm, Gold Coast, owned by the Nduom family, who are domiciled in Virginia. The Nduom family allegedly used a network of shell companies in Ghana and the United States to illicitly transfer the investors' funds out of their reach. The investors sued in a federal district court in Virginia, invoking a provision of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) that authorizes a private cause of action for any person injured in his business or property by a violation of RICO’s substantive prohibitions.The district court dismissed the action, ruling that the plaintiffs had not alleged a domestic injury, which is a requirement for a private RICO plaintiff. The court considered the residency of the plaintiffs and the location of the money when it was misappropriated, both of which were in Ghana. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ state law claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, as there was no diversity jurisdiction over the claims and the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims after dismissing the only federal claim in the case.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court agreed that the plaintiffs had not alleged a domestic injury, which is a requirement for a private RICO plaintiff. The court noted that the case involved Ghanaian victims who entrusted Ghanaian funds to a Ghanaian entity, with no expectation that their money would end up in the United States. The defendants’ unilateral use of American entities to complete their scheme did not domesticate an otherwise foreign injury. View "Percival Partners Limited v. Paa Nduom" on Justia Law

The case involves Austin Kyle Lee, who was found guilty of several federal drug and firearm offenses. After serving over four years in a New York prison for selling cocaine, Lee was released in late 2015 and moved to North Carolina, where he resumed selling drugs. A search of his residences revealed distribution quantities of a fentanyl–heroin mixture, cocaine, and marijuana; handguns and ammunition; packaging material; and over $200,000 in cash. A federal grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging Lee with multiple offenses, including conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin, five kilograms or more of cocaine, and a quantity of marijuana, among others.The district court found Lee guilty on all counts. The court also found additional facts that increased Lee’s mandatory minimum sentence for those crimes. Lee appealed, arguing that this judicial factfinding violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The Government agreed but contended that the district court’s procedural error was harmless because proof of the relevant facts was overwhelming and uncontroverted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court agreed with the Government that any procedural error in the district court’s determination that the serious drug felony enhancement applied to increase Lee’s statutory sentencing range was harmless. The court noted that Lee conceded that, under existing law, the judge could decide the fact of his prior conviction without a jury. Furthermore, the Government’s proof of the other two elements—concerning the duration and recency of his incarceration for that offense—was overwhelming and uncontroverted. View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law

The case involves Donald Herrington, who was charged with multiple counts of perjury, obtaining money by false pretenses, filing false or fraudulent income tax returns, failure to file an income tax return, and drug possession. Herrington chose to represent himself in court, waiving his right to counsel. He was eventually convicted on several charges and sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment. Herrington appealed his conviction, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to bring two meritorious arguments on direct appeal.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which rejected Herrington's arguments and denied his petition. Herrington then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. The court found that Herrington knowingly, unequivocally, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, thus affirming that aspect of the district court's decision. However, the court agreed with Herrington that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the jury was erroneously instructed on the requirements for a conviction for failure to file a tax return. The court reversed this part of the district court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to issue a writ of habeas corpus unless Herrington is afforded a new state court appeal in which he may raise this claim. View "Herrington v. Dotson" on Justia Law

The case involves Bestwall, LLC, a company that filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in November 2017. The company sought to establish a trust to pay current and future asbestos-related claims against it. As part of this process, Bestwall requested all persons with pending mesothelioma claims against it to complete a personal injury questionnaire. Several individual claimants and the Official Committee of Asbestos Claimants objected to this request. The bankruptcy court granted Bestwall's motion and ordered all current mesothelioma claimants to complete the questionnaire. Some claimants, represented by the law firm of Maune, Raichle, Hartley, French & Mudd, LLC, filed a lawsuit in Illinois seeking an injunction to prevent Bestwall from enforcing the questionnaire order. In response, Bestwall moved in the bankruptcy court to enforce the order.The bankruptcy court held the claimants and their law firm in contempt for violating the questionnaire order. The court later sanctioned them jointly and severally in the amount of $402,817.70 for fees and expenses Bestwall incurred in defending the Illinois lawsuit and enforcing the questionnaire order. The claimants and their law firm appealed both the contempt order and the sanctions order to the district court, which dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the contempt and sanctions orders were not final appealable orders because they did not terminate a procedural unit separate from the remaining bankruptcy case. The court noted that in normal civil litigation, a party may not immediately appeal a civil contempt order or attendant sanctions but must wait until final judgment to appeal. The same rule applies in bankruptcy, except the relevant final judgment may be a decree ending the entire case or a decree ending a discrete proceeding within the bankruptcy case. The court concluded that the contempt and sanctions orders did not terminate a procedural unit separate from the remaining bankruptcy case, and therefore, they were not final appealable orders. View "Blair v. Bestwall, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves David Thurston, a registered sex offender, who moved to Avery County, North Carolina, where Kevin Frye served as Sheriff and Lee Buchanan was the Deputy in charge of sex-offender registrations. Thurston informed Sheriff Frye that he had been invited to his nephew’s wedding in Spokane, Washington, and sought advice on how to comply with the law and asked for permission to attend the wedding. Sheriff Frye gave Thurston permission to travel and instructed him to email a copy of his Washington visitor-registration form within ten days of his arrival. However, while Thurston was away, the Sheriff’s Office mailed his verification form. Thurston contacted Sheriff Frye for guidance, but Sheriff Frye never responded. Deputy Buchanan began investigating Thurston and obtained a warrant alleging three different criminal violations. Thurston was arrested upon his return to North Carolina.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied the officers' motion for summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity because their arrest of Thurston did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. The officers appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Thurston’s arrest was unconstitutional and that the officers failed to prove that they acted objectively reasonably in seeking Thurston’s arrest warrant. The court also concluded that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because Thurston’s right to be free from unlawful arrest was clearly established. View "Thurston v. Frye" on Justia Law

This case revolves around the appointment of a general registrar of elections in Lynchburg, Virginia. The plaintiff, Christine Gibbons, was appointed as registrar in 2018 by a board consisting of two Democrats and one Republican. Her term expired in 2023, at which point the board had two Republican members and one Democratic member. The board informed Gibbons that she would have to reapply for her position. Despite reapplying, the two Republican members voted to appoint a different candidate who was a registered Republican. Gibbons sued the board and its two Republican members, alleging that the decision not to reappoint her was based on her political affiliation, which she claimed violated the First Amendment.The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that sovereign immunity barred all of Gibbons’ claims. The district court dismissed Gibbons’ claims against the board itself as barred by sovereign immunity, but denied the individual board members’ motions to dismiss. The court concluded that the board members could be sued for equitable relief in their official capacities and for damages in their personal capacities. The board members appealed both orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the appellants’ motions to dismiss. The court rejected the board members’ argument that sovereign immunity bars Gibbons’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against them in their official capacities. The court also rejected the board members’ assertion that Gibbons’ damages claims against them are barred by sovereign immunity. The court concluded that individual members of Virginia electoral boards may be sued in their official capacities for equitable relief under Ex parte Young and that Gibbons’ claims for damages against the board members in their personal capacities are not barred by sovereign immunity. View "Gibbons v. Gibbs" on Justia Law