Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of making false statements on an ATF form (Count One) and possessing a firearm after being "adjudicated as a mental defective" (Count Two). On appeal, defendant challenged his firearms conviction, arguing that Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), renders the indictment and jury instructions deficient, that the conviction runs afoul of the Second Amendment, and that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that because defendant had notice of the allegations against him and has not demonstrated that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different without the indictment error, his challenge to the indictment cannot survive plain-error review. The court also held that the jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was guilty of Count One. In doing so, it necessarily found that defendant knew he had been committed to a mental institution, satisfying Rehaif's knowledge-of-status element in Count Two. The court rejected defendant's Second Amendment claim where United States v. Midgett, 198 F.3d 143 (4th Cir. 1999), foreclosed his argument that his commitment under W. Va. Code 27-6A-3(f) does not fall within the realm of ordinary 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4) challenges because a different West Virginia statute, W. Va. Code 27-5-1 to -11, governs "final commitment proceedings." Rather, defendant's commitment to restore him to competency under W. Va. Code 27-6A-3(f) falls squarely within the definition of committed as used in section 922(g)(4). Finally, the court held that defendant's sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Collins" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition as untimely. The court rejected petitioner's contention that McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018), extended his limitations period by recognizing a new constitutional right retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. Rather, the court explained that McCoy refines the Gideon rule, but it is an extension of a watershed rule rather than a watershed rule itself. Therefore, the rule announced in McCoy is not retroactively applicable on collateral review. View "Smith v. Stein" on Justia Law

Challengers filed suit alleging that a 2018 North Carolina law requiring voters to present photographic identification is unconstitutional because it was enacted with the same discriminatory intent as the 2013 Omnibus Law. The district court found that the Challengers were likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional claims and issued a preliminary injunction against the law's enforcement.The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that a legislature's past acts do not condemn the acts of a later legislature, which the court must presume acts in good faith. In this case, the district court considered the General Assembly's discriminatory intent in passing the 2013 Omnibus Law to be effectively dispositive of its intent in passing the 2018 Voter-ID Law. In doing so, it improperly flipped the burden of proof at the first step of its analysis and failed to give effect to the Supreme Court's presumption of legislative good faith in Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324 (2018). Consequently, these errors fatally infected its finding of discriminatory intent.Furthermore, once the proper burden and the presumption of good faith are applied, the Challengers fail to meet their burden of showing that the General Assembly acted with discriminatory intent in passing the 2018 Voter-ID Law. The court considered the Arlington Heights factors—the sequence of events leading to enactment, legislative history, and disparate impact—and concluded that they cannot support a finding of discriminatory intent. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction. View "North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. Raymond" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motions to reduce their sentences under the First Step Act and reduce their sentences to time served. In these consolidated appeals, defendants were convicted of robberies and accompanying firearms violations under 18 U.S.C. 924(c).The court concluded that the district courts appropriately exercised the discretion conferred by Congress and cabined by the statutory requirements of 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). The court saw no error in the district courts' reliance on the length of defendants' sentences, and the dramatic degree to which they exceed what Congress now deems appropriate, in finding "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for potential sentence reductions. In this case, the district courts took seriously the requirement that they conduct individualized inquiries, basing relief not only on the First Step Act's change to sentencing law under section 924(c) but also on such factors as defendants' relative youth at the time of their offenses, their post-sentencing conduct and rehabilitation, and the very substantial terms of imprisonment they already served. The court concluded that these individualized determinations were neither inconsistent with any "applicable" Sentencing Commission guidance nor tantamount to wholesale retroactive application of the First Step Act's amendments to section 924(c). View "United States v. McCoy" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against the United States for wrongful investigation, arrest, and detention. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from his arrest, detention, transportation, and removal from the country by immigration officers based on an incorrect citizenship determination.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's determination that the discretionary function exception to the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity operated to defeat plaintiff's claims. The court explained that, in deciding whom to investigate, detain, and then remove, DHS officers must make all the kinds of classic judgment calls the discretionary function exception was meant to exempt from tort liability. Applying the Berkovitz analysis, the court concluded that the decisions to detain and remove are discretionary and DHS officers' decisions in investigating and responding to potential violations of immigration law are infused with public policy considerations. Because the discretionary function exception applies so plainly here, the court need not consider the government's other arguments. View "Blanco Ayala v. United States" on Justia Law

Ayon-Brito was prosecuted and convicted in the Eastern District of Virginia of reentering the U.S. without permission after having been removed, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). The district court had denied his pretrial motion to dismiss for improper venue. Ayon-Brito argued that although the indictment alleged that he was first “encountered” after his reentry by officers in Virginia, it also alleged, as an element of the offense, that he was “found” in the Middle District of Pennsylvania where he was first accurately identified. He argued that the crime charged was committed in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, so that venue was appropriate only there; 8 U.S.C. 1329 establishes venue for a section 1326 violation in the district where the violation “occurred.”The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss. The violation of 1326(a) was a continuing offense that began when he reentered the U.S. and continued wherever he was present until he was found and arrested. Because “found” does not itself refer to an act or conduct of the defendant, it does not describe a conduct element; the crime at issue is “being in” the U.S. If Ayon-Brito believed that he faced prejudice or inconvenience, he could have sought a transfer; he did not. He elected a bench trial in Virginia and was dealt with fairly. View "United States v. Ayon-Brito" on Justia Law

Varner’was having an alcoholic drink and lunch at a restaurant. Deputy Roane approached and requested that he leave the restaurant with him. Varner complied. Roane had previously arrested Varner on drug charges. Outside, Roane asked Varner to empty his pockets. Finding nothing, Roane patted Varner down. No incriminating items were found. Roane asked him to submit to a breath test. Varner stated he would not be driving and refused. K-9 officer Johnson then approached Varner’s car with a drug-sniffing dog, Zeke. Zeke and Johnson had successfully completed Police Narcotic Detection Training. Zeke gave a positive alert. Varner alleges that Johnson manufactured this alert by smacking the side of his car and that Zeke displayed erratic behavior. Johnson contradicted those assertions. No drugs were found in the car.Varner sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court dismissed Varner’s claim that he had been unlawfully seized during the pat-down, reasoning that Varner had failed to demonstrate the encounter was anything but consensual. After discovery, the court granted Roane summary judgment on the remaining Fourth Amendment claim, finding no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Johnson had manufactured Zeke’s alert. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Roane did not use or threaten force, did not restrain Varner, and did not make any misrepresentation as to a warrant. There is nothing to suggest a conspiracy to manipulate Zeke’s behavior. View "Varner v. Roane" on Justia Law

Ka was convicted of possessing a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. While serving five years of supervised release, he tested positive for drug use three times. Ka stated, in the presence of his probation officer, Padilla, and her partner, that he had been helping friends sell drugs to make money. Padilla examined Ka’s phone, finding text messages related to drug sales. Ka then signed a statement admitting to selling marijuana and cocaine with an averment that “[t]hese are my own words and [are] given voluntarily.” Ka did not invoke his right against self-incrimination. Padilla petitioned to revoke Ka’s supervised release, 18 U.S.C. 3583(e).Ka moved to suppress statements he had made to Padilla concerning his possession and sale of drugs, citing the Fifth Amendment and arguing that the “penalty exception” applied to his situation. His terms of supervision required him to “answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer and follow the instructions of the probation officer” so he would have been penalized for any assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Ka’s motion to suppress, having previously held that the use of compelled, self-incriminating statements in a supervised release revocation hearing does not violate the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment. View "United States v. Ka" on Justia Law

MVP asked two Army Corps districts to verify that, pursuant to the Clean Water Act, MVP's proposed discharge of dredged and/or fill material into waters of the United States in furtherance of construction of a natural gas pipeline in those districts could be governed by the Army Corps' 2017 nationwide permit (NWP) referred to as NWP 12. The Huntington District issued a verification, determining that the Pipeline project met the criteria for operation under the NWP 12, excusing the project from the individual permitting process (the "Verification"). The Norfolk District did the same, issuing a reinstatement of its prior verification allowing MVP to use NWP 12 in that district (the "Reinstatement"). Petitioners filed petitions for agency review of the Verification and Reinstatement pursuant to the Natural Gas Act (NGA) and filed the instant motions to stay.The Fourth Circuit concluded that petitioners are likely to succeed on the merits of their petitions for review, and other equitable factors weigh in favor of granting the motions for stay. The court explained that the Verification was likely issued in contravention of applicable law because the Army Corps impermissibly incorporated into NWP 12 a modified permit condition from the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (WVDEP). Furthermore, because the Verification was likely issued in contravention of law, the Reinstatement (which necessarily depends on the validity of the Verification) is likely defective as well. Therefore, the court granted petitioners' motions for a stay of the Huntington District's Verification and the Norfolk District's Reinstatement until such time as the court may consider the petitions for review on their merits. However, the court concluded that petitioners are not likely to succeed on the merits of their challenges to the Army Corps' 2017 issuance of NWP 12 itself because the court likely lacks jurisdiction to entertain such challenges. View "Sierra Club v. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs in an action brought against Equinor and SWN, challenging the deduction of post-production costs from royalties paid to plaintiffs pursuant to an oil and gas lease between the parties. The district court held that the lease failed to properly provide for the method of calculating post-production costs.The court held, however, that the lease provisions regarding royalty payments satisfy Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, LLC, 633 S.E.2d 22 (W. Va. 2006), and are otherwise consistent with West Virginia law. In this case, the lease suffices under Tawney to indicate the method for calculating the amount of post-production costs to be deducted when calculating plaintiffs' royalties; that method is simply to add up all of the identified, reasonable, and actually incurred post-production costs, and deduct them from SWN and Equinor's gross proceeds; and the amount is then adjusted for plaintiffs' fractional share of the total pooled acreage and their royalty rate. Especially in light of Leggett v. EQT Production Co., 800 S.E.2d 850 (W. Va. 2017), the court concluded that West Virginia law demands nothing more. The court found it unnecessary to certify any issue of law. View "Young v. Equinor USA Onshore Properties, Inc." on Justia Law