Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, twelve record companies, filed suit against defendant alleging claims for five separate violations of the Copyright Act. Plaintiffs are Delaware corporations, with eight having their principal place of business in New York, three in California, and one in Florida. Defendant, born in Rostov-on-Don, Russia, is a Russian citizen who still resides in Rostov-on-Don. Defendant owns and operates websites that offer visitors a stream-ripping service through which audio tracks may be extracted from videos available on various platforms and converted into a downloadable format.The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that defendant's contacts sufficiently show he purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in Virginia. Therefore, the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1) is appropriate if it is constitutionally reasonable. Because the district court did not perform a reasonability analysis in the first instance, the court remanded for the district court to do so. View "UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Kurbanov" on Justia Law

By an interim order dated April 2, 2020, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision denying defendant's motion for a reduced sentence, ruled that defendant was eligible for relief under the First Step Act, and remanded for the district court to consider whether to exercise its discretion under the Act to impose a reduced sentence. This opinion explains the reasons for the court's order.The court held that when the Fair Sentencing Act changed the quantities of crack cocaine to which 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C) applies, it "modified" the statutory penalties of that subsection for purposes of crack cocaine offenders within the meaning of the First Step Act. In this case, defendant's sentence under subsection 841(b)(1)(C) was imposed for a "covered offense," and he is eligible for a First Step Act sentence reduction. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Woodson" on Justia Law

Defendants Campbell, Shropshire, Wells, and Washington were convicted of charges related to their participation in a heroin-distribution conspiracy and related substantive-drug-distribution offenses. Washington was convicted of distributing heroin that resulted in the death of a young woman.The court held that the district court acted well within its discretion by admitting expert testimony on J.L.'s cause of death over Washington's objection; the district court acted within its discretion in rejecting Washington's proposed instruction; the evidence of the home-invasion robbery was properly admitted by the district court; Shropshire failed to show that clear prejudice resulted from the joint trial and the district court did not abuse its discretion; the court declined to address Shropshire's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim; and the district court acted within its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial after mitigating any risk of prejudice with a cautionary instruction. View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law

After the tax court determined that petitioners failed to report approximately $41.2 million of compensation income that they realized when certain restricted stockholdings that they owned became substantially vested in January 2004, the tax court upheld the Commissioner's decision to impose accuracy-related penalties for negligence and substantial understatement of tax liability, and denied petitioners' post-trial attempt to offset their underreported income with various net operating loss carrybacks.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the tax court, holding that the tax court did not err in holding that petitioners each realized and were required to report $45.7 million of taxable income when their UMLIC S-Corp. stock substantially vested in taxable year 2004. In this case, even if the Surrender Transactions could somehow be seen as rescinding petitioners' employment and compensation agreements with UMLIC S-Corp., the court agreed with the tax court's conclusion that those transactions were totally devoid of economic substance and must be disregarded for federal income tax purposes. The court also held that the tax court did not err in upholding the accuracy-related penalties imposed by the Commissioner. Finally, the court rejected petitioner's claim that the tax court erred in refusing to consider their net operating losses (NOL) carryback claim during post-trial computation proceedings conducted pursuant to Tax Court Rule 155. View "Estate of Arthur E. Kechijian v. Commissioner" on Justia Law

Citynet filed a qui tam action against West Virginia officials, alleging that defendants defrauded the United States when obtaining federal funding for a program to improve broadband connectivity for West Virginia residents, in violation of the False Claims Act (FCA). Specifically, Citynet alleged that Defendants Gianato and Given, respectively the Director of the West Virginia Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management and the State Technology Officer, along with other defendants, knowingly submitted false statements and records to the United States as part of their application for funding under the federal Broadband Technology Opportunities Program and, once the funding was obtained, made false claims in drawing down funds under the Program.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's immunity ruling and remanded with instructions to deny Gianato and Given's claim of qualified immunity. Because the district court's ruling was contingent on the answer to the threshold legal question of whether qualified immunity may be invoked as a defense to FCA claims, the court exercised appellate jurisdiction and held that qualified immunity does not apply to protect government officials from claims against them for fraud under the Act. View "United States ex rel. Citynet, LLC v. Gianato" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction of 15 counts of unlawfully distributing controlled substances. Defendant's charges stemmed from his operation of a medical practice and his opioid prescription-writing practices.The Fourth Circuit agreed with defendant that, under United States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876 (4th Cir. 1994) and Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), the district court improperly admitted the testimony of patients whose treatment by defendant was not the basis for any of the charges in the indictment. The court held that the testimony was not necessary to complete the story of the charged offenses under Kennedy, and was not otherwise admissible under Rule 404(b). Furthermore, because the government did not carry its burden of establishing that this error was harmless, the court vacated defendant's conviction and remanded for a new trial. View "United States v. Brizuela" on Justia Law

In explaining defendant's original sentence, the district court's order denying defendant's 18 U.S.C. 3582 motion referred to the government's motion under USSG 5K1.1 based on defendant's substantial assistance.The Fourth Circuit circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to seal the order referring to defendant's assistance, because it was necessary to protect defendant from harm. In this case, defendant's request implicates the public's interest in accessing judicial records, the government's interest in protecting cooperating defendants in federal custody, and defendant's interest in his own safety. Furthermore, the district court ignored facts showing that defendant faces a heightened risk of harm in prison and failed to consider the increased risks that all government cooperators now face due to the advent of electronic filing and the use of the internet to identify cooperators. View "United States v. Doe" on Justia Law

On appeal, defendant contends that the delay of over six years between the date of his federal charge and the date of his guilty plea violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Defendant also contends that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable.The Fourth Circuit held that defendant's speedy trial argument is foreclosed by his guilty plea and, in any event, failed on the merits. In this case, defendant did not know of the pending federal charge until he was arrested and thus he did not experience oppressive pretrial incarceration or anxiety during the delay. Nor does defendant assert that the delay impaired his ability to prepare a defense. Furthermore, defendant failed to show prejudice. The court also held that defendant's sentence is procedurally reasonable where the district court acted within its discretion when it heard defendant's arguments and varied downward, albeit not as far as defendant would have liked. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Macias Lozano" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of methamphetamine, along with simple possession of a smaller quantity. The court agreed with defendant that the district court erred in permitting the government to deviate from the order of closing arguments prescribed in Rule 29.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court explained that the district court's decision to allow the government to waive its initial closing argument—yet retain the opportunity to rebut defendant's—violates the letter and spirit of that rule, inasmuch as it impairs a defendant's ability to rebut the government's arguments in the prescribed manner. However, the court held that this error did not prejudice defendant in light of the overwhelming evidence supporting the verdict. Furthermore, the court found no error with respect to defendant's remaining claims. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging Charleston's Tour Guide Licensing Ordinance, which requires that a prospective tour guide must obtain a license by passing a 200 question written examination on the city's history, architecture, and historic preservation efforts. The district court declared the Ordinance unconstitutional.The Fourth Circuit affirmed and held that, although the city has a significant interest in protecting its tourism industry, the Ordinance failed intermediate scrutiny because it is not narrowly tailored to serve the city's interest. Because the city failed to provide evidence that it attempted to use less intrusive tools readily available to it or that it ever seriously considered different methods that other jurisdictions have found effective, the court held that the city has not established that the Ordinance is narrowly tailored. Therefore, the district court correctly declared the Ordinance unconstitutional. View "Billups v. City of Charleston" on Justia Law