Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Advantage Health filed suit, alleging that HHS's continuing recoupment of overpayments before completion of the severely delayed administrative process was denying it procedural due process. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, enjoining HHS from withholding Medicare payments to Advantage Health to effectuate recoupment of any alleged overpayments.The Fourth Circuit held that the injunction entered in this collateral proceeding, which prohibits HHS from recouping overpayments in accordance with applicable law, was inappropriately entered because the delay of which Advantage Health complains could have been and still can be avoided by bypassing an ALJ hearing and obtaining judicial review on a relatively expeditious basis, as Congress has provided. Therefore, this administrative review process did not deny Advantage Health procedural due process and thus Advantage Health has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. View "Accident, Injury and Rehabilitation, PC v. Azar" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for sex trafficking and related crimes, holding that the warrantless forensic searches of defendant's digital devices did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights.Where a search at the border is so intrusive as to require some level of individualized suspicion, the object of that suspicion must bear some nexus to the purposes of the border search exception in order for the exception to apply. The court agreed with defendant that the border search exception did not extend to the challenged searches, because no such nexus existed here. However, the court held that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule barred suppression. In this case, law enforcement relied on an established and uniform body of precedent allowing warrantless border searches of digital devices at the time of the search. View "United States v. Aigbekaen" on Justia Law

All defendants who are serving sentences for violations of 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and (B)(iii), and who are not excluded pursuant to the expressed limitations in Section 404(c) of the First Step Act, are eligible to move for relief under that Act. District courts then "may," at their discretion, "impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed."The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to reduce his sentence under the First Step Act. The court held that 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(B) is the appropriate vehicle for a First Step Act motion, and eligibility under the Act turns on the proper interpretation of a "covered offense." The court agreed with defendant and adopted his understanding that he is eligible to seek relief under the Act because, "before August 30, 2010," he "committed" a "violation" of 21 U.S.C. 841(a) and (b)(1)(B)(iii), and "the statutory penalties" for that statute "were modified by" Section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act. Accordingly, the court remanded for the district court to consider defendant's motion. View "United States v. Wirsing" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit vacated the judgment denying defendant's motion to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(B), as authorized by the First Step Act of 2018. The court held that the district court erred in determining that defendant was statutorily ineligible for a sentence reduction under the Act, because he had finished serving his original term of imprisonment and was currently serving a term of imprisonment for revocation of supervised release. Accordingly, the court remanded for the district court to consider defendant's motion in the first instance. View "United States v. Venable" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of defendant's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion challenging his sentence as no longer valid. The court held that defendant's predicate conviction for causing bodily injury to a witness under 18 U.S.C. 1513(b)(1) is categorically a violent Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) felony. In this case, defendant's conviction required knowing conduct that causes bodily injury to another, which categorically involved the use of violent force sufficient to bring it within the ACCA's elements clause. View "United States v. Allred" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress various ammunition and ammunition components seized from his residence pursuant to a search warrant.The court held that the search warrant was supported by probable cause. In this case, the warrant affidavit provided the magistrate with a substantial basis to conclude that defendant made terrorist threats within the meaning of W. Va. Code 61-6-24, and that evidence of this crime would be found in his home. The court also held that the alleged omissions in the warrant affidavit were immaterial to the magistrate's probable cause determination. In this case, defendant failed to demonstrate that the omitted statements were material to the magistrate's probable cause determination and thus the district court did not err in denying defendant's request for a Franks hearing. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Defendants Taylor and Hersl, appealed their convictions and sentences for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy and substantive acts of RICO, as well as Hobbs Act robbery. Defendants' convictions stemmed from, among other things, their participation, while employed as police officers who were members of the Gun Trace Task Force (GTTF), in a conspiracy to rob citizens in the course of their police service.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the record was sufficient to convict defendant of the charges; the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendants' pretrial motion in limine to prohibit the government and its witnesses from using the term "robbery" during trial and by overruling their subsequent objection; the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendants' motion for a mistrial after an outburst by a government witness and opting, instead, to strike the testimony and give the jury a curative instruction; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to dismiss the indictment; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants' motion for a new trial; the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant defendants a downward departure; and defendants' sentences were substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's declaratory judgment in favor of the insurer, holding that the district court abused its discretion when it assumed jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act. In this case, without addressing the decision to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction, the district court reached the merits despite a thin and ambiguous record. The court held that the district court created both a substantial question about whether Article III jurisdiction existed and a serious potential to interfere with ongoing state proceedings. Therefore, the court remanded with instructions to dismiss the action without prejudice. View "Trustgard Insurance Co. v. Collins" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendant, alleging unlawful entry and use of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In this case, police officers used a battering ram to enter plaintiff's dwelling to execute a warrant. The officers did not announce their presence before using the battering ram, and plaintiff responded by pulling out a gun. Although plaintiff never discharged the gun, 29 shots were fired at him and he was struck nine times.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity with respect to the excessive force claim, holding that disputes of material fact preclude an award of summary judgment. The court held that a reasonable jury could find under the facts presented that plaintiff did not pose a threat to the officers justifying the use of deadly force. Furthermore, in light of Cooper v. Sheehan, 735 F.3d 153 (4th Cir. 2013), the court held that plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force was clearly established at the time the incident occurred. View "Betton v. Belue" on Justia Law

A law firm challenged the government's use of a "Filter Team" — created ex parte by a magistrate judge in the District of Maryland and comprised of federal agents and prosecutors — to inspect privileged attorney-client materials. The district court denied the law firm's request to enjoin the Filter Team's review of seized materials.The Fourth Circuit held that the use of the Filter Team was improper because the Team's creation inappropriately assigned judicial functions to the executive branch, the Team was approved in ex parte proceedings prior to the search and seizures, and the use of the Team contravened foundational principles that protect attorney-client relationships. Therefore, the court held that injunctive relief was warranted and the district court abused its discretion by failing to enjoin the Filter Team's review of the materials. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Under Seal" on Justia Law