Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of South Carolina (ACLU-SC) challenged the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) policy that prohibits personal contact interviews with inmates. ACLU-SC sought to record and publish interviews with death row inmate Marion Bowman, Jr., and another inmate, Sofia Cano, for a series of audio podcasts and written pieces. The SCDC policy, however, forbids such interviews. ACLU-SC filed a lawsuit alleging that the policy violates the First Amendment both facially and as applied to its planned interviews.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina dismissed ACLU-SC’s complaint for failure to state a claim and denied its request for a preliminary injunction. The district court found that ACLU-SC has no First Amendment right to access prison inmates to conduct interviews for publication. The court relied on Supreme Court precedents that reject a claimed right to access and interview inmates, concluding that the Constitution does not mandate a right of access to government information or sources of information within the government’s control.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Fourth Circuit held that ACLU-SC has no First Amendment right to interview and record SCDC inmates, as the policy does not place the press in any less advantageous position than the public generally. The court also rejected ACLU-SC’s facial challenge to the policy, finding that the policy does not prohibit a substantial amount of protected speech relative to its plainly legitimate sweep. The court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed ACLU-SC’s complaint and did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction. View "American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of South Carolina v. Stirling" on Justia Law

The case involves Andris Pukke, Peter Baker, and John Usher, who were found liable for violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Telemarketing Sales Rule, and a permanent injunction from a prior fraud case. They were involved in a real estate scam, selling lots in a development called "Sanctuary Belize" through deceptive practices. The district court issued an equitable monetary judgment of $120.2 million for consumer redress, imposed an asset freeze, and appointed a receiver.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland found the defendants liable after a bench trial and issued permanent injunctions against them. The court also held them in contempt for violating a prior judgment in a related case, ordering them to pay the same $120.2 million in consumer redress. The defendants appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, except for vacating the monetary judgment to the extent it relied on FTC Act Section 13(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision to maintain the receivership and asset freeze. The court held that the receivership and asset freeze were necessary to effectuate the injunctive relief and ensure that the defendants did not continue to profit from their deceptive practices. The court also found that the contempt judgment supported maintaining the receivership and asset freeze until the judgment was satisfied. The court emphasized the defendants' history of deceptive conduct and the need for a professional receiver to manage and distribute the assets to defrauded consumers. The judgment was affirmed. View "Federal Trade Commission v. Pukke" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case are retail pet stores, a dog broker, and a dog breeder who want to sell dogs through physical retail stores in Maryland. However, a Maryland law restricts their ability to do so. The plaintiffs sued, alleging that the Maryland statute is preempted by the federal Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, concluding that they failed to state plausible claims. The plaintiffs then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the AWA does not preempt the Maryland statute because the AWA expressly contemplates state and local regulation on the same subject. The court also found that the Maryland statute does not pose an impermissible obstacle to achieving the purposes and objectives of the AWA.Regarding the Commerce Clause claims, the court held that the Maryland statute does not discriminate against interstate commerce in purpose or effect. The statute applies equally to in-state and out-of-state breeders and brokers, and it does not prohibit the flow of interstate goods or place added costs upon them. The court also found that the statute does not violate the Pike balancing test because the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that the statute imposes a substantial burden on interstate commerce that is clearly excessive in relation to its putative local benefits.In conclusion, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint, holding that the Maryland statute is not preempted by the AWA and does not violate the Commerce Clause. View "Just Puppies, Inc. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Tati Abu King and Toni Heath Johnson were unable to register to vote in Virginia due to felony convictions. King was convicted of felony drug possession in 2018, and Johnson was convicted of multiple felonies, including drug possession, in 2021. Virginia's constitution disenfranchises individuals convicted of felonies unless their civil rights are restored by the Governor or other appropriate authority. King and Johnson argued that this disenfranchisement violated the Virginia Readmission Act, a federal statute from 1870, which they claimed restricted Virginia from amending its constitution to disenfranchise individuals for crimes that were not felonies at common law in 1870.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed three of the four counts in the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim but allowed one count based on the Virginia Readmission Act to proceed. The defendants, including various state election officials and the Governor of Virginia, moved to dismiss the complaint on sovereign immunity grounds, which the district court rejected.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the plaintiffs' claim met the requirements of the Ex parte Young doctrine, which allows suits for prospective relief against state officials to prevent ongoing violations of federal law. The court affirmed the district court's decision to allow the claim to proceed against most defendants but reversed the decision regarding the Governor of Virginia and the Secretary of the Commonwealth, finding that they lacked enforcement responsibility for the challenged state action. The court concluded that the Governor and Secretary must be dismissed from the case on sovereign immunity grounds. The district court's order was thus affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "King v. Youngkin" on Justia Law

Stanley Lubkin pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(a), and 924(e). In his plea agreement, Lubkin waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence in exchange for several concessions from the government, including the dismissal of additional charges and a recommendation against state prosecution. The plea agreement and plea colloquy informed Lubkin that he could be sentenced as an armed career criminal, which would entail a mandatory minimum of 15 years and a maximum of life in prison. The district court sentenced him to 15 years as an armed career criminal.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina accepted Lubkin's guilty plea after a thorough plea colloquy, ensuring that he understood the charges, potential penalties, and the appeal waiver. The court later sentenced him to 15 years in prison, finding that his prior convictions qualified him as an armed career criminal under the ACCA. Lubkin appealed, arguing that the court erred in classifying him as an armed career criminal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and dismissed the appeal. The court held that Lubkin's appeal waiver was valid and enforceable, as it was made knowingly and voluntarily. The court found that Lubkin's argument fell within the scope of the waiver, and no exceptions applied. The court emphasized that enforcing the waiver preserved the value of plea agreements and the benefits of the plea system, such as speed, economy, and finality. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the district court's sentence. View "United States v. Lubkin" on Justia Law

Ashleigh Gelin died by suicide in November 2013 while incarcerated at the Baltimore County Detention Center. Her parents, Edward and Deborah Gelin, sued Baltimore County and several correctional officers, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and Maryland common law. They claimed the officers showed deliberate indifference to Ashleigh's safety and were grossly negligent.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland partially granted and partially denied the County's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court found that the complaint did not properly allege deliberate indifference to Ashleigh's mental health needs but did plausibly allege indifference to her physical safety. The court held that the officers could not claim qualified immunity or Maryland common-law public official immunity and denied Baltimore County's claim of governmental immunity. The County's subsequent motion for reconsideration was partially addressed, but the court did not rule on whether the officers could assert public official immunity against the negligence claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the County's appeal was premature because the district court had not yet ruled on all issues raised in the County's motion for reconsideration. Specifically, the district court had not decided whether the officers could assert public official immunity against the negligence claims. As a result, the Fourth Circuit held the appeal in abeyance, pending the district court's resolution of the remaining issue. The court directed the parties to inform it once the district court had made a final ruling on the pending issue. View "Gelin v. Baltimore County" on Justia Law

Robert Keshaun Turner pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm after police seized a gun from a car in which he was sitting. Turner challenged the denial of his motion to suppress the gun on Fourth Amendment grounds, arguing that the search was unlawful. He also contended that inconsistencies between the supervised-release conditions announced at his sentencing and those in his written judgment constituted an error.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina denied Turner’s motion to suppress, holding that the search of the car was a lawful search incident to arrest under Arizona v. Gant. The court found that it was reasonable to believe the vehicle contained evidence of the crime of arrest. Turner then pleaded guilty but reserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling. At sentencing, the district court adopted a Sentencing Guidelines advisory range of 46 to 57 months, based on an offense level of 19 and seven criminal history points, placing Turner in criminal history category IV. Turner was sentenced to 57 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress, agreeing that the search was justified under Gant. The court found no Fourth Amendment violation. However, the court vacated Turner’s sentence due to a miscalculation of his criminal history score, which resulted in an incorrect advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. The court remanded the case for resentencing under the correct range. The court also found no material discrepancy between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment regarding the supervised-release conditions, thus no error under United States v. Rogers. View "United States v. Turner" on Justia Law

R.A. filed a lawsuit against her son G.A.'s special education teacher, Robin Johnson, and several school officials, alleging that Johnson mistreated G.A. during the first and second grades. The complaint claimed that Johnson subjected G.A. to physical and emotional abuse and that the school officials negligently failed to intervene despite knowing about the abuse. The school officials moved to dismiss the negligence claims, arguing they were protected by public official immunity. The district court denied the motion, and the school officials filed an interlocutory appeal.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina initially denied the school officials' motion to dismiss the state law claims, leading to an appeal. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals previously ruled that the school officials were entitled to public official immunity and that the state law claims against them should be dismissed. Despite this, the district court allowed R.A. to file an amended complaint with additional details from new evidence, which the school officials again moved to dismiss. The district court denied this motion, interpreting the appellate mandate as allowing dismissal without prejudice.The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case again and held that the district court violated the mandate rule by not dismissing the claims with prejudice as instructed. The appellate court emphasized that its prior decision required dismissal with prejudice and that the district court's interpretation was incorrect. The court reiterated that the mandate rule requires lower courts to follow the appellate court's instructions precisely and that no exceptions to the mandate rule applied in this case. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, reaffirming that the state law claims against the school officials must be dismissed with prejudice. View "R.A. v. McClenahan" on Justia Law

Mohamed Lamine Kouyate, a 36-year-old native and citizen of Guinea, entered the United States on a tourist visa in 2014 due to concerns about political unrest in Guinea. He overstayed his visa and was later convicted in Maryland for identity fraud involving over $100,000, resulting in a 15-year prison sentence. Following his release on parole, the Department of Homeland Security charged him with removability for overstaying his visa. Kouyate applied for asylum, withholding of removal under the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming he would be persecuted or tortured if returned to Guinea due to his father's political notoriety.An immigration judge (IJ) denied Kouyate's applications, ruling that his identity fraud conviction constituted a "particularly serious crime," making him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal under the INA and CAT. The IJ also denied his application for deferral of removal under the CAT, finding insufficient evidence that he would likely be tortured if returned to Guinea. The IJ noted that the political climate in Guinea had changed, and Kouyate's fears were speculative and based on generalized concerns of violence.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Kouyate's appeal, deeming his challenge to the IJ's particularly serious crime ruling waived and affirming the IJ's denial of deferral of removal under the CAT. The BIA agreed with the IJ's assessment that Kouyate's fears were speculative and not supported by sufficient evidence of a particularized risk of torture.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed both the IJ's and BIA's decisions, finding no reversible error. The court upheld the BIA's determination that Kouyate had not exhausted his administrative remedies regarding the particularly serious crime ruling and affirmed the denial of deferral of removal under the CAT, concluding that substantial evidence supported the BIA's decision. The petition for review was denied. View "Kouyate v. Garland" on Justia Law

Stephen Bullis was convicted of six federal crimes, including two counts of using a firearm during and in relation to other crimes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). After serving twenty-three years in prison, the United States Supreme Court struck down the “residual clause” of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) as unconstitutional. This led the district court to set aside Bullis’s two Section 924(c) convictions and resentence him on the remaining four counts. Bullis argued that the resentencing violated his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause because he had fully served his sentence on these counts at the time of the resentencing.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina initially sentenced Bullis to 235 months of imprisonment on each of Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5, all to run concurrently. On Count 3, Bullis was sentenced to 360 months, and on Count 6, he received a lifetime sentence, both to run consecutively to the 235-month concurrent sentences. After the Supreme Court’s ruling, the district court vacated Counts 3 and 6 and resentenced Bullis to 450 months on Count 2 and 240 months on Counts 1, 3, and 5, all to run concurrently.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Bullis’s resentencing did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because his sentences for Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5 were part of a consecutive sentence package that had not been fully served. However, the court found that the district court committed reversible errors by imposing a special condition of supervised release that differed materially from the court’s oral pronouncement and by failing to incorporate clearly the Standard Conditions of Supervision as adopted in the Eastern District of North Carolina. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the case for resentencing. View "US v. Bullis" on Justia Law