Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Virginia's Incumbent Protection Act, Va. Code Ann. 24.2-509(B), violates the First Amendment of the Constitution. Subsection 24.2-509(B) limits the broad authority recognized by subsection A, which empowers the duly constituted authorities of the state and local parties to determine the method by which a party nomination shall be made.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to permanently enjoin enforcement of the entire Act. The court agreed with the district court's finding that the fourth sentence of the Act, which protects the nomination prerogatives of incumbent members of Congress among others, violated the First Amendment because it imposed a severe burden on the associational rights of Virginia's political parties and the Commonwealth has been unable to show that it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.The court also agreed with the district court's decision to enjoin the Act's second and third sentences, which protect the nomination prerogatives of incumbent members of the General Assembly. The court held that the Committee had standing to challenge these provisions and that they were, if anything, even more offensive to the First Amendment than the fourth sentence. View "6th Congressional District Republican Committee v. Alcorn" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's 240 month sentence for willfully shooting and killing the victim while he was unarmed and fleeing arrest. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in making its factual findings and correctly determined, based on those findings, that second-degree murder was the proper cross-reference. In this case, the district court did not reversibly err by inferring defendant's malice from the facts it found credible and by determining that defendant's malice was not negated by sudden quarrel or heat of passion. The court also held that the district court did not plainly err by applying a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstructing justice. View "United States v. Slager" on Justia Law

South Carolina filed suit to enjoin the United States and others from terminating the construction of a mixed-oxide fuel nuclear processing facility located in the state. The Fourth Circuit held that South Carolina failed to establish standing to pursue its claims and therefore vacated the preliminary injunction imposed by the district court. In this case, South Carolina's alleged injury -- becoming the permanent repository of weapons-grade plutonium -- was too speculative to give rise to a sufficient concrete injury in fact. The court also held that South Carolina's claims failed on ripeness grounds where numerous contingent future events must occur before South Carolina becomes the permanent repository of the nuclear material. View "South Carolina v. United States" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's determination that plaintiff was required to wait longer than 180 days to commence a civil action under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act after amending his initial administrative complaint before the relevant agency. The court held that the text of Title VII, as well as the legislative context and purpose, plainly states that a claimant may commence a civil action 180 days from "the filing of the initial charge." Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Stewart v. Iancu" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment holding that the statute of limitations barred plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. The court explained that Congress did not provide fixed timing rules in section 1983 or its companion provision, section 1988. Rather, Congress specified that gaps in section 1983 should be filled by state law, as long as that law is not inconsistent with federal law. Because Virginia lacks a generally applicable statute that pauses limitations to accommodate administrative exhaustion requirements, plaintiff sought to borrow a tolling provision in the Virginia Tort Claims Act (VTCA).The court held that the VTCA did not save plaintiff's claims because it operates on a tighter schedule than section 1983 and does not govern suits against state employees. Furthermore, plaintiff could not invoke equitable estoppel under Virginia law. However, the court held that, with no Virginia rule available to toll the limitations period, refusal to do so during a prisoner's mandatory exhaustion period is inconsistent with federal law and the court could not apply it here. Therefore, the court applied federal equitable tolling principles and held that plaintiff's section 1983 complaint was timely because it was filed within two years of the date he exhausted his administrative remedies required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. View "Battle v. Ledford" on Justia Law

Relator brought a qui tam action against four student loan corporations, including PHEAA, alleging that they violated the False Claims Act (FCA) by defrauding the Department of Education. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the jury's unanimous verdict in favor of PHEAA, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding a 2004–2007 Performance Audit as irrelevant; plaintiff failed to preserve his challenge to the failure to give his proposed jury instructions; and the district court did not plainly err in instructing the jury. View "United States ex rel. Oberg v. Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment concluding that defendant, chair of the Loudoun County Board of Supervisors, violated the First Amendment rights of one of her constituents, Brian Davison, when she banned Davison from the "Chair Phyllis J. Randall" Facebook page she administered. The court held that Davison had standing because she adduced facts establishing an injury in fact sufficient to justify the prospective declaratory relief awarded by the district court; considering the totality of these circumstances, the district court correctly held that defendant acted under color of state law in banning Davison from the Chair's Facebook Page; and the interactive component of the Chair's Facebook Page constituted a public forum, and defendant engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination when she banned Davison's page from that forum. In regard to Davison's cross-appeal, the court rejected his assertion that the district court reversely erred by dismissing his claim against defendant in her official capacity and by denying his motion to amend. View "Davison v. Randall" on Justia Law

After defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, the district court sentenced him to 120 months in prison. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and held that the district court did not err in declining to run its sentence concurrently with the anticipated state sentence. The district court found that defendant's offense conduct was extremely serious, and explained that it would not order its sentence to run concurrently with the anticipated state sentence in light of this seriousness, remarking that a lengthy term of imprisonment was necessary in this case. View "United States v. Lynn" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen and native of El Salvador, challenged the BIA's dismissal of his appeal of the IJ's denial of his application for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court assumed, without deciding, that petitioner was a member of a particular social group comprised of his disabled father's immediate family members and that he suffered past persecution in El Salvador. Even with that assumption, the court held that petitioner failed to establish the requisite nexus between any persecution he suffered and his relation to his disabled father. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Cortez-Mendez v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

The offense of New York first-degree robbery, in violation of New York Penal Law 160.15, qualifies as a crime of violence for purposes of the USSG 4B1.1 career offender enhancement. The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence as a career offender and held that New York statutory robbery, irrespective of the degree of the offense, is a crime of violence, because it necessarily involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. View "United States v. Hammond" on Justia Law