Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Tairou was born in Benin in 1977. Although Tairou married a woman, he testified that in 2007, he “figured out [he] was a homosexual” and entered into a relationship with a man. Despite the general secrecy surrounding their relationship, the men were openly affectionate in front of Tairou’s cousin, who took pictures. Tairou was subsequently confronted by a group of approximately 40 men, including his uncles, cousins, ministers from the mosque, and other villagers. The crowd threatened and harassed him for five hours. In Tairou’s declaration attached to his asylum application, he asserted that several people said that he “should die,” and some "outright threatened to kill [him].” A week later, Tairou’s cousins forced their way into his home and beat him, threatening to “kill [him], to shame [him] publicly again,” and to harm his wife and children. Tairou’s son sustained head and arm injuries trying to protect his father. The Fourth Circuit remanded a removal order. The BIA erred in finding that Tairou was not subjected to past persecution. Binding precedent explicitly holds that a threat of death constitutes persecution. Tairou established that he was subjected to past persecution; the BIA must consider whether, in light of Tairou’s demonstrated past persecution, he has a well-founded fear of future persecution. View "Tairou v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

In 2004, after pleading guilty to selling crack cocaine to a government informant, Lester was sentenced to almost 22 years in prison because he was designated a career offender under the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines. This enhancement depended on a past conviction for a “crime of violence,” Lester’s 1990 Georgia conviction for walkaway escape. In 2005, the Supreme Court stripped the Sentencing Guidelines of legal force and made them purely advisory; in 2009, the Court ruled that the generic crime of failing to report to a prison was not a crime of violence. Lester’s sentence should have been up to 11 years shorter. Lester sought habeas corpus relief. The district court denied his petition. The Fourth Circuit vacated, noting that its 2018 decision in United States v. Wheeler permits Lester’s challenge although Lester had already filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255. In limited circumstances, courts, including the Fourth Circuit, allow a prisoner otherwise unable to file a second or successive section 2255 petition to seek relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241. A sentencing error “need not result in a sentence that exceeds statutory limits in order to be a fundamental defect.” Lester’s case must be considered on the merits. View "Lester v. Flournoy" on Justia Law

In 2004-2006, Pulte purchased 540 acres of Clarksburg land, then governed by the 1994 Master Plan, which divided development into four stages. In the fourth stage, the area containing Pulte’s land was to be developed into residential communities. Pulte’s land was designated as a receiving property for Transferable Development Rights (TDRs) and was zoned for one-acre lots. Pulte could increase the allowable density to two units per acre by purchasing TDRs from agricultural properties in other Montgomery County areas, which would restrict future development of the agricultural property. Pulte invested 12 million dollars in TDRs. Under the Plan, there were prerequisites to Stage 4 development. All had occurred by 2009. The Plan stated that Stage 4 developments can proceed once public agencies and the developer have complied with all “implementing mechanisms,” which included Water and Sewer Plan amendments. Pulte submitted its Water and Sewer Request to the County and the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission in 2009, with a $10,000 filing fee. The County never acted on Pulte’s application. In 2012, Pulte submitted a Pre-Application Concept Plan to the Commission, which rejected the plan. The agencies refused to meet and stopped responding to Pulte’s communications but reopened the Plan to study the watershed in which Pulte’s land is located and ultimately imposed regulatory changes that severely reduced the number of dwellings Pulte could build and imposed additional costly burdens. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Pulte’s due process, equal protection, and regulatory taking claims, stating that federal courts are not the appropriate forum to challenge local land use determinations. Pulte had no constitutional property interest in developing its land as it had contemplated, and local authorities had a plausible, rational basis for their actions. View "Pulte Home Corp. v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law

A Newport News police officer pulled over Brown’s car for a traffic violation; he smelled alcohol and observed that Brown had slurred speech. A preliminary breath test measured a blood alcohol content of approximately 0.23, over the legal limit for driving in Virginia. Officers informed Brown that he was under arrest and instructed him to put his hands behind his back. Brown attempted to flee. Officers pursued him on foot, seized and handcuffed him, then recovered a firearm that had fallen from Brown’s pants leg. Officers searched the vehicle and recovered bags containing 3.59 grams of cocaine. Brown pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). A PSR gave Brown three criminal history points for a 2008 state conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine and added two points under USSG 4A1.1(d) because Brown committed the instant offense while “under a criminal justice sentence.” Brown was sentenced to 10 years’ incarceration for the 2008 conviction, with eight years and nine months suspended, conditioned on good behavior for 10 years upon release. The PSR calculated a guidelines range of 57-71 months. The Fourth Circuit affirmed a 60-month sentence, agreeing that a period of good behavior qualifies as being under a criminal justice sentence. Although Brown wasn’t under active supervision, he was subject to the authority of the state court, which could revoke the suspended sentence if Brown violated the condition. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, who arbitrated a claim that arose under a federal statute, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (known as the Stored Communications Act), 18 U.S.C. 2701, sought to vacate or modify the arbitration award. The plaintiff filed a motion in the district court; for jurisdiction, he invoked 28 U.S.C. 1331 (federal-question jurisdiction) and 1332 (diversity jurisdiction). The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 10-11, which provides for the enforceability of arbitration agreements and specifies procedures for conducting arbitrations and enforcing arbitration awards, does not provide an independent jurisdictional basis for disputes under the Act. The Fourth Circuit vacated the dismissal of the action, stating that the better approach for determining subject-matter jurisdiction over section 10 and 11 motions is to look to the nature of the underlying claim in dispute, as is done with respect to section 4 petitions to compel arbitration. If the underlying claim is one that otherwise could be litigated in federal court, the motion can likewise be resolved in federal court. The district court had federal-question jurisdiction because the plaintiff’s underlying claim arose under federal law. View "McCormick v. America Online, Inc." on Justia Law

Allen pleaded guilty to the unlawful possession of firearms by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). His PSR reported that, in 2009, Allen was convicted of using a communication facility to facilitate the crime of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 843(b), and, in 2007, Allen was convicted of two North Carolina misdemeanors--possession of marijuana in an amount less than or equal to one-half ounce, and second-degree trespass. Those misdemeanor convictions were consolidated into one judgment for sentencing. The district court increased Allen’s base offense level under USSG 2K2.1(a)(2), based on his two prior felony convictions of “controlled substance offenses,” including his Section 843(b) conviction; added one point to Allen's criminal history score under USSG 4A1.1(c) based on the North Carolina consolidated judgment; determined that Allen’s Guidelines range was 84-105 months, varied downward, and imposed a sentence of 77 months’ imprisonment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Section 843(b) commentary states that a Section 843(b) conviction is a “controlled substance offense” if the “underlying offense” is a “controlled substance offense.” Allen’s 2009 judgment shows that he used a communication facility to facilitate the underlying offense of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, which is a “controlled substance offense.” The district court properly added one criminal history point for the North Carolina consolidated judgment. View "United States v. Allen" on Justia Law

Ott worked for Maryland’s Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS). In 2010, she learned that a pediatrician had molested her daughter, causing Ott to develop PTSD and severe anxiety. She took medical leave and transferred to a different location. Ott says that her co-worker harassed Ott about her daughter and Ott’s mental health for a year and that DPSCS ignored the harassment. Ott’s performance deteriorated. DPSCS forced her to resign in March 2014. While still employed, Ott filed an EEOC discrimination charge, which proceeded slowly; eventually, the agency found reasonable cause for Ott’s claims and referred them to the Department of Justice, which issued a right to sue notice in July 2016. Ott filed suit in October 2016, asserting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her Rehabilitation Act claims as untimely. Because the Rehabilitation Act does not contain a limitations period, courts borrow the time limit from the most analogous state law claim and have previously applied Maryland’s three-year general civil case limitation. After the Fourth Circuit last addressed the issue, Maryland amended its Fair Employment Practices Act (MFEPA) to align more closely with the Rehabilitation Act so that the MFEPA qualifies as the most analogous Maryland law. The MFEPA’s two-year statute of limitations applies and bars Ott’s claims. Ott did not meet the exacting standard for invoking the doctrine of equitable tolling. View "Ott v. Maryland Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

IPC hired Ray in 2002. McDowell was Ray’s supervisor. In 2013, Ray was transferred to the shipping department where she reported to Owens and to McDowell when Owens was not present. In 2003, McDowell started acting inappropriately toward Ray, including asking Ray to engage in sexual activity with him. On one occasion, McDowell grabbed Ray’s thigh. In 2013, Ray reported McDowell’s behavior to Owens and to supervisor, Smith. Both offered to report Ray’s allegations. Ray declined out of fear of retaliation, but frequently called Owens requesting to leave work because of McDowell’s conduct. Under IPC’s policy, when a supervisor is notified of potential harassment, the supervisor is required to report that allegation. Neither supervisor formally reported any of Ray’s complaints. In 2014, McDowell learned that Ray had complained and confronted Ray, who denied making any complaints. Around the same time, McDowell informed Ray that she could no longer perform voluntary overtime work, which represented a significant portion of her income. Other operators still were allowed to work voluntary overtime. Ray reported McDowell’s conduct to IPC’s human resources department. Investigators obtained evidence of the harassment from other employees and concluded that McDowell was lying but IPC did not discipline McDowell. Ray complained about McDowell twice more; IPC did not discipline McDowell, but instructed him to stop “manually adjust[ing] the line.” Ray sued, alleging hostile work environment and retaliation, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Fourth Circuit vacated summary judgment that had been entered in favor of IPC, finding genuine issues of material fact on both claims. View "Ray v. International Paper Co." on Justia Law

Lawlor worked at a Fairfax County apartment complex and had access to keys to each apartment. On September 24, 2008, Lawlor consumed alcohol and a large amount of crack cocaine and sexually assaulted, bludgeoned, and killed a tenant in that complex, Genevieve Orange. A Virginia state court sentenced Lawlor to death; the sentencing jury found that there was a probability Lawlor “would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society,” Va. Code 19.2–264.4.C. Lawlor exhausted state court direct appeal and post-conviction remedies then sought review of his death sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court dismissed his petition. The Fourth Circuit reversed. The state court excluded specialized and relevant testimony of a qualified witness who would have explained that Lawlor “represents a very low risk for committing acts of violence while incarcerated,” where the jury’s only choices were life in prison without parole or death. That ruling was an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent that “evidence that the defendant would not pose a danger if spared (but incarcerated) must be considered potentially mitigating,” and “such evidence may not be excluded from the sentencer’s consideration.” The error had a substantial and injurious effect. View "Lawlor v. Zook" on Justia Law

The 42-inch diameter natural gas Mountain Valley Pipeline proposes to run 304 miles through Virginia and West Virginia, In the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Huntington District, the Pipeline and related roads will cross 591 federal water bodies, including four major rivers three of which are navigable-in-fact rivers regulated by the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. 403. Because construction will involve the discharge of fill material into federal waters, the Clean Water Act requires clearance from the Corps, 33 U.S.C. 1344(a). The Act provides for individual permits or “interested parties can try to fit their proposed activity within the scope of an existing general permit,” in this case Clean Water Act Nationwide Permit (NWP) 12, “which acts as a standing authorization for developers to undertake an entire category of activities deemed to create only minimal environmental impact.” The Corps verified that the Pipeline can proceed under NWP 12 rather than an individual permit. The Fourth Circuit vacated, holding that the Corps lacked statutory authority to substitute its own special condition for a different special condition imposed by West Virginia as part of its certification of NWP 12. Without completion of the notice-and-comment procedures required by the Act, a state cannot waive a special condition previously imposed as part of its certification of a nationwide permit. West Virginia did not follow federally-mandated notice-and-comment procedures in waiving another special condition imposed as part of its certification of NWP 12. View "Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law