Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Fourth Circuit granted the petition for review of an order of removal after the BIA determined that the crime petitioner pleaded guilty to, sexual solicitation of a minor in Maryland, was a crime involving moral turpitude. The court explained that, under Maryland law, sexual solicitation of a minor does not require that the perpetrator know the victim’s age. Under BIA precedent, a sexual offense against a child categorically involved moral turpitude only if the perpetrator knew or should have known that the victim was a minor. In this case, the court held that the BIA failed to explain its change in position and remanded to the BIA for further proceedings. View "Jimenez-Cedillo v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Rather than broadcasting in real time over satellite or cable, Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) stores programming on servers and delivers content digitally over a high-speed network. Sky received third-party content at its satellite substation, transcoded it, and transmitted it to NeuLion’s servers via a private line. NeuLion sent the encoded signals over the public internet to subscribers’ set-top boxes, relying on third-party internet connections. Sky wanted Discovery programming. Sky stated it would not transmit Discovery content over the public internet. Discovery’s engineer advised that while it was possible to use a closed fiber-optic network, he had “concerns that it may be going over the Internet” which could present “rights issues.” The final agreement described "a multichannel video distribution system which utilizes Internet Protocol (IP) technology to deliver video programming services over a closed and encrypted transmission path over a national fiber-optic network to a central location for subsequent distribution of such video programming services with proprietary encoding over a high-speed data connection to set-top-boxes that are secured by industry-standard encryption and conditional access technologies and are connected to Subscribers’ television sets." Discovery terminated the contract after learning Sky used the “public internet.” The court held the agreement was susceptible to competing reasonable interpretations concerning the scope of Sky’s distribution rights, examined extrinsic evidence, and found no support for Sky’s claim that the contract permitted public internet distribution. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The contract allowed Discovery to terminate at any time it became dissatisfied with Sky ’s method of distribution; Discovery did not act in bad faith. View "Sky Angel U.S., LLC v. Discovery Communications, LLC" on Justia Law

Rather than broadcasting in real time over satellite or cable, Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) stores programming on servers and delivers content digitally over a high-speed network. Sky received third-party content at its satellite substation, transcoded it, and transmitted it to NeuLion’s servers via a private line. NeuLion sent the encoded signals over the public internet to subscribers’ set-top boxes, relying on third-party internet connections. Sky wanted Discovery programming. Sky stated it would not transmit Discovery content over the public internet. Discovery’s engineer advised that while it was possible to use a closed fiber-optic network, he had “concerns that it may be going over the Internet” which could present “rights issues.” The final agreement described "a multichannel video distribution system which utilizes Internet Protocol (IP) technology to deliver video programming services over a closed and encrypted transmission path over a national fiber-optic network to a central location for subsequent distribution of such video programming services with proprietary encoding over a high-speed data connection to set-top-boxes that are secured by industry-standard encryption and conditional access technologies and are connected to Subscribers’ television sets." Discovery terminated the contract after learning Sky used the “public internet.” The court held the agreement was susceptible to competing reasonable interpretations concerning the scope of Sky’s distribution rights, examined extrinsic evidence, and found no support for Sky’s claim that the contract permitted public internet distribution. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The contract allowed Discovery to terminate at any time it became dissatisfied with Sky ’s method of distribution; Discovery did not act in bad faith. View "Sky Angel U.S., LLC v. Discovery Communications, LLC" on Justia Law

D.S. and S.P are high school students. D.S. (who is black and has learning disabilities) was charged with violating South Carolina’s Disturbing Schools Law, S.C. Code 16-17-420(A), “after becoming involved in a physical altercation which she did not initiate and in which she was the only person" injured. S.P. (who is white and suffers from disabilities) was charged with violating the Disorderly Conduct Law, S.C. Code 16-17-420(B), after she cursed at a student who had been teasing her and refused to leave as instructed. Other Plaintiffs include young black adults who were previously arrested and charged with violating the Disturbing Schools Law when they expressed concerns about police conduct and an afterschool program serving at-risk youth with two members (Latina and black girls) who were charged under the Disturbing Schools Law. The Fourth Circuit vacated the dismissal, for lack of standing, of a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging the laws as unconstitutionally vague. At least some of the plaintiffs do not rely on conjecture or speculation; they attend schools where they were previously arrested and charged under the statutes, and they do not know which of their actions at school will be interpreted to violate the statutes in the future. Plaintiffs also allege that the laws chill their exercise of free expression, forcing them to refrain from exercising their constitutional rights or risk arrest and prosecution. View "Kenny v. Wilson" on Justia Law

D.S. and S.P are high school students. D.S. (who is black and has learning disabilities) was charged with violating South Carolina’s Disturbing Schools Law, S.C. Code 16-17-420(A), “after becoming involved in a physical altercation which she did not initiate and in which she was the only person" injured. S.P. (who is white and suffers from disabilities) was charged with violating the Disorderly Conduct Law, S.C. Code 16-17-420(B), after she cursed at a student who had been teasing her and refused to leave as instructed. Other Plaintiffs include young black adults who were previously arrested and charged with violating the Disturbing Schools Law when they expressed concerns about police conduct and an afterschool program serving at-risk youth with two members (Latina and black girls) who were charged under the Disturbing Schools Law. The Fourth Circuit vacated the dismissal, for lack of standing, of a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging the laws as unconstitutionally vague. At least some of the plaintiffs do not rely on conjecture or speculation; they attend schools where they were previously arrested and charged under the statutes, and they do not know which of their actions at school will be interpreted to violate the statutes in the future. Plaintiffs also allege that the laws chill their exercise of free expression, forcing them to refrain from exercising their constitutional rights or risk arrest and prosecution. View "Kenny v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against UTC and Honeywell under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, alleging that the companies were vicariously liable for illegal calls made by telemarketers promoting UTC and Honeywell products. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) motion because plaintiffs failed to show that they did not have an opportunity to discover specific evidence that was essential to their opposition to summary judgment. The court also affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment because plaintiffs failed to proffer more than a scintilla of evidence to support the conclusion that UTC and Honeywell were vicariously liable for the telemarketers' alleged TCPA violations. View "Hodgin v. UTC Fire & Security Americas Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the administrator of detective David E. Abbott's estate under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the search of his person violated his Fourth Amendment right of privacy or, alternatively, his right of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff also brought a claim under 18 U.S.C. 2255(a), alleging that, as a result of the search, he was the victim of manufactured child pornography. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment as to the section 1983 claim alleging a Fourth Amendment violation because a reasonable police officer would have known that attempting to obtain a photograph of a minor child's erect penis, by ordering the child to masturbate in the presence of others, would unlawfully invade the child's right of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. The court remanded plaintiff's section 1983 claim alleging Fourth Amendment violation to the district court for further proceedings; vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim for damages under 18 U.S.C. 2255 as an alleged victim of child pornography, and remanded that claim for consideration by the district court in the first instance; and affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's remaining claims. View "Sims v. Labowitz" on Justia Law

Airgas appealed the district court's preliminary injunction prohibiting the contemplated transfer of one of its facilities to another nonunionized facility pending arbitration, to ensure that the status quo ante could be restored were the Union to prevail on the merits of the contract dispute. While Airgas's appeal was pending, the arbitrator issued a final decision in favor of the Union, the arbitration concluded, and the preliminary injunction expired by its own terms. The Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot because Airgas no longer had a legally cognizable interest in the validity of the preliminary injunction. View "International Brotherhood Local 639 v. Airgas, Inc." on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's order finding defendant to be sexually dangerous under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 18 U.S.C. 4247-4248. The court found no error in the district court's decision to credit the testimony of two experts regarding defendant's sexual dangerousness, and there was no clear error in the district court's other factual findings. The court also held that, although a mental health expert twice declined to reach the conclusion in prior evaluations that defendant was sexually dangerous, she adequately explained why defendant's conduct led her to a different conclusion and the district court did not err in relying on her opinion. View "United States v. Bell" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's order finding defendant to be sexually dangerous under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 18 U.S.C. 4247-4248. The court found no error in the district court's decision to credit the testimony of two experts regarding defendant's sexual dangerousness, and there was no clear error in the district court's other factual findings. The court also held that, although a mental health expert twice declined to reach the conclusion in prior evaluations that defendant was sexually dangerous, she adequately explained why defendant's conduct led her to a different conclusion and the district court did not err in relying on her opinion. View "United States v. Bell" on Justia Law