Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for one count of bank fraud conspiracy and two counts of aggravated identity theft. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of bank fraud conspiracy; the district court did not err in failing to conduct an in camera review to determine whether material required disclosure under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. 3500(b), or pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); the district court did not err by declining to provide defendant's requested jury instruction on accomplice testimony, and by providing the jury with a written copy of the jury instruction on aiding and abetting liability; the district court did not erroneously apply a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice, a ten-level sentencing enhancement based on the amount of loss, a two-level sentencing enhancement based on use of sophisticated means, a three-level sentencing enhancement based on his role in the offense as a manager or supervisor; and the district court did not abuse its discretion by requiring part of defendant's sentences to run consecutively. View "United States v. Savage" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for one count of bank fraud conspiracy and two counts of aggravated identity theft. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of bank fraud conspiracy; the district court did not err in failing to conduct an in camera review to determine whether material required disclosure under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. 3500(b), or pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); the district court did not err by declining to provide defendant's requested jury instruction on accomplice testimony, and by providing the jury with a written copy of the jury instruction on aiding and abetting liability; the district court did not erroneously apply a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice, a ten-level sentencing enhancement based on the amount of loss, a two-level sentencing enhancement based on use of sophisticated means, a three-level sentencing enhancement based on his role in the offense as a manager or supervisor; and the district court did not abuse its discretion by requiring part of defendant's sentences to run consecutively. View "United States v. Savage" on Justia Law

A subcontractor hired by a property owner's contractor to repair flood damage to the owner's property was not injured in its business or property by reason of a pattern of racketeering allegedly carried out by the property owner's insurance company and its independent consultants to reduce the amount paid on the property owner's insurance claims for reimbursement of the repair costs. In this case, the Fourth Circuit held that the property owner's subcontractor, Slay's Restoration, was not proximately caused by conduct of the insurance company, and Slay's Restoration therefore failed to state a plausible claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against the insurance company and its consultants upon which relief could be granted. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Slay's Restoration's complaint. View "Slay's Restoration, LLC v. Wright National Flood Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate at the Red Onion State Prison, appealed the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim that certain officials at Red Onion denied him medical treatment for serious mental and physical health needs, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The Fourth Circuit applied the continuing violation doctrine and held that plaintiff's claims were not time-barred; plaintiff sufficiently alleged deliberate indifference by certain defendants to his serious mental health needs; but he has not adequately alleged deliberate indifference to his physical health needs. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "DePaola v. Clarke" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's admittance into evidence a Facebook post where defendant quoted a rap lyric. The court held that the facts were sufficient for a jury to infer that defendant adopted the rap lyric as his own statement; the post was relevant because it indicated that defendant had carried a gun for self-protection; the risk of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the Facebook post; the government properly authenticated the post; and the post was direct evidence of the crime charged, not impermissible evidence of other acts. The court also held that even if the district court erred in admitting the post, any error was harmless. The court rejected defendant's contention that the district court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial and instead instructing the jury to continue its deliberations. View "United States v. Recio" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the personal representative of Jamycheal Mitchell, filed suit against defendant and 49 others, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law. Jamycheal died from severe malnutrition in Regional Jail while awaiting a bed in the Hospital. Defendant was the Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Behavioral Health & Developmental Services, the agency responsible for overseeing state mental health hospitals. The Fourth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss the state law claims and remanded those claims to the district court. The court also held that Eleventh Amendment absolute immunity did not bar the suit where defendant was being sued in her personal capacity and plaintiff sought to recover only from defendant, not the Commonwealth of Virginia. Finally, the court held that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity from suit on the section 1983 claims where no clearly established law dictated that housing mentally ill inmates in prisons, rather than transferring them to state mental health facilities, automatically and alone amounted to an objectively excessive risk to inmate health and safety. View "Adams v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

In a contract dispute between BAE and Korea, BAE sought a declaratory judgment that it had not breached any contractual obligation to Korea and a permanent injunction barring Korea from prosecuting its suit against BAE in Korean courts. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of BAE's requested declaration, but refused to issue a permanent injunction. The court held that the BAE-Korea agreement's permissive forum selection clause provided no basis for dismissing this action; Korea was not immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act; the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) structure shields a U.S. contractor, such as BAE, from liability; enforcement of the BAE-Korea agreement would undermine the control the United States retained in all FMS transactions over price; because the U.S. government retained control over price in an FMS transaction, a foreign state generally has no cause of action — against anyone — if the price demanded by the U.S. government increases over time; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying BAE's petition for a permanent anti-suit injunction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "BAE Systems Technology v. Republic of Korea's Defense Acquisition Program Admin." on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit vacated defendant's conviction for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and remanded for further proceedings. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence recovered from a dog sniff conducted after an already-completed traffic stop. The court held that the police officer had neither defendant's consent to extend the traffic stop nor a reasonable, articulable suspicion of ongoing criminal activity to justify doing so. Consequently, the prolonged traffic stop abridged defendant's right under the Fourth Amendment to be free of unreasonable seizures. View "United States v. Bowman" on Justia Law

Intervening defendants could not be required to pay a portion of prevailing plaintiffs' attorneys fees and costs, awarded under 42 U.S.C. 1988(b) and 52 U.S.C. 10310(e), when intervening defendants were not charged with any wrongdoing and could not be held liable for the relief that plaintiffs sought. In Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989), the Supreme Court precluded the assessment of attorneys fees and costs against intervenors who were "blameless," meaning that they were not charged as wrongdoers and legal relief could not have been obtained from them. In this racial gerrymandering case, the Fourth Circuit held that Zipes was controlling and that the Commonwealth could not be held liable for attorneys fees and costs incurred by plaintiffs in litigating against the entry of Intervening Congressmen or against Intervening Congressmen's positions. Under the traditional American rule, plaintiffs must bear those intervention-related fees. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order awarding attorneys fees and costs, remanding for reconsideration of plaintiffs' petitions for fees. View "Brat v. Personhuballah" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of post-conviction relief and remanded for resentencing. The court held that defendant's prior conviction for South Carolina involuntary manslaughter did not qualify as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e). In this case, South Carolina involuntary manslaughter sweeps more broadly than the physical force required under the ACCA's force clause. View "United States v. Middleton" on Justia Law