Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant operated an immigration services business, preparing self-petition visa applications under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) for clients who claimed abuse by U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouses. Investigators found that the defendant submitted applications containing forged psychological evaluations—some altered from a psychologist’s prior reports—and fabricated residential lease documents for multiple clients. These documents were used as evidence to satisfy VAWA eligibility criteria, such as establishing residence and proof of abuse. The defendant was not a licensed attorney and did not sign the applications as preparer.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland presided over the defendant’s trial. After the government presented its case, the defendant moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the fraudulent documents were not “required” by immigration law and that the statute required submission under oath, which he claimed was not satisfied. The district court denied the motion, ruling that while the regulations did not mandate specific documents, any evidence submitted to establish eligibility became “required” for that application. The jury subsequently convicted the defendant on all counts, and he was sentenced to 57 months’ imprisonment and two years of supervised release. The defendant did not renew his acquittal motion and later appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for several counts and alleging a sentencing error based on a discrepancy between oral and written conditions of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and sentence. The court held that documents submitted to establish eligibility in VAWA self-petitions—including psychological evaluations and lease agreements—constitute “required” documents under 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) once chosen and presented. It further held that the statute’s “knowingly presents” clause does not require an oath for criminal liability. Regarding sentencing, the court found no material discrepancy between oral and written supervised release conditions and concluded that resentencing was not warranted. View "US v. Aborisade" on Justia Law

Two plainclothes detectives in Baltimore, acting on a tip about drug activity, observed Robert Gary Moore and another individual near a parked vehicle. When approached, Moore dropped a plastic bag and fled but was apprehended. The police recovered the bag, which was later analyzed in a laboratory report stating it contained cocaine. During Moore’s trial for possession and possession with intent to distribute, the State introduced two chain-of-custody reports: one disclosed before trial and another (the ECU report) disclosed only mid-trial. The latter did not mention the chemist who performed the analysis, raising questions about whether the correct bag was tested. Moore’s counsel did not object to the late disclosure or use the discrepancy in his defense. Moore was convicted by a jury.After his conviction was affirmed on appeal by Maryland’s intermediate appellate court, Moore sought postconviction relief in Maryland state court, arguing that the State’s belated disclosure of the ECU report violated his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland and that his counsel was ineffective. The Maryland trial court initially granted relief under Brady but, upon remand from the intermediate appellate court for further factfinding, ultimately denied both claims, finding that disclosure during trial did not constitute suppression under Brady. Moore’s application for leave to appeal this denial was rejected.Moore then filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. The district court found a Brady violation and granted habeas relief, ordering Moore’s conviction vacated unless retried within sixty days. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed that the state court had unreasonably applied federal law and that a Brady violation warranted habeas relief. However, it held that federal district courts lack authority to vacate state convictions directly and thus vacated the district court’s order, remanding for a new order consistent with the proper bounds of federal habeas relief. View "Moore v. State of Maryland" on Justia Law

An African American police officer employed by the Baltimore Police Department attended a nightclub event in August 2018, where an altercation occurred between a member of her party and an on-duty police sergeant, resulting in the sergeant striking her friend. The officer testified against the sergeant before a grand jury and at his criminal trial, after which she was warned by colleagues that she was being targeted. Though criminal charges against her were declined, the department initiated internal disciplinary proceedings, ultimately filing charges against her in June 2020 for assault and making false statements. She was suspended with pay and later, after filing an EEOC complaint in February 2021 alleging race discrimination and retaliation, was forced to resign in lieu of termination in June 2022.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland reviewed her claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including allegations of race discrimination, retaliation, and municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York. The district court dismissed her original and amended complaints, concluding that she failed to plead plausible claims for relief, specifically finding her comparator evidence insufficient for the discrimination claim and that her retaliation and Monell claims lacked factual support.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied de novo review to the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the officer had sufficiently alleged a Title VII racial discrimination claim by identifying multiple white or non-black comparators who engaged in similar conduct but received less severe discipline. However, it affirmed the dismissal of her retaliation claim, finding she failed to plausibly allege a causal connection between her protected activity and the adverse employment action. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Monell claim, holding the complaint did not include specific factual allegations of a widespread pattern or practice. The judgment was therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Johnson v. Baltimore City, Maryland" on Justia Law

Adrian Roberts, a military veteran suffering from severe mental health issues, was the subject of an involuntary commitment order after his wife raised concerns about his safety and possession of weapons. Law enforcement officers, including a specially trained response team, attempted to execute the order, initially trying to persuade Adrian to leave his home peacefully. When he refused, the team forcibly entered his residence. Shortly after entry, Deputy Evans shot and killed Adrian. The circumstances surrounding the shooting were disputed: Evans claimed Adrian charged at officers with a machete, while Adrian’s wife alleged he was shot in the back while facing away.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina reviewed the case after Adrian’s wife brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force and unlawful entry. The district court granted Evans qualified immunity and summary judgment on the unlawful entry claim but denied both on the excessive force claim. The court found that genuine disputes of material fact existed, particularly regarding whether Adrian posed an immediate threat or was resisting arrest, and relied on the autopsy report suggesting Adrian may have been shot from behind. Because these factual disputes remained, the court concluded that a reasonable jury could find Evans violated Adrian’s clearly established rights.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether it had jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of qualified immunity and summary judgment on the excessive force claim. The Fourth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction because the district court’s decision was based on unresolved factual disputes rather than purely legal questions. The court emphasized it could not weigh evidence or resolve factual disputes at this stage, and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Roberts v. Evans" on Justia Law

A coal miner was employed at the Burke Mountain Mine Complex until October 2019, when he was told the mine was “shut down” and his job was terminated without receiving advance notice. He brought a class action lawsuit on behalf of himself and other similarly situated employees against five related mining companies, alleging they failed to provide notice of termination as required by the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act). Evidence at trial showed that the companies shared common officers, directors, ownership, and business addresses, and that personnel and equipment were regularly exchanged among them. Employees testified that the companies operated interchangeably and were managed collectively by the same family.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia certified the class, denied summary judgment to both sides, and submitted the matter to a jury. The jury found the companies liable under the WARN Act, determining that they operated as a single employer and that at least 50 employees suffered an employment loss through termination or reduction in hours. The district court entered judgment for the plaintiff and, after trial, denied the defendants’ renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial. The companies appealed, challenging both the sufficiency of the evidence and the jury instructions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the jury had sufficient evidence to conclude the companies were a single employer under the WARN Act and that the district court’s instruction regarding the definition of employment loss was correct. The court also found that the companies forfeited any argument regarding an inconsistent jury verdict by failing to object before the jury was discharged. View "Gautier v. Tams Management, Inc." on Justia Law

A group of current and former battalion chiefs employed by the City of Alexandria Fire Department alleged that the City failed to pay them overtime wages as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The battalion chiefs’ compensation was based on a complex pay structure. Chiefs worked either operational or administrative schedules. Operational chiefs rotated through 24-hour shifts within a nine-day cycle, and administrative chiefs worked a standard 40-hour week. The City paid the chiefs a predetermined amount per pay period, corresponding to either 80 administrative hours or 106 operational hours, regardless of the exact number of hours worked, with additional compensation for hours worked beyond their scheduled shifts.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment for the City. The district court found that the chiefs were exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements under the “highly compensated employee” exemption. Specifically, the court held that the chiefs were paid on an hourly basis and applied the salary basis test found in 29 C.F.R. § 541.604(b). The court concluded the chiefs received guaranteed pay that satisfied the regulatory requirements and that the pay had a reasonable relationship to their usual earnings.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment but for different reasons. The appellate court held that the district court applied the wrong salary basis test, finding that the appropriate test was under 29 C.F.R. § 541.602(a), which applies to employees paid on a weekly or less frequent salary basis. The court concluded that, despite the complexity of the pay system, the chiefs received a predetermined salary not subject to improper deductions and, therefore, were compensated on a salary basis. As a result, the chiefs were correctly deemed exempt from overtime requirements, and the district court’s decision was affirmed. View "Kelly v. City of Alexandria" on Justia Law

The case concerns the fatal shooting of Kwamena Ocran by four Gaithersburg Police Department officers in January 2021. Ocran, who had recently been released from prison and was reported by a confidential informant to be armed, was surveilled by the officers after the informant indicated Ocran might attempt to sell a handgun. When Ocran left an apartment with the informant and was approached by the officers, he fled. The officers pursued him, and during the chase, multiple officers reported seeing a muzzle flash and believed Ocran fired a weapon in their direction. The officers collectively discharged 27 rounds, resulting in Ocran’s death. Forensic evidence revealed Ocran was shot multiple times in the back, and a handgun was found near his body, though no evidence indicated it had been fired.After discovery, Melody Cooper, Ocran’s mother and personal representative, brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied the officers’ motion for summary judgment and rejected their claim of qualified immunity, finding genuine disputes of material fact existed—particularly regarding whether Ocran pointed or fired his weapon at the officers. The court also denied the officers’ motion for reconsideration.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed the officers’ appeal to the extent it challenged the district court’s findings of disputed material facts, as such findings are not reviewable under the collateral order doctrine. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that, accepting the undisputed facts, the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because the right to be free from deadly force when fleeing and not posing a significant threat was clearly established at the time of the incident. The case was remanded for further proceedings, including a jury trial. View "Cooper v. Doyle" on Justia Law

In September 2020, a college student alleged she was sexually assaulted by a man during a late-night traffic stop in Virginia. She reported the incident to local law enforcement and participated in multiple interviews with detectives, who investigated her claims but found surveillance footage that was low-quality and recorded at a different time than the alleged assault. During a subsequent interview, detectives pressured her about inconsistencies in the evidence and, after the interview, she received threatening text messages. The detectives later told university officials she had confessed to fabricating her report. The sheriff then directed detectives to use her confession as probable cause for an arrest warrant charging her with filing a false police report. After her arrest, officers issued a press release with her personal information and photo, which led to widespread public shaming and emotional distress.Initially, she was convicted in a bench trial in Washington County District Court, but after appealing, her conviction was annulled and she was acquitted in a de novo bench trial in Washington County Circuit Court. She then sued the officers and the sheriff in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, alleging violations of her constitutional rights and state law torts.The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), relying on an audio recording of the key interview. The court found the recording contradicted her claims of coercion, ruling that it showed a civil discussion without coercion and that her confession appeared voluntary. It also found her allegation of having no choice but to confess was not credible based on the recording.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court erred by dismissing the complaint based on the audio recording, because the recording did not "blatantly contradict" her factual allegations as required by Fourth Circuit precedent. The appellate court vacated the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bermeo v. Andis" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on a Florida-based construction project, where Westerfeld Construction by Glick, LLC served as the general contractor. Westerfeld, a Florida company, retained Jessup Construction, LLC as a subcontractor. Jessup and GSH of Alabama, LLC entered into a joint venture to work on the project and later obtained a $5.8 million loan from Mobilization Funding, LLC, a company with operations in South Carolina. The loan contracts involved Mobilization Funding, Jessup, GSH, and individual guarantors, and included South Carolina choice-of-law and venue provisions. Westerfeld was not a party to these loan contracts. When Jessup allegedly defaulted, Mobilization Funding sued Jessup, GSH, and the guarantors in South Carolina, and GSH, joined by individual guarantors, brought third-party claims against Westerfeld, alleging conspiracy and fraud.After removal, the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina reviewed Westerfeld’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Applying the prima facie standard, the district court held that it lacked both general and specific jurisdiction over Westerfeld. The court found Westerfeld had no offices, employees, or business activities in South Carolina and was not party to any South Carolina-centered agreements. The court also determined that GSH’s conspiracy allegations were conclusory and did not plausibly tie Westerfeld to conduct in South Carolina sufficient to establish jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the third-party complaint against Westerfeld and certified its order as final.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s ruling de novo. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that Westerfeld did not have sufficient minimum contacts with South Carolina to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. The court rejected both direct and conspiracy-based theories of jurisdiction, concluding that GSH failed to present plausible, particularized facts to support jurisdiction over Westerfeld. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed. View "Stokes v. Westerfeld Construction by Glick, LLC" on Justia Law

Cherry Grove Beach Gear, LLC, operated by Derek and Jacqueline Calhoun, began providing beach equipment rentals and setup services on public beaches in the City of North Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, starting in 2020. The City informed CGBG that its activities violated local ordinances, but the company continued operating despite repeated warnings and complaints from competitors. In response, the City enacted a new ordinance in June 2022 that explicitly restricted professional setup of beach equipment on City beaches to City officials only. CGBG persisted with its services and received several citations for noncompliance.Following these actions, CGBG filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, alleging that the City had unlawfully established a monopoly over beach equipment rentals and setup services, violating federal antitrust law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, determining that the municipal ordinances qualified for state action immunity from federal antitrust liability under the Parker doctrine, based on relevant South Carolina statutes.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that the South Carolina statutes in question clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy allowing municipalities to create exclusive franchises for beach equipment rentals and setup, and that the anticompetitive effects were a foreseeable result of this legislative authorization. The court also rejected CGBG’s argument for a “market participant exception” to state action immunity, noting that precedent does not recognize such an exception. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the City is entitled to state action immunity and affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Cherry Grove Beach Gear, LLC v. City of North Myrtle Beach" on Justia Law