Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In early 2021, Jarohn Parham was stopped by Newport News, Virginia police for driving with an expired registration. During the stop, officers observed Parham reaching towards the center console and subsequently found a .25 caliber semi-automatic pistol in the vehicle. Parham, a convicted felon, was arrested and later indicted by a federal grand jury for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He pled guilty to the charge without a plea agreement but with a stipulated statement of facts.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia calculated Parham’s Sentencing Guidelines range, determining his base offense level to be 20 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), based on a prior conviction for Virginia common law robbery, which the court deemed a crime of violence. Parham objected, arguing that his prior conviction did not qualify as a crime of violence under the Guidelines. The district court overruled his objections, finding that Virginia robbery met the generic definition of robbery and imposed an 84-month sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with Parham, finding that Virginia robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. The court noted that Virginia robbery can be committed by threatening to accuse the victim of sodomy, which does not involve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s judgment, vacated Parham’s sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing. The appellate court also instructed the district court to consider whether Parham’s conviction for use of a firearm during a robbery qualifies as a crime of violence. View "United States v. Parham" on Justia Law

David Levine, former CEO of Geostellar Inc., was accused of defrauding and bankrupting the company. Geostellar had a directors and officers insurance policy from Philadelphia Indemnity Company, which began providing Levine's defense. The policy had a $3 million coverage limit. Levine and his wife later filed for personal bankruptcy, which stayed the Geostellar adversary action. The Geostellar Trustee moved to lift the stay to proceed against Levine to the extent of the insurance coverage, admitting that Levine's debt to Geostellar was uncollectable beyond the insurance coverage.The bankruptcy court granted the motion to lift the stay. The Trustees then filed an adversary action for declaratory judgment, seeking to establish that the right to settlement under the policy was an asset of the Levine Bankruptcy Estate, for which the Levine Trustee was the exclusive representative. The bankruptcy court dismissed the action, and the district court affirmed, finding that neither Trustee had standing to sue the insurer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Geostellar Trustee had no standing because West Virginia law did not permit a direct action against the insurer under the circumstances, and the policy only provided coverage to Levine, not Geostellar. The Levine Trustee also lacked standing because any judgment in the Geostellar adversary action would not impact the Levine Bankruptcy Estate, as Levine's debt to Geostellar was discharged and uncollectable beyond the insurance coverage. The court concluded that the right to consent to settlement under the policy was not the property of either Trustee. View "Fluharty v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Robert Valladares, who struggled with drug addiction, distributed fentanyl to a friend who subsequently overdosed and died. Valladares was initially charged with distribution resulting in death but ultimately pleaded guilty to lesser charges without the death-resulting enhancement. He was sentenced to 144 months in prison. Valladares sought to earn time credits under the First Step Act, which allows incarcerated individuals to earn credits for participating in recidivism reduction programs, except for those convicted of certain offenses, including drug offenses resulting in death.The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) deemed Valladares ineligible for time credits, citing his conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) and the resulting death. Valladares challenged this decision through BOP’s administrative process and then filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia. The district court denied his petition, agreeing with BOP that Valladares was ineligible due to the death associated with his crime.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the First Step Act’s ineligibility provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(lviii), applies only to those convicted of the death-resulting enhancement element. Since Valladares was not convicted of this enhancement, he is eligible to earn time credits. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case, allowing Valladares to earn time credits under the First Step Act. View "Valladares v. Ray" on Justia Law

In 2019, the FBI and DEA, along with local law enforcement, investigated a Mexican drug trafficking organization operating in Mexico, California, Georgia, and North Carolina. Oscar Pliego-Pineda, based in Atlanta, Georgia, was identified as a key figure in coordinating methamphetamine deliveries and managing drug proceeds. He arranged multiple drug transactions and coordinated logistics for methamphetamine shipments, including converting liquid methamphetamine to crystal form.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina sentenced Pliego-Pineda to 120 months in prison after he pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and conspiracy to commit money laundering. The court applied a three-level managerial role enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which Pliego-Pineda contested, arguing that the district court erred in applying the enhancement and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the district court's application of the managerial role enhancement, finding that Pliego-Pineda exercised significant decision-making authority, participated extensively in the conspiracy, and managed the logistics of drug transactions. The court noted that the conspiracy involved at least ten individuals and large quantities of methamphetamine. Despite an error in considering Pliego-Pineda's supervision of an undercover officer, the court found sufficient evidence to support the enhancement.The Fourth Circuit also found Pliego-Pineda's sentence substantively reasonable, affirming the district court's decision. The court emphasized that the sentence was within the properly calculated Guidelines range and thus presumptively reasonable. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Pliego-Pineda. View "United States v. Pliego-Pineda" on Justia Law

Scott Rendelman was convicted in 2008 for mailing threatening communications under 18 U.S.C. § 876(c). The district court instructed the jury that the government only needed to prove that a “reasonable person” would find Rendelman’s communications threatening. In 2023, the Supreme Court held in Counterman v. Colorado that the First Amendment requires the government to prove that the defendant was subjectively aware of the threatening nature of his statements. Rendelman now seeks authorization to file a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his conviction based on this new ruling.Previously, the district court denied Rendelman’s first § 2255 motion, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit declined to authorize a second § 2255 motion. Rendelman’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed Rendelman’s motion for authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion. The court concluded that Rendelman satisfied the gatekeeping requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h), as the Supreme Court’s decision in Counterman announced a new rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively and was previously unavailable to Rendelman. The court rejected the government’s argument that Rendelman must also show a plausible claim for relief, adhering to the standard that a prima facie showing of possible merit is sufficient. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit granted Rendelman’s motion for authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion. View "In re Rendelman" on Justia Law

John Sigley applied for a Material Handler position with ND Fairmont LLC (NDF) and was offered the job contingent on passing a physical exam. During the physical, conducted by Industrial Therapy Solutions (ITS), Sigley denied having any back issues or seeing a chiropractor, despite having undergone three back surgeries and having a metal rod in his back. He passed the physical and began working on September 13, 2021. On October 28, 2021, Sigley called out of work due to back spasms and later disclosed his back condition to NDF's HR Manager, Joyce Hardway, and Environmental Health & Safety Manager, Justin Darrah. NDF confirmed Sigley's omission of his back condition during the physical and terminated him for dishonesty on November 2, 2021.Sigley filed a lawsuit against NDF, alleging disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of NDF, finding that Sigley was terminated for dishonesty, not because of his disability. The court also dismissed Sigley's claims of breach of confidentiality and failure to accommodate, as they were not properly pled in his complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that Sigley failed to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, as he could not demonstrate that his termination raised a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination. The court found that NDF had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Sigley—his dishonesty during the physical exam. The court also noted that Sigley's claims of breach of confidentiality and failure to accommodate were untimely and meritless, as he did not properly plead them and admitted he did not require an accommodation. View "Sigley v. ND Fairmont LLC" on Justia Law

Jerry Lee Edwards pled guilty to escaping from a re-entry center in Charlotte, North Carolina, where he was completing a 130-month sentence for federal drug and firearm offenses. He left the center for work on April 29, 2023, and did not return, leading to his arrest after a brief police chase. During sentencing, the district court considered a presentence report that calculated ten criminal history points, including three points for a 2008 North Carolina fleeing-to-elude conviction, which initially involved special probation.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina overruled Edwards's objection to the criminal history points. Edwards argued that his 2008 sentence should receive zero points because it did not exceed one year and was imposed over ten years ago. He contended that his original 53-day active term should not be counted separately from the 12-month suspended term. The district court, however, combined the 53-day term and the 12-month term, resulting in a total sentence of 12 months and 53 days, which merited three criminal history points.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit found that North Carolina’s special probation statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1351(a), clearly establishes two separate prison terms: an active term and a suspended term. The court held that the district court correctly combined these terms under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(k), resulting in a total sentence that exceeded one year and one month, thus justifying the three criminal history points. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court properly applied the Sentencing Guidelines and affirmed the 24-month sentence. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law

Dashawn Leonard Garrett pled guilty to three charges related to a drug trafficking investigation in Wilson County, North Carolina, after withdrawing his suppression motion. He later discovered information suggesting police and prosecutorial misconduct, which he argued rendered his plea involuntary. Garrett contended that the misconduct included misidentification by a confidential informant and the use of multiple informants, one of whom was paid and had never identified him.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina initially denied Garrett's co-defendant's suppression motion. Garrett withdrew his own motion, fearing it would be risky to proceed, and accepted a plea deal. After his sentencing, Garrett learned from a Government disclosure that multiple confidential informants were used, and one was compensated, which had not been disclosed earlier. This led to his appeal, arguing that the new information would have influenced his decision to plead guilty.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the newly discovered information about the informants and the misidentification issue constituted egregious police and prosecutorial misconduct. The court held that a reasonable defendant in Garrett's position would not have pled guilty if aware of all the relevant information. The court determined that the misconduct affected the integrity of the prosecution and Garrett's ability to make an informed plea. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit vacated Garrett's guilty plea and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Garrett" on Justia Law

Bryan Alexis Molina-Diaz and his wife Cony Vanessa Pasqual de Molina fled El Salvador after witnessing the murder of Cony's cousin, Jose. Bryan applied for asylum and withholding of removal, but an Immigration Judge (IJ) denied relief, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) affirmed. Bryan then moved for reconsideration and to reopen based on his prior counsel’s ineffective assistance, but the Board denied both motions.The IJ found Bryan and Cony's testimony credible but concluded that Bryan failed to show that the threats he received were on account of his family relationship rather than because he witnessed the murder. The IJ also found that Bryan did not demonstrate that the Salvadoran government was unable or unwilling to control the non-state actors (MS-13 gang members) who threatened him. The Board affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that Bryan did not establish the necessary nexus for asylum and that the government control requirement was not met.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. Bryan argued that the requirement to show the home government’s inability or unwillingness to control non-state persecutors should be abandoned following the Supreme Court's decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. Alternatively, he argued that the IJ and Board conflated inability with unwillingness and ignored evidence about conditions in El Salvador. The Fourth Circuit rejected these arguments, holding that binding precedent requires showing the home government’s inability or unwillingness to control non-state persecutors. The court found that the IJ and Board did not conflate inability with unwillingness and that substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding of government control. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit denied the petitions for review. View "Molina-Diaz v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Ganesa Rosales, a nurse, filed a False Claims Act (FCA) complaint against Amedisys North Carolina, LLC, Dr. Sanjay Batish, and Batish Medical Service, PLLC, alleging fraudulent practices in admitting and recertifying patients for hospice care who did not meet the requirements. Rosales claimed that these practices were widespread and systematic within the company. She also added a claim under the Anti-Kickback Statute in her amended complaint.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina dismissed Rosales's federal claims without prejudice, citing the FCA’s first-to-file rule, which bars subsequent related actions based on the same facts as a pending action. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state-law claim. Rosales appealed, arguing that her claims were distinct and that the district court should have considered her amended complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that the first-to-file rule applies claim-by-claim and defendant-by-defendant, and it should consider the most recent properly filed complaint. However, the court found that Rosales's claims against Amedisys NC, Dr. Batish, and his practice were based on the same material elements of fraud as the earlier-filed complaint by Jackie Byers against Amedisys Holding and its South Carolina subsidiary. The court also noted that Rosales failed to develop an argument distinguishing her Anti-Kickback Statute claim from the earlier complaints.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Rosales's complaint without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, adhering to its precedent that the first-to-file rule is jurisdictional. View "United States ex rel. Rosales v. Amedisys North Carolina, L.L.C." on Justia Law