Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Steven Fulton was convicted by a jury of knowingly making a false statement in connection with the attempted acquisition of a firearm. The evidence showed that Fulton denied having any felony convictions on a background check form at a gun shop in North Carolina, despite having a prior felony conviction in New Jersey. The district court overturned the jury’s verdict and entered a judgment of acquittal, reasoning that the Government did not present evidence to the jury demonstrating that Fulton’s New Jersey offense was punishable by more than a year in prison. The district court also conditionally granted Fulton a new trial in case the acquittal was reversed.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina initially reviewed the case. The district court granted Fulton’s motion for acquittal, holding that the Government failed to prove that Fulton’s New Jersey conviction was a felony. The court reasoned that the criminal judgment did not define a third-degree offense, did not include the word “felony,” and did not identify the maximum punishment for the offense. The district court also conditionally granted a new trial, citing insufficient evidence of Fulton’s knowledge that he was a felon.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court reversed the district court’s judgment of acquittal, holding that the Government had introduced sufficient evidence to prove that Fulton’s New Jersey conviction was a felony punishable by more than one year in prison. The court determined that whether a crime is punishable by more than one year in prison is a legal question for the judge to determine, not a factual question for the jury. The appellate court also reversed the district court’s conditional grant of a new trial, finding that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. The case was remanded with instructions to reinstate the jury’s verdict. View "US v. Fulton" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In 2019, Navient Solutions, LLC, a student loan servicer, filed a civil action alleging that a group of lawyers, marketers, and debt-relief businesses conspired to defraud Navient out of millions of dollars in unpaid student debt. Navient claimed that the defendants lured student borrowers into filing sham lawsuits against Navient under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), which regulates abusive telemarketing practices. The case proceeded to trial, and a jury found in favor of Navient. However, the district court later granted the defendants' renewed motions for judgment as a matter of law, ruling that the TCPA suits were not sham litigation and setting aside the jury's verdicts.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia initially rejected the defendants' argument that their litigation activities were protected under the Noerr–Pennington doctrine, which safeguards the First Amendment right to petition the government. After the jury returned verdicts against each defendant, the district court vacated the verdicts, concluding that the TCPA litigation was not sham litigation and that Navient's damages were directly related to the TCPA litigation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the TCPA actions were not sham litigation and were protected under the Noerr–Pennington doctrine. The court found that the defendants' actions were based on a legitimate question of statutory interpretation regarding the definition of an automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS) under the TCPA. The court also noted that Navient had conceded the merits of the TCPA cases and had only sought damages related to the litigation costs. As a result, the court concluded that the defendants' petitioning activity was protected by the First Amendment, and the district court's judgment as a matter of law was appropriate. View "Navient Solutions, LLC v. Lohman" on Justia Law

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Samir Fernandes Baptista, a lawful permanent resident, was convicted in Massachusetts of unarmed assault with intent to rob or steal. During his removal proceedings, the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determined that this state crime is categorically an aggravated felony attempted theft offense under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Consequently, the immigration judge ordered Baptista removed for committing an aggravated felony after admission, and the BIA upheld this order.Baptista appealed the BIA's decision, arguing that his conviction does not qualify as an attempted theft offense under the INA. He contended that under Massachusetts law, a defendant could be convicted of unarmed assault by stealing property with the victim’s fraudulently obtained consent, which would make the state offense broader than the generic federal theft offense that requires the taking to be against the victim’s will. Baptista also argued that his conviction cannot qualify as an attempt because it does not require a defendant to commit an overt act toward a taking.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the BIA's legal conclusion de novo. The court concluded that the Massachusetts unarmed assault statute requires the taking to be against the victim’s will and involves force and violence, making it a categorical match to a generic federal theft offense. Additionally, the court found that the statute requires an overt act constituting a substantial step towards the commission of the theft, thus qualifying as an attempted theft offense under the INA. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit denied Baptista’s petition for review. View "Baptista v. Bondi" on Justia Law

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The case involves Raymond Dugan, who was convicted and sentenced in the Southern District of West Virginia for accessing child pornography. Dugan raised three main issues on appeal: the denial of his motion to compel discovery related to a foreign law enforcement agency's investigation, the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search warrant, and the restitution order requiring him to pay $22,000 to five child victims.In the lower court, Dugan was convicted by a jury of accessing child pornography. He was sentenced to 54 months in prison, followed by five years of supervised release, and ordered to pay $22,000 in restitution. Dugan filed pretrial motions to compel discovery and suppress evidence, both of which were denied by the district court. The court found that the foreign agency's tip was reliable and that the search warrant was supported by probable cause. The court also ruled that the officers acted in good faith when executing the warrant.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decisions, holding that the denial of the motion to compel discovery was appropriate because Dugan's request was speculative and unsupported by evidence. The court also upheld the denial of the motion to suppress, finding that the search warrant was based on probable cause, given the deliberate steps required to access the child pornography website. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the restitution order, as the district court had carefully considered the relevant factors and evidence in determining the amounts.The Fourth Circuit affirmed Dugan's conviction and sentence, including the restitution order. View "US v. Dugan" on Justia Law

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Julio Alvarado Dubon moved to suppress firearms and ammunition discovered during a warrantless search of his home. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Alvarado Dubon voluntarily consented to the search and, even if he had not, the items were found during a valid protective sweep. The case involves officers searching for a man named Rolman Balcarcel, who was reported to have weapons and potentially planning violent acts. Alvarado Dubon allowed officers into his home, where they saw a handgun magazine. After a brief interaction, Alvarado Dubon gestured and verbally indicated consent for the officers to check the rest of the house, where they found firearms.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Alvarado Dubon's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search. The court found that Alvarado Dubon had voluntarily consented to the search and that the search was justified as a protective sweep. Alvarado Dubon entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. He was sentenced to 16 months of imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court's finding of voluntary consent was not clearly erroneous. The court noted that Alvarado Dubon's actions and body language indicated consent and that the conditions under which he consented did not suggest coercion or duress. The court also concluded that Alvarado Dubon did not effectively revoke his consent before the rifle was found. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "US v. Dubon" on Justia Law

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Dr. Timothy Baxter, while working for Indivior, a pharmaceutical company, distributed misleading information to Massachusetts’s Medicaid program about the safety of new opioid drugs. This led to his conviction for misdemeanor drug misbranding. Following his conviction, the Secretary of Health and Human Services banned him from participating in federal healthcare programs for five years. Baxter challenged this exclusion, arguing that his crime did not categorically relate to the delivery of an item or service under a state healthcare program.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, rejecting Baxter’s claims. Baxter then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the exclusion statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a), does not require a categorical approach. Instead, it employs a circumstance-specific approach, meaning it looks at the actual conduct of the individual rather than the elements of the statute of conviction. The court found that Baxter’s conduct—misbranding drugs to influence MassHealth’s coverage decisions—was related to the delivery of an item under a state healthcare program. Therefore, his exclusion was mandatory under the statute.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, upholding Baxter’s exclusion from federal healthcare programs. View "Baxter v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

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Adolfo Acevedo Ibarra, a Mexican citizen, entered the United States illegally and used the identity of a U.S. citizen, Raul Cabrera, to obtain various documents and benefits fraudulently. He was detained in 2014 for using a fraudulent Social Security number and later pleaded guilty to illegal entry. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him, and Ibarra admitted to the allegations and agreed he was removable. He sought cancellation of removal, arguing that his removal would cause hardship to his four U.S.-citizen children. However, the immigration judge denied his application, citing his lack of good moral character due to his fraudulent activities.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the immigration judge's decision, agreeing that Ibarra's significant negative criminal history, including fraud, outweighed any evidence of good character. Ibarra then petitioned for review, claiming that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated during the removal hearing when his attorney's attempts to assert the privilege against self-incrimination were overruled.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and found that substantial evidence supported the immigration judge's finding that Ibarra lacked good moral character. The court noted that Ibarra's fraudulent activities, even without a conviction, justified the finding under the catchall provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). The court also rejected Ibarra's Fifth Amendment claim, stating that the privilege against self-incrimination must be asserted by the individual, not their attorney, and that Ibarra continued to testify without asserting the privilege himself.The Fourth Circuit denied Ibarra's petition for review, upholding the BIA's decision to deny cancellation of removal based on the substantial evidence of his lack of good moral character and rejecting his Fifth Amendment claims. View "Ibarra v. Bondi" on Justia Law

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Honeywell International, a Delaware corporation, and OPTO Electronics, a Japanese company, are competitors in the barcode-scanning equipment market. In May 2019, Honeywell sued OPTO for patent infringement, alleging that OPTO's barcode products infringed on seven of Honeywell's patents. The parties settled in January 2020 with a patent-licensing agreement, allowing OPTO to use Honeywell's patents in exchange for royalty payments. In March 2021, Honeywell audited OPTO and claimed that OPTO had underreported its revenues, leading to a dispute over the definition of "2D Barcode Products." Honeywell then sued OPTO for breach of contract in September 2021, alleging unpaid royalties.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina handled the case. A jury found that OPTO's laser-scanning barcode readers were "2D Barcode Products" but awarded Honeywell only $859,741. The district court also rejected OPTO's counterclaim of patent misuse, concluding that Honeywell had not engaged in such conduct. Both parties filed post-trial motions, which the district court denied. Honeywell sought attorney's fees, and OPTO moved to set aside the jury verdict, but both requests were denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that it could not reach the merits because the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the appeal due to the patent-related counterclaim asserted by OPTO. The Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal, allowing the parallel appeal pending in the Federal Circuit to proceed. The main holding was that the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals involving patent claims and counterclaims, even if the primary dispute is over a contract. View "Honeywell International, Inc. v. OPTO Electronics Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

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In 2019, Irene Pressley, a rural mail carrier, was found dead in her car in Andrews, South Carolina, having been shot multiple times. An assault rifle and 21 bullet casings were found near the scene. A package containing marijuana addressed to Trevor Seward's residence, with Pressley's blood on it, was discovered nearby. Surveillance footage showed Seward leaving his house after Pressley did not deliver the package and later returning with an assault rifle. Seward's fingerprints and palm prints were found on Pressley's car and packages inside it, including a palm print in her blood.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina convicted Seward of murdering a federal employee, using a firearm during a crime of violence, Hobbs Act robbery, possessing a firearm after a felony conviction, and conspiring to possess marijuana with intent to distribute. Seward appealed, challenging the qualifications of the government's firearms toolmark examiner and the exclusion of evidence that another witness failed a polygraph test. He also argued that the admission of testimony from the government's DNA expert violated the Confrontation Clause.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the firearms toolmark examiner's testimony or in excluding the polygraph evidence. Regarding the Confrontation Clause, the court acknowledged that the DNA expert's testimony may have violated the clause but concluded that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming evidence of Seward's guilt. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Seward" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Edward Joseph Walsh, III was riding his lawn mower when he was struck and killed by an underinsured motorist. Walsh had underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage on two personal automobiles insured by Owners Insurance Company. After Owners paid benefits equal to the UIM coverage limits for a single covered automobile, Walsh’s estate sought to stack the UIM coverage from the other. Owners asserted that stacking was unavailable and, in the declaratory judgment action that followed, the district court agreed. The court found that neither South Carolina law nor the terms of the policy entitled the insured to stack coverage under these circumstances.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina evaluated the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court determined that the policy terms disallowed stacking and that this limitation was consistent with South Carolina law. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment to Owners Insurance Company and dismissed the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The appellate court considered whether Walsh’s estate was entitled to stack UIM benefits from both scheduled automobiles under South Carolina law and the terms of the policy. The court concluded that the policy provisions clearly limited stacking to specific circumstances not applicable in this case. Additionally, the court found that the lawn mower involved in the accident was not an insured vehicle, and thus, the estate was not entitled to stack UIM coverage. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the estate was not entitled to collect additional UIM benefits beyond what had already been paid by Owners Insurance Company. View "Owners Insurance Co. v. Walsh" on Justia Law

Posted in: Insurance Law