Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

At issue is whether the admissions policy (hereinafter the “challenged admissions policy” or the “Policy”) adopted by Virginia’s Fairfax County School Board (the “Board”) in 2020 for use at Thomas Jefferson High School for Science & Technology (“TJ”) purposefully discriminates against Asian American students, in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. In March 2021, the Coalition for TJ (the “Coalition”) — an advocacy organization of Fairfax County public school parents — commenced this litigation against the Board in the Eastern District of Virginia, seeking to have the challenged admissions policy invalidated as unconstitutional. In February 2022, following the submission by the parties of cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled that the challenged admissions policy violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of the Board. The court held that it is satisfied that the challenged admissions policy does not disparately impact Asian American students and that the Coalition cannot establish that the Board adopted its race-neutral policy with any discriminatory intent. Moreover, the court wrote that it is satisfied that the policy passes constitutional muster under a rational basis standard of review. Accordingly, it is the Board — not the Coalition — that is entitled to summary judgment on the Equal Protection claim. View "Coalition for TJ v. Fairfax County School Board" on Justia Law

In 2009, a jury convicted Movant of knowingly possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). He was sentenced to 180 months imprisonment. His direct appeal and initial application for postconviction relief under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 were unsuccessful. Now, he moved the Fourth Circuit for authorization to file a second or successive Section 2255 application premised on the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif v. United States. And he argued in the alternative that if his motion is denied, he will be authorized to file a traditional Section 2241 habeas application through Section 2255(e)’s savings clause.   The Fourth Circuit denied Movant’s motion for authorization to file a second or successive Section 2255 application because Rehaif did not announce a constitutional rule. But as a consequence of our determination that he may not file a Section 2255 application, the court held that he may file a Section 2241 application under the savings clause. The court explained that it is true that, after Rehaif, possessing a firearm as a felon remains criminal under Section 922(g). But the government did not charge Movant with simply “possessing” a firearm in violation of Section 922(g). It charged him with “knowingly” doing so under Sections 922(g) and 924(a). That his conviction might have survived Rehaif if the government had charged him under Section 922(g) alone is of no moment: the government chose not to do so. View "In re: Randolph McNeill" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of one count of acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign government and one count of criminal conspiracy. The district court granted a judgment of acquittal as to both charges and conditionally granted a new trial in the event the judgment of acquittal was reversed on appeal. On appeal, in Rafiekian I, the Fourth Circuit reversed the judgments of acquittal, vacated and remanded the court’s new-trial order, and noted that the district court “may have additional justifications for its decision” that it failed to explain. On remand, ordered a new trial. The government appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because the government’s case relied on the jury’s drawing inferences of guilt, the district court had no choice but to examine those inferences in considering the new trial motion. Barring the district court from granting a new trial based solely on disagreement with the jury’s inferences of guilt would place this class of cases beyond the reach of the new-trial standard. The government is entitled to rely on circumstantial evidence, but it is not entitled to special deference when it does so.   In this case, because the district court determined that a new trial was warranted based on the weight of the evidence, the court’s role is only to ask whether the court abused its discretion in doing so. Exercising “great deference” to the district court’s “discretionary assessments of the balance of the evidence,” the court held that it did not. View "US v. Bijan Rafiekian" on Justia Law

The law firm of Brown Goldstein Levy LLP (“BGL”) and one of its partners (collectively, “Appellants”) filed suit against their insurer, Federal Insurance Company (“Appellee”), when it refused to provide coverage for costs Appellants incurred after the Government investigated the partner, executed a search warrant at BGL’s office, and notified the partner that his representation of certain clients may present a conflict of interest. The district court dismissed Appellants’ complaint, holding that there was no “Claim,” as that term is defined in the insurance policy, and alternatively that any costs Appellants incurred were excluded from the policy’s definition of “loss.”   The Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that there is no “Claim.” Neither the search warrant application nor the resulting search warrant is “written demand[s] or written request[s] for . . . nonmonetary relief . . . against an Insured” as required by the Policy. Therefore, the Search Warrant Claim fails because Appellants cannot state a claim for relief. The Target Conflict Letter makes no demand or request for relief against an Insured. The Government’s request to be notified promptly as to how the partner intends to proceed is not a request for “the redress or benefit, esp. equitable in nature (such as an injunction or specific performance), that a party asks of a court.” The Conflict Letters are not “Claims.” The court explained that despite Appellants’ attempts to characterize them as “demands,” they are not. Therefore, Appellants cannot state a claim as to the Partner Claim. View "Brown Goldstein Levy LLP v. Federal Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to two counts of using a firearm to commit murder in the course of a “crime of violence,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(j). In 2016, he filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. In the motion, he cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), which held that the “residual clause” in the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (“ACCA”) definition of “violent felony,” was unconstitutionally vague. The district court dismissed the motion. The court concluded that Johnson did not affect the validity of Defendant’s Section 924(j) convictions because they rested on predicate “crimes of violence”, not on the ACCA definition of “violent felony.” While Defendant’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held that the residual clause in Section 924(c)’s definition of a “crime of violence” was unconstitutionally vague, recognizing the specific right Defendant asserted in his Section 2255 motion.   The Fourth Circuit vacated Defendant’s conviction and sentence on the other Section 924(j) count because the conviction is unsupported by a valid predicate offense, and the Government concedes that he is entitled to relief. The court explained that because Defendant filed his motion within one year of Johnson and Davis extended the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Johnson, the court held that it was timely. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the dismissal of Defendant’s motion as to one of his Section 924(j) convictions because Defendant procedurally defaulted his claim challenging the conviction and cannot establish grounds for excusing the default. View "US v. Andra Green" on Justia Law

The North Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Hazard Association (“NC OSHA”) issued several itemized citations to Industrial Services Group (“ISG”) following the on-site deaths of two ISG employees. Soon thereafter, ISG filed for declaratory and injunctive relief against two North Carolina state officials, Josh Dobson, the North Carolina Commissioner of Labor and acting Chief Administrative Officer for the North Carolina Department of Labor (“NCDOL”), and Kevin Beauregard, the Director of NCDOL’s Occupational Safety and Health Division, (collectively “Defendants”). ISG alleged that the issued citations were unlawful because they stemmed from North Carolina’s occupational health and safety plan, which in their view, violates 29 U.S.C. Section 657(h) of the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSH Act”). The district court denied Defendants’ motions to dismiss and for judgment on pleadings, holding that they were not entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity because ISG’s claims satisfied the Ex Parte Young exception.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to deny Defendants Eleventh Amendment immunity and decline to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over Defendants’ newly-raised claims. Here, ISG’s Complaint alleges that the NC State Plan has and continues to violate the OSH Act. It also claims that Dobson and Beauregard, who in their official capacities are responsible for overseeing NCDOL’s implementation of the NC State Plan and its conformity with federal law, are accountable for the unlawful employee evaluation practices. Relying on that, the Complaint does not seek action by North Carolina but rather by the named Defendants who are at the helm of the NC State Plan’s operation. Thus, the individuals were properly named as such in this suit. View "Industrial Services Group, Inc. v. Josh Dobson" on Justia Law

In 2015, Towers Watson & Co. (“Towers Watson”), a Delaware company headquartered in Virginia, purchased directors and officers (“D&O”) liability insurance coverage from several insurance companies, including National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa. (“National Union”) as the primary insurer. Following Towers Watson’s merger with another company, Towers Watson shareholders filed several lawsuits against Towers Watson’s chairman and CEO and others, alleging that the shareholders received below-market consideration for their shares in the merger. The litigation was settled, and Towers Watson sought indemnity coverage from its insurers under the relevant D&O policies. The insurers refused the indemnity request, citing a so-called “bump-up” exclusion in the policies. This declaratory judgment action followed. The district court sided with Towers Watson and held that the bump-up exclusion “does not unambiguously” preclude indemnity coverage for the underlying settlements.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. Under Virginia law, it will not do to merely identify any conceivable basis to hold that an insurance-coverage exclusion does not apply before stripping the exclusion of all force. Rather, the language of the exclusion must reasonably lend itself to an “equally possible” interpretation precluding the exclusion’s applicability. Here, however, the district court’s chosen interpretation, which disregarded the Policy’s plain language and inserted terms not included by the parties, cannot be characterized as one of two “equally possible” constructions. View "Towers Watson & Co. v. National Union Fire Insurance Company" on Justia Law

A criminal complaint was filed against Appellant. On May 20, 2009, a certificate of mental disease or defect and dangerousness issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 4246. Appellant’s mental condition improved with treatment. The district court ordered his conditional discharge. Appellant returned home and lived with his mother after conditional discharge. The district court revoked the term and recommitted him. This appeal presents two consequential questions. Both relate to the continued involuntary commitment of those afflicted with a mental illness. A commitment wrongly perpetuated is an unwarranted restraint of liberty; a commitment errantly discontinued poses a danger to the committee and the public.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that the record is unclear whether the district court’s findings were made by a preponderance of the evidence. It also appears from the record that the district court collapsed both inquiries of Section 4246(f) into a single question, focusing only on whether Appellant violated the conditions of his release and not explaining why “in light of” those violations his continued release created a substantial risk to other persons or property. Additionally, the record would benefit from further development respecting the violations alleged and the available, recent records from the facility. Further, the court wrote that the government should take note of its evidentiary burden, develop evidence on the point, and provide the district court a sound basis for making reasoned findings on the matter of dangerousness for that particular alleged violation. View "US v. Christopher Perkins" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, residents of West Virginia, formerly owned Demcorp, LLC, which did business as “Dollar Stretcher,” a convenience store in nearby Winchester, Virginia. That store sold large quantities of cigarettes, which law enforcement agents of the Department of Homeland Security had evidence to believe was being resold in New York to avoid New York’s higher excise taxes, in violation of the Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act. During their criminal investigation, agents, armed with warrants, seized 1,560 cartons of cigarettes from the Dollar Stretcher store, and the Department of Homeland Security then held them for several years, during which time the cigarettes passed their shelf life of one year. When the Department ultimately offered to return the cigarettes, Plaintiff refused them as they could no longer be sold and thus had no value. Plaintiffs commenced this action against the Department of Homeland Security and the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, seeking compensatory damages. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the criminal warrant served a range of obvious and stated criminal investigative purposes. Any damages action against the United States for the improper seizure and detention under such a warrant is barred by sovereign immunity. Even though the seizure of cigarettes, in this case, was authorized by both a warrant issued for criminal investigative purposes and a warrant issued for civil forfeiture — dual purposes — the court concluded that the United States is immune from suit. View "Reba Myers v. Alejandro Mayorkas" on Justia Law

Defendant was originally charged with four federal offenses: (1) carjacking; (2) kidnapping; (3) using a firearm during a crime of violence; and (4) possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony. The parties agreed Defendant would plead guilty to the kidnapping and Section 924(c) charges, and the government would dismiss the carjacking and felon in possession charges. Neither the indictment nor the plea agreement specified a predicate “crime of violence” for the Section 924(c) charge, and the plea agreement contained no agreed-upon factual statement. Defendant filed a pro se motion to vacate his Section 924(c) conviction based on intervening authority. The district court denied Defendant’s motion. The court acknowledged it is now clear “kidnapping is not a Section 924(c) predicate offense.” But the court concluded Defendant’s Section 924(c) conviction remained valid because.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to vacate his firearm conviction and remanded him for resentencing. The court explained that the categorical approach does not deny the district court its ultimate discretion, nor does it deprive the facts of their force. Even if a statutory enhancement under Section 924(c) does not apply because of the categorical approach, as is the case here, judges may, at their discretion, calculate a guidelines range or grant upward variances based on the violent nature of the criminal activity. Even if the categorical approach renders violent predicates legally invalid, district courts are at liberty to sentence the violent character of the cases that come before them. View "US v. Elliott Graham" on Justia Law