Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

CSX Transportation, Inc. sued Norfolk Southern Railway Company and Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line Railroad Company in 2018, alleging that they conspired to exclude CSX from competing in the international shipping market at the Norfolk International Terminal by imposing an exclusionary switch rate starting in 2010. CSX claimed this rate caused ongoing injury to its business. The key issue was whether the Sherman Act’s four-year statute of limitations barred CSX’s claims or if an exception applied.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding CSX’s claims time-barred. The court held that the continuing-violation doctrine did not apply because the decision to maintain the switch rate did not constitute a new act causing new injury within the limitations period. The court also found that CSX failed to show specific damages resulting from any acts within the limitations period.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit agreed that the continuing-violation doctrine did not apply because maintaining the switch rate was not a new act but a continuation of the initial decision. The court also found that CSX did not provide sufficient evidence of new antitrust injury within the limitations period. The court emphasized that for the continuing-violation doctrine to apply, there must be an overt act within the limitations period that causes new injury, which CSX failed to demonstrate. Therefore, the court held that CSX’s claims were time-barred and affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "CSX Transportation, Incorporated v. Norfolk Southern Railway Company" on Justia Law

A former employee of Credit Suisse, John Doe, filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) alleging that the bank failed to disclose ongoing criminal conduct to the United States, thereby avoiding additional penalties. This followed Credit Suisse's 2014 guilty plea to conspiracy charges for aiding U.S. taxpayers in filing false tax returns, which included a $1.3 billion fine. Doe claimed that Credit Suisse continued its illegal activities post-plea, thus defrauding the government.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted the government's motion to dismiss the case. The government argued that Doe's allegations did not state a valid claim under the FCA and that continuing the litigation would strain resources and interfere with ongoing obligations under the plea agreement. The district court dismissed the action without holding an in-person hearing, relying instead on written submissions from both parties.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the "hearing" requirement under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) of the FCA can be satisfied through written submissions and does not necessitate a formal, in-person hearing. The court found that Doe did not present a colorable claim that his constitutional rights were violated by the dismissal. The court emphasized that the government has broad discretion to dismiss qui tam actions and that the district court properly considered the government's valid reasons for dismissal, including resource conservation and the protection of privileged information. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court's dismissal was appropriate and affirmed the judgment. View "United States ex rel. Doe v. Credit Suisse AG" on Justia Law

Hussein Ahmed Mouns, a native of Ethiopia and citizen of Yemen, has been in the United States since 1996. He applied for asylum and withholding of removal in 1997, which were denied by an immigration judge in 1999 and affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in 2002. Mouns filed motions to reopen his proceedings in 2003 and 2004 to pursue asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), which were denied by the BIA in 2003 and 2005. In 2020, Mouns filed a third motion to reopen based on changed country conditions in Yemen, citing the ongoing civil war and potential persecution due to his religion and imputed political opinion.The BIA denied Mouns’s 2020 motion to reopen, applying the stringent standard from In re Coelho, which requires the movant to show that the new evidence would likely change the result of the case. Mouns requested reconsideration, arguing that the BIA should have used the less burdensome "reasonable likelihood" standard from In re L-O-G-. The BIA denied reconsideration, reaffirming the use of the Coelho standard without addressing the L-O-G- standard.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision. The court found that the BIA abused its discretion by not following its own precedents, which limit the Coelho standard to cases with special, adverse considerations. The court noted that the BIA did not identify any such considerations in Mouns’s case and should have applied the "reasonable likelihood" standard. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit granted Mouns’s petition for review, vacated the BIA’s decision denying reconsideration, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mouns v. Garland" on Justia Law

Alexis Guerrero, a Black Dominican-American, sued Ollie’s Bargain Outlet under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for race discrimination. Guerrero alleged that while shopping for flowerpots at an Ollie’s store in Salisbury, Maryland, an employee named Richard Murray threatened him with a knife and shouted racial slurs, preventing him from purchasing the items. Guerrero claimed that this discriminatory conduct interfered with his right to make and enforce contracts.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted Ollie’s motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court reasoned that Guerrero failed to sufficiently allege that he was denied the opportunity to contract for goods or services that was otherwise afforded to white customers. Specifically, the court found that Guerrero did not claim that Ollie’s actually prevented him from purchasing a flowerpot and noted that he voluntarily left the store without attempting to make a purchase.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that Guerrero sufficiently alleged a contractual interest by demonstrating his intent to purchase the flowerpots and that Murray’s actions, including wielding a knife and shouting racial slurs, interfered with this interest. The court found that Guerrero’s allegations were enough to show that he was denied the opportunity to contract based on his race. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Guerrero v. Ollie's Bargain Outlet, Inc." on Justia Law

Maggie Anne Boler was convicted of six counts of presenting false claims against the United States by submitting fraudulent tax returns to the IRS and one count of making a false statement on a Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan application. Boler submitted six fraudulent tax returns, receiving refunds on four, totaling $116,106. Additionally, she falsely claimed a $20,833 PPP loan. She was sentenced to 30 months in prison.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina calculated Boler's sentencing range based on the total intended financial harm, including the two denied tax returns, amounting to $180,222. Boler objected, arguing that only the actual loss should be considered, not the intended loss. The district court overruled her objection, holding that the term "loss" in the Sentencing Guidelines could include both actual and intended loss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the term "loss" in the Sentencing Guidelines is genuinely ambiguous and can encompass both actual and intended loss. The court deferred to the Sentencing Guidelines' commentary, which defines "loss" as the greater of actual or intended loss. The court found that the district court correctly included the full intended loss in Boler's sentencing calculation. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Boler's 30-month sentence. View "United States v. Boler" on Justia Law

Harry Nolan Moody was convicted in 2002 for conspiring to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine. He was sentenced as a career offender to 360 months’ imprisonment. If sentenced today, Moody would no longer qualify as a career offender, and the advisory minimum would be 210 months. Moody moved for compassionate release based on this disparity, but the district court denied relief, holding that the sentencing disparity, considering Moody’s individual circumstances, didn’t constitute an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), and that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weighed against a reduced sentence.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina initially denied Moody’s motion for compassionate release, finding that the career-offender designation only increased his offense level by one level and didn’t impact his criminal history category. Moody appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, directing the district court to reassess the drug quantity attributable to Moody and reevaluate the effect of the career-offender designation on the guidelines range.On remand, the district court again denied Moody’s motion. It found that Moody was responsible for at least 50 grams of actual methamphetamine and concluded that the sentencing disparity didn’t amount to an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. The court reasoned that Moody’s conduct fell within the enhancement’s scope and that his criminal history and risk of recidivism justified an upward variance sentence. The court also considered Moody’s age, time served, and rehabilitative efforts but found that these factors, either singly or in combination, didn’t warrant release. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, agreeing that the court didn’t abuse its discretion in its analysis. View "United States v. Moody" on Justia Law

Timothy Olson, a fifth-grade teacher, used peer-to-peer software to download approximately 100 child pornography videos depicting the sexual abuse of prepubescent children. Olson admitted to downloading the videos and understanding the software due to his master's degree in information systems management. He pled guilty to transporting and possessing child pornography involving minors under twelve.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina sentenced Olson to 120 months’ imprisonment and a 30-year term of supervised release with numerous special conditions. Olson did not object to these conditions at sentencing. He later appealed, challenging six of the supervised release conditions as substantively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court applied the plain error standard because Olson did not object to the conditions at the time of sentencing. The court found that each of the six challenged conditions was reasonably related to Olson’s offense, history, and characteristics, and that none involved a greater deprivation of liberty than necessary. The conditions included restrictions on interacting with felons, refraining from excessive alcohol use, submitting to suspicionless searches, avoiding places frequented by children, and not possessing children’s items without permission.The Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing these conditions. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the conditions were substantively reasonable and aligned with statutory goals of deterrence, public safety, and rehabilitation. View "U.S. v. Olson" on Justia Law

In 2013, Johnny Ray Penegar, Jr. was diagnosed with mesothelioma, and Medicare partially covered his treatment costs. He filed a workers' compensation claim against his employer, UPS, and its insurer, Liberty Mutual. After his death, his wife, Carra Jane Penegar, continued the claim and added a death benefits claim. The North Carolina Industrial Commission (NCIC) ruled in her favor, ordering Liberty Mutual to cover all medical expenses related to the mesothelioma and reimburse any third parties, including Medicare. The NCIC's decision was affirmed by the North Carolina Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of North Carolina denied further review. In 2020, Penegar and Liberty Mutual settled, with Liberty Mutual agreeing to pay $18,500 and to handle any Medicare liens.Penegar filed a class action lawsuit in the Western District of North Carolina under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act (MSP Act), alleging that Liberty Mutual failed to reimburse Medicare, leading to a collection letter from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) demanding $18,500. Liberty Mutual moved to dismiss, arguing Penegar lacked standing and that the settlement precluded her claims. The district court agreed, finding Penegar lacked standing and dismissed the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Penegar did not suffer a cognizable injury in fact at the time she filed the lawsuit. The NCIC had ordered Liberty Mutual to reimburse Medicare directly, not Penegar, distinguishing her case from Netro v. Greater Baltimore Medical Center, Inc. Additionally, the CMS letter only posed a risk of future harm, which is insufficient for standing in a damages suit. Finally, any out-of-pocket expenses Penegar incurred were already compensated by Liberty Mutual before she filed the lawsuit, negating her claim of monetary injury. View "Penegar v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Detective Frias of the Richmond Police Department observed an Instagram video showing known gang member J.S. and others brandishing firearms at the Belt Atlantic apartment complex. The video, posted shortly before the incident, depicted two men later identified as Anthony Cornelius Brown, Jr., and Dequane Aquil McCullers. Detectives accessed live surveillance footage showing individuals matching the video’s description at the same location. Upon arrival, the officers approached the men, who attempted to walk away. Brown and McCullers were detained and frisked, leading to the discovery of firearms.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Brown and McCullers' motions to suppress the evidence of the firearms. The court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk the defendants based on the video and their behavior. Brown and McCullers entered conditional guilty pleas, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Brown and McCullers based on the Instagram video and their actions upon the officers' arrival. The court also found that the frisk of McCullers was justified as the officers reasonably believed he was armed. Additionally, the court ruled that the length of Brown’s detention was reasonable given the circumstances and the need to ensure officer safety. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motions to suppress. View "US v. Brown" on Justia Law

Krishna P. Sharma Poudel and Binod Dhakal worked as Nepalese-English interpreters for Mid Atlantic Professionals, Inc. (MAPI), serving the U.S. Department of State in Kabul, Afghanistan. They alleged that MAPI failed to pay them all contracted-for and promised wages, including overtime, per diem allowances, and reimbursement for annual trips home. Their employment agreements, executed in Maryland, included a choice-of-law provision specifying Maryland law.The plaintiffs filed their complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, asserting violations of the Maryland Wage and Hour Law (MWHL) and the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law (MWPCL). MAPI moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Maryland’s Wage Laws do not apply extraterritorially, and since the plaintiffs performed no work in Maryland, their claims were barred. The district court granted MAPI’s motion to dismiss, holding that the Wage Laws lacked an express extraterritorial provision and that the plaintiffs did not perform any work in Maryland.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, agreeing that Maryland’s Wage Laws do not apply extraterritorially without some work being performed in Maryland. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the choice-of-law provision in their employment agreements allowed them to bring claims under Maryland’s Wage Laws, noting that Maryland precedent does not support such an extension. The court concluded that the plaintiffs could not maintain their claims under the Wage Laws because they did not perform any work in Maryland. View "Poudel v. Mid Atlantic Professionals, Inc." on Justia Law