Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Simply Wireless, Inc. appealed a district court order dismissing its complaint against Defendants T-Mobile US, Inc. and T-Mobile USA, Inc. (collectively, “T-Mobile”). Upon determining that the parties’ business relationship was governed by a written agreement containing a mandatory arbitration clause, the district court went on to determine that the scope of that arbitration clause included all of Simply Wireless’s claims against T-Mobile. After review, the Fourth Circuit concluded the district court erred in determining the scope of the parties’ arbitration clause, as the parties "clearly and unmistakably" intended for an arbitrator to resolve all arbitrability disputes. Nonetheless, because the parties intended for an arbitrator to resolve all arbitrability disputes, the district court’s ultimate dismissal of Simply Wireless’s complaint in favor of arbitration was proper. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, but on alternate grounds. View "Simply Wireless, Inc. v. T-Mobile US, Inc." on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit vacated defendant's 272-month sentence after he pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. The court agreed with defendant that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately explain the sentence imposed in light of his nonfrivolous arguments for a downward departure. In this case, the district court failed to acknowledge or explain six additional arguments that defendant raised in his sentencing briefs and at his hearing. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Blue" on Justia Law

A disinterested observer could not reasonably conclude that the Commission violated SEC Rule of Practice 900(a). Although Rule 900(a) sets timelines by which the Commission would ideally adjudicate cases, the permissive language of the text could not lead an employee to reasonably conclude that failing to meet such aspirational guidelines would amount to a "violation." Plaintiff petitioned for review of the Board's decision affirming the ALJ's determination that plaintiff was not entitled to relief under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act, 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8). After plaintiff was fired from his position at the SEC, plaintiff claimed that his supervisor terminated him in reprisal for raising concerns about his section's alleged chronic inefficiency. The Second Circuit held that the ALJ did not err in rejecting plaintiff's Rule 900(a) claim and that the ALJ more than adequately explained why an employee in plaintiff's position could not have reasonably concluded that Rule 900(a) was violated. Because the ALJ did not actually analyze plaintiff's claims that he made protected disclosures when he raised concerns that Adjudication violated Rule 900(b), the court remanded the issue to the ALJ. Finally, the court declined to address plaintiff's claims of evidentiary and discovery error. Accordingly, the court denied in part, granted in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Flynn v. SEC" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of BLC's appeal of the bankruptcy court's confirmed reorganization plan for debtor. The court held that BLC's appeal was not equitably moot. On the merits, the court held that the bankruptcy court did not err in calculating the indubitable equivalent of BLC's claim or in calculating the amount of post-petition interest due to BLC. Therefore, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment. View "Bate Land Company LP v. Bate Land & Timber LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his in forma pauperis, 42 U.S.C. 1983 action for failure to state a claim and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Plaintiff, an adherent of the Rastafarian faith, challenged the discontinuation of the Rastafarian worship services in prison. The Fourth Circuit held that failure to exhaust plaintiff's administrative remedies was not a proper basis for dismissal and plaintiff's pro se complaint sufficiently alleged that defendants' refusal to allow the group Rastafarian service substantially burdened his religious practices. However, the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's complaint, except to the extent that the district court dismissed as to Chaplain Menhinick for failure to state a claim. In this case, plaintiff failed to allege involvement by Menhinick necessary to impose liability. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Wilcox v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the administrator of detective David E. Abbott's estate under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the search of his person violated his Fourth Amendment right of privacy or, alternatively, his right of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff also brought a claim under 18 U.S.C. 2255(a), alleging that, as a result of the search, he was the victim of manufactured child pornography. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment with respect to the section 1983 claim alleging a Fourth Amendment violation, holding that a reasonable police officer would have known that attempting to obtain a photograph of a minor child's erect penis, by ordering the child to masturbate in the presence of others, would unlawfully invade the child's right of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the remaining claims. View "Sims v. Labowitz" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for asylum. The court held that the BIA applied the wrong legal standard for assessing asylum eligibility when it categorically held that additional proof of an existing claim did not establish changed circumstances. Accordingly, the court vacated the BIA's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Zambrano v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence after he pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. The court held that defendant's prior North Carolina common law robbery conviction categorically qualified as a felony conviction for a crime of violence, as provided in USSG 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) and defined in USSG 4B1.2(a). The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to support the district court's application of a two-level enhancement under USSG 2K2.1(b)(1)(A), based on the number of weapons involved in the offense, and a four-level enhancement under USSG 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), based on the use or possession of a firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense. View "United States v. Gattis" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the Board's holding that Frontier-Kemper was responsible for the payment of benefits to a coal miner under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 30 U.S.C. 901 et seq. Frontier Constructors and Kemper Construction formed a partnership that worked on heavy construction projects. The Partnership later reorganized into a newly-formed corporation, Frontier-Kemper. The court agreed with the Board that Frontier-Kemper was a successor operator and that the miner's employment with both Frontier-Kemper and the Partnership could be combined in determining Frontier-Kemper's potential liability; there was no retroactive effect in applying the expanded definition of "operator" to the Partnership for the purpose of combining the miner's employment there with his later work at Frontier-Kemper; and the ALJ correctly found that the miner worked for Frontier-Kemper and the Partnership cumulatively for at least one year. View "Frontier-Kemper Constructors, Inc. v. DOWCP" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Westmoreland's petition for review of the Board's final decision and order granting federal disability benefits to plaintiff, a retired coal miner, under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.SC. 901 et seq. The court held that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's decision and order to award plaintiff benefits and the decision otherwise accords with applicable law. In this case, plaintiff timely brought his claim; given the array of evidence presented, substantial evidence supported the ALJ's calculation of plaintiff's smoking history; the ALJ did not err in rejecting Dr. Rosenberg's opinion regarding the ability to show particularized causation; and the ALJ did not reversibly err in concluding that Westmoreland failed to carry its "strict" and "substantial" burden to completely rule out coal dust exposure as a cause of plaintiff's disability. View "Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Stallard" on Justia Law