Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, six men affiliated with the transnational criminal organization MS-13 were convicted of sex trafficking a thirteen-year-old girl by force, fraud, or coercion, and conspiracy to do the same. The accused appealed the district court’s denial of their motions to suppress evidence obtained from Facebook warrants, arguing the warrants failed the probable cause and particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment. One of the accused also appealed the district court’s denial of his motion for acquittal, contending that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction.The court held that the Facebook warrants were supported by probable cause, as they were based on substantial evidence linking the accused’s use of Facebook to their criminal activities. The court also held that the warrants were sufficiently particular as they identified the items to be seized by reference to the suspected criminal offenses and confined the officers’ discretion by restricting them from rummaging through the accused’s social media data in search of unrelated criminal activities. However, the court noted that future warrants enhance their claims to particularity by requesting data only from the period of time during which the defendant was suspected of taking part in the criminal conspiracy.The court rejected one appellant's sufficiency challenge to his conviction and affirmed his convictions, finding that substantial evidence supported the jury’s conclusion that he was guilty of conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking of a minor under fourteen or of a minor by force, fraud, or coercion, and of conspiracy to transport a minor in interstate commerce with intent for the minor to engage in prostitution or illegal sexual activity.Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court in all respects. View "United States v. Zelaya-Veliz" on Justia Law

A former patients of Pediatric Partners for Attention and Learning, Inc. and its founder, Dr. Joni Johnson, sued them in state court after discovering that the clinic’s in-house psychologist, Sharonda Avery, was not a licensed psychologist. The clinic and Dr. Johnson asked their professional liability insurance carrier, Medical Mutual Insurance Company of North Carolina, to defend and indemnify them in those lawsuits. Medical Mutual responded by filing a declaratory judgment action in federal court, arguing that it could rescind the policy covering Pediatric Partners and Dr. Johnson due to Dr. Johnson’s material misstatements in her insurance applications. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that Medical Mutual has no duty to indemnify or defend Dr. Johnson or Pediatric Partners under Virginia law due to material misstatements made by Dr. Johnson in her policy applications. The court affirmed the district court's decision that Dr. Johnson's misrepresentation that none of her employees had been subject to disciplinary investigative proceedings was a material misstatement, and therefore, Medical Mutual could rescind its professional liability policy covering Pediatric Partners and Dr. Johnson. View "Medical Mutual Insurance Co. of North Carolina v. Gnik" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Yagoub Mohamed, a self-employed mechanic, sued Bank of America, alleging that the bank's conduct and error-claim procedures violated the federal Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) and various state laws. Mohamed had applied for unemployment benefits during the COVID-19 pandemic and was found eligible to receive $14,644, which he elected to receive via a Bank of America-issued debit card. However, by the time he received and activated his card, the entire benefit amount had been spent on transactions he did not recognize. The bank opened an error claim and later froze his account due to possible fraud.The district court granted Bank of America's motion to dismiss Mohamed's federal claim, stating that the unemployment benefits he was to receive via a prepaid debit card were not protected by the EFTA. The court did not exercise jurisdiction over the state-law claims.On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that the account in which Mohamed's benefits were held qualified as a "government benefit account" under the EFTA and its implementing regulations. As such, the court concluded that Mohamed had stated a claim under the Act. The court rejected the bank's arguments that it had established the account in question, asserting that the account was established by the state of Maryland, and the bank acted solely under its contract with the state.The court's holding is significant because it clarifies the scope of protection offered by the EFTA for government benefits distributed via prepaid debit cards, and it underlines the responsibilities of banks in managing such accounts. View "Mohamed v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Maurice Owen Wiley, Jr., for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and conspiracy to possess firearms in furtherance of a crime of violence. Wiley and his coconspirators planned to rob the owners of a restaurant, believing the owners kept the business's profits at their home. Wiley drove the group to the owners' home, where they exchanged gunfire with the owners, resulting in the death of one of the owners. Wiley appealed his convictions on several grounds.First, he argued that his indictment for conspiracy to possess firearms in furtherance of a crime of violence failed to state an offense and that the district court constructively amended it. The court rejected this argument, stating that the indictment alleges the statutory conspiracy offense proscribed by § 924(o) by mirroring the statute’s wording, and the government is not required to specify a predicate crime of violence offense in an indictment for a § 924(c) offense.Second, Wiley contended that the district court erred in denying his Batson challenges (claims that the prosecution excluded jurors on the basis of race). The court found no clear error in the district court's denial of Wiley's Batson claim.Third, Wiley argued that the district court violated his due process rights by not allowing him to define “reasonable doubt” in his closing argument. The court rejected this argument, stating that the district court has broad authority to limit closing argument to ensure that it doesn’t impede the fair and orderly conduct of the trial.Lastly, Wiley challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. The court found there was sufficient evidence that Wiley entered into an agreement that contemplated both Hobbs Act robbery and using a firearm to execute the robbery. Additionally, the court found there was sufficient evidence to show that Wiley and his coconspirators targeted the proceeds of a business engaged in interstate commerce. View "US v. Wiley" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had to decide whether a defendant could waive his right to be physically present at a resentencing hearing, and whether such an order denying his request for resentencing in absentia is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The defendant, Heverth Castellon, argued that he could waive his right to be present at the resentencing hearing per Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(c)(1)(B), which allows a defendant who is voluntarily absent during sentencing to waive his right to be present. The district court had ruled that the Rule allows a defendant to exercise this right only by "absconding or disrupting the [sentencing] proceedings."While the court explained that the text of the Rule and their previous precedent suggest that a noncapital defendant can voluntarily waive his right to be present at sentencing, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. This is because the district court's order compelling the defendant's presence at resentencing did not meet the requirements for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine. The court concluded that the defendant’s right to waive his presence at resentencing was not an "important right" that would be lost irreparably if review awaited final judgment, which is a necessary condition for invoking the collateral order doctrine. Therefore, the court could not entertain the defendant's appeal until after the imposition of a sentence. View "US v. Castellon" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered a case involving Gerald Wayne Timms, who was civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, following his sentence for a child pornography conviction. During his civil commitment, Timms was convicted of and sentenced for two separate federal crimes. After serving the prison terms for these offenses, his civil commitment continued. Timms argued that his civil commitment should have ended when his first criminal sentence started, and he claimed that certain conditions of his criminal confinement violated the requirements of the Act. He also contended that the application of the Act violated his constitutional rights.However, the court held that a person ordered to be civilly detained after a finding of sexual dangerousness remains committed until a court finds that he is no longer sexually dangerous and that an intervening criminal sentence has no impact on the civil commitment. The court also held that the Attorney General did not fail to meet his statutory obligation to detain Timms in a suitable facility and that the Attorney General was not required to seek recommitment following Timms' sentences. Thus, the court affirmed the dismissal of Timms' petition for habeas corpus relief. View "Timms v. U. S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

In a federal case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the petitioner, James Rosemond, appealed a district court's dismissal of his habeas corpus petition. Rosemond, who was serving multiple life sentences for offenses related to drug trafficking and murder, claimed that his continued detention was unconstitutional because then-President Donald Trump had commuted his sentence to time served during a phone conversation with two of Rosemond's supporters, Jim Brown and Monique Brown. The Browns signed declarations stating that during the December 2020 call, they believed President Trump had decided to commute Rosemond's sentence. However, no clemency warrant or official record of clemency for Rosemond exists, and his clemency petition is still listed as "pending" on the Department of Justice’s Office of the Pardon Attorney website.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Rosemond’s petition. The court held that while a written document is not constitutionally required for a presidential commutation, the evidence provided by Rosemond, namely the Browns' declarations, did not establish that President Trump actually commuted his sentence. The court found that President Trump's alleged statements during the phone call were forward-looking and indicative of a desire to commute Rosemond's sentence in the future, rather than a declaration of a completed act of clemency. The court also noted the established practice of documenting acts of presidential clemency, which was consistently followed by President Trump throughout his presidency, and emphasized the constitutional separation of powers, which vests the clemency power exclusively in the President. View "Rosemond v. Hudgins" on Justia Law

In this case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the appellant, Ricky Demarco Robinson, challenged the enhanced sentence he received for possession of a firearm by a felon. The enhancement was based on U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2), which increases the advisory sentencing range when the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions qualifying as either a “crime of violence” or a “controlled substance offense.” Robinson argued that his prior conviction for North Carolina assault inflicting physical injury by strangulation should not be deemed a "crime of violence," even though a previous ruling (United States v. Rice) had categorized it as such. Robinson claimed that the Rice decision was no longer binding because it relied on an analysis that the Supreme Court later prohibited in United States v. Taylor. The Taylor decision rejected an analysis that depends on survey evidence as to how the crime is “normally committed or usually prosecuted.”The Court of Appeals disagreed with Robinson's contention. It concluded that the Rice decision remains valid and binding because it was based on an interpretation of the text of the North Carolina assault by strangulation legislation and on North Carolina case law. The court stated that the Rice decision’s reference to survey evidence was only used to confirm the holding and was not fundamental to it. Consequently, the court affirmed Robinson’s enhanced sentence, ruling that his prior North Carolina conviction for assault by strangulation qualifies categorically as a conviction for a crime of violence. View "US v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In a dispute between SmartSky Networks, LLC and DAG Wireless, Ltd., DAG Wireless USA, LLC, Laslo Gross, Susan Gross, Wireless Systems Solutions, LLC, and David D. Gross over alleged breach of contract, trade secret misappropriation, and deceptive trade practices, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that the district court did not have the jurisdiction to enforce an arbitration award. Initially, the case was stayed by the district court pending arbitration. The arbitration tribunal found in favor of SmartSky and issued an award, which SmartSky sought to enforce in district court. The defendants-appellants argued that, based on the Supreme Court decision in Badgerow v. Walters, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the arbitration award. The Fourth Circuit agreed, noting that a court must have a basis for subject matter jurisdiction independent from the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and apparent on the face of the application to enforce or vacate an arbitration award. The court concluded that the district court did not have an independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award. As such, the court reversed and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Smartsky Networks, LLC v. DAG Wireless, LTD." on Justia Law

The case involves Robert Mestanek, a citizen of the Czech Republic, who filed two Form I-130 petitions to establish his eligibility for lawful permanent residence in the United States based on his marriages to two different U.S. citizens. The first petition was filed by his then-wife Angel Simmons, and the second by his current wife Mary Mestanek. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied both petitions, the first on the grounds that Robert’s marriage to Angel was fraudulent, and the second based on the “marriage fraud bar” which prohibits approval of Form I-130 petitions for any noncitizen who has previously been found to have entered into a fraudulent marriage to circumvent immigration laws. The Mestaneks filed suit in federal district court seeking judicial review of USCIS’s denial of Mary’s Form I-130 petition. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of USCIS, and the Mestaneks appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that USCIS’s denial was neither arbitrary nor contrary to law. The court rejected all of the Mestaneks’ arguments, including their contention that USCIS applied the wrong legal standard for marriage fraud, and their assertion that the administrative record was incomplete and insufficient for judicial review. The court also found no due process violation by USCIS. View "Mestanek v. Jaddou" on Justia Law