Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, a class of retirees and their union, filed suit against Constellium after the company unilaterally altered its retiree health benefits program. The district court granted summary judgment to Constellium. The court interpreted Article 15 of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) using ordinary contract principles and concluded that the plain language of the CBA and summary plan description (SPD) clearly indicated that the retiree health benefits did not vest. The court rejected plaintiffs' assertion that the Cap Letters and other provisions of the CBA evince an intent to vest the retiree health benefits. The court also rejected plaintiffs' remaining claims and affirmed the judgment. View "Barton v. Constellium Rolled Products-Ravenwood, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former Battalion Chief, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the County and others, alleging that he was fired in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment free speech rights, and that the Department's social media policy was facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on the First Amendment claim, and dismissed as moot the facial challenge to the social media policy. The court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants as to the First Amendment claim. In this case, at least some of plaintiff's Facebook activity prompting his termination implicated matters of public concern, and the Department's interest in workplace efficiency and preventing disruption outweighed the public interest commentary contained in plaintiff's Facebook activity. Because the court found that the district court properly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment against plaintiff, the court declined to review the as-applied challenge. The court concluded that the third-party facial challenge was properly dismissed as moot where defendants have adopted a new social media policy and revised code of conduct, as well as declared that the Department has no intent to reenact the offending policies. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Buker v. Howard County" on Justia Law

This case involved the differences between how ad valorem taxes are determined in South Carolina for railroad property and how they are determined for most other commercial and industrial property. CSXT filed suit against the State, alleging that the property taxes imposed for the 2014 tax year will discriminate against CSXT. CSXT sought a judgment declaring that excluding CSXT from the benefit of the caps of the South Carolina Real Property Valuation Reform Act (SCVA), S.C. Code 12-37-3140(B), violates the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, 49 U.S.C. 11501(b)(4), which prohibits the imposition of "another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier." CSXT also sought preliminary and permanent injunctions. The district court ultimately rejected CSXT's section 11501(b)(4) challenge. The court explained that Congress designed section 11501(b)(4) to prohibit taxes that discriminate against railroads. In this case, CSXT alleged that if it is not allowed to benefit from the SCVA cap, its 2014 property tax will be just such a tax. The court concluded that there was no basis for precluding CSXT from proving the claim it alleged – discrimination – and requiring CSXT instead to fit its challenge into a provision that does not even address discrimination and that required proof of facts CSXT has not even alleged. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings because the district court granted judgment against CSXT without ever reaching the question of whether the challenged tax was discriminatory. View "CSX Transportation, Inc. v. South Carolina Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action against Machine Zone, alleging a claim under Maryland's gambling loss recovery statute, Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law 12-110. Plaintiff claimed that she and thousands of similarly situated individuals lost money participating in an unlawful "gaming device," a component of Game of War that allows players to "spin" a virtual wheel to win virtual prizes for use within that video game. Plaintiff also asserted claims on her behalf and or the alleged class under the California Penal Code, and the California Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200, et seq., as well as a common law claim of unjust enrichment. The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff appealed only from the district court's dismissal of her claim under the Loss Recovery Statute. The court held that the district court correctly concluded that plaintiff did not "lose money" within the meaning of the Loss Recovery Statute as a result of her participation in the Game of War casino. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Mason v. Machine Zone, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging fraud and conspiracy and seeking as damages the difference between the price he paid and the actual value of the restaurants he purchased from defendants based on a multiple of the restaurants' actual sales. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, concluding that plaintiff failed to introduce adequate evidence of damages, particularly of the actual value of the restaurants at the time of the sale. The court vacated and remanded, concluding that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to create a dispute of material fact as to the amount of their damages. In this case, plaintiff attempted to estimate with reasonable precision the actual value of the restaurants at the time of purchase, using the widely accepted income-based approach with a capitalization multiplier that was purportedly the industry standard and that the parties allegedly used to agree on the $600,000 purchase price. View "Sharma v. USA International, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a qui tam suit under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, and the state equivalents, alleging that Manor Care was overbilling the government for medical services. Plaintiff also alleged a separate claim of retaliation, claiming that he was terminated after he notified his employer of the alleged overbilling. Christine A. Ribik had previously filed a qui tam suit under seal in the Eastern District of Virginia on behalf of the United States against Manor Care. The court dismissed the complaint under the FCA's first-to-file rule. The court concluded that plaintiff has not managed to avoid the first-to-file bar simply by alleging additional facts relating to how Manor Care overbilled, even though some of those specific allegations were not mentioned in Ribik's complaint. The court also concluded that plaintiff's alternative argument, that his complaint should not be dismissed because the district court consolidated them with Ribik's, failed under the plain language of the FCA. Therefore, the district court properly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's qui tam action under the FCA. The court concluded, however, that the first-to-file rule has no relation to a claim for retaliation. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not support its decision with any discussion or authority to establish that any of the states apply the FCA first-to-file rule, or its equivalent, to that state's statute. Therefore, the court affirmed in part, but vacated and remanded that part of the judgment concerning plaintiff's retaliation and state fraud claims. View "US ex rel. Carson v. Manor Care, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to manufacturing child pornography. The district court determined that defendant's previous convictions for taking indecent liberties with children, N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-202.1, constituted a state law "relating to the sexual exploitation of children" and sentenced defendant to 45 years in prison. The court concluded that the district court correctly concluded that defendant's conviction for taking indecent liberties with children under North Carolina law related to the "sexual exploitation of children" for the purposes of the 18 U.S.C. 2251(e) enhancement. The court also concluded that, even assuming the district court committed an error, the error did not affect defendant's substantial rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Mills" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual battery of a mentally incapacitated victim. Defendant began a term of supervised probation after his prison sentence which required that defendant attend a Sex Offender Treatment Program. During an interview in the program, defendant disclosed details about his sexual history, including his sexual contact with minors and commission of forcible sexual assaults, as well as his involvement in two murders. Defendant later plead guilty to violating the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. 2250, and the district court denied defendant's motion to exclude from consideration at sentencing his admissions of criminal activity made in the treatment program. Defendant argued that the statements he made were protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The court concluded that defendant affirmatively waived any psychotherapist-patient privilege when he agreed as part of his conditions of probation in the prior case to the disclosure of any statements he made in the treatment program; the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination did not apply to those statements, because defendant voluntarily made the statements while participating in the treatment program; and therefore the district court did not err in considering defendant's statements at sentencing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Lara" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion for post-conviction relief. Defendant's sentence included an enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), based in part on his prior conviction for the Virginia crime of common law robbery as a qualifying predicate "violent felony." The court agreed with the district court's rejection of the government's procedural arguments because defendant sufficiently has shown that he relied on a new rule of constitutional law under Johnson v. United States. The court held, however, that defendant's conviction for Virginia common law robbery does not constitute a violent felony under the ACCA, because the full range of conduct covered by the Virginia crime does not necessarily include the use of "force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person." Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "United States v. Winston" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Honduras, sought review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's conclusion that she was not eligible for asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner argued that she feared persecution on account of her nuclear family ties to her husband Johnny Martinez, whom she suspected had been murdered by his employer. The court granted the petition and remanded, concluding that petitioner's familial relationship with Martinez necessarily was one central reason for the persecution and fear of future persecution established by her, thereby meeting the statutory "nexus requirement" for asylum provided in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). View "Cantillano Cruz v. Sessions" on Justia Law