Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to Maryland's firearms regulatory scheme, arguing that the scheme is unconstitutional as applied to him. Plaintiff is a convicted felon in Virginia who has had his civil rights restored by the Governor of Virginia and his firearms rights restored by the Virginia courts. Currently a resident of Maryland, plaintiff wants to obtain a permit for a handgun and possess a long gun, both of which he is unable to do in Maryland absent a full pardon from the Governor of Virginia. The district court dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim. The court held that a state law felon cannot pass the first step of the United States v. Chester inquiry when bringing an as-applied challenge to a law disarming felons, unless that person has received a pardon or the law forming the basis of conviction has been declared unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful. The court further held that evidence of rehabilitation, the likelihood of recidivism, and the passage of time may not be considered at the first step of the Chester inquiry as a result. Therefore, the court concluded that plaintiff failed at step one of the Chester analysis. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Hamilton v. Pallozzi" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the dismissal of their pro se complaint that, inter alia, sought a declaration that Chase and U.S. Bank could not foreclose on their home. The district court dismissed certain counts based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 12 U.S.C. 1821, and other counts for failure to state a claim. The court affirmed, concluding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over most of the counts (Counts 1, 2, 5-9, and 16-19) that plaintiffs appeal because they failed to exhaust their claims with the FDIC. The court further concluded that the other relevant counts for constructive fraud (Count 14) and negligence (Count 15) failed to state a claim. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by not providing a reason for denying plaintiffs' requests to amend their complaint. View "Willner v. Dimon" on Justia Law

Two police officers appealed their dismissal from the force, alleging retaliation for the exercise of their First Amendment rights. The district court granted qualified immunity to the police chief. The court held that the chief is entitled to qualified immunity because he could reasonably have believed that the officers were acting as police officers rather than private citizens and believed that the officers' conversation with an individual arrested by another officer was surreptitious conduct designed to foment complaints and litigation against a supervisor with whom they did not get along. In this case, the chief saw this behavior as a serious threat to the smooth running of the police department and to his own ability to maintain operational control. The court explained that the chief could reasonably have viewed the department's interest in maintaining discipline as paramount in the Pickering balance. Because the court found that the law was not clearly established here, the court declined to determine whether a constitutional violation actually occurred. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Crouse v. Town of Moncks Corner" on Justia Law

Relators filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, alleging that Agape fraudulently billed Medicare and other federal health care programs for services to thousands of patients. The district court determined that using statistical sampling to prove relators' case would be improper. The district court also rejected a proposed settlement between relators and Agape, because the Attorney General of the United States objected to it. The district court concluded that the Government — despite not having intervened in an FCA qui tam action — possesses an unreviewable veto authority over the action's proposed settlement. Then the district court certified both its rulings for these interlocutory appeals. The court concluded that, under the plain language of section 3730(b)(1), the Attorney General possesses an absolute veto power over voluntary settlements in FCA qui tam actions. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's unreviewable veto ruling. In regard to the statistical sampling ruling, the court concluded that relators' appeal does not present a pure question of law that is subject to the court's interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b). Accordingly, the court dismissed as improvidently granted relators' appeal as to this rule. View "United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Community" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 45-month sentence after pleading guilty to mailing a threatening letter in violation of 18 U.S.C. 876(c). Defendant's conviction stemmed from him sending a threatening letter to a federal courthouse that was covered with white powder. The court concluded that defendant failed to establish that any lack of notice of the district court's intention to depart from the advisory Guidelines range affected his substantial rights. The court rejected defendant's claim that the severity of the sentence rested on improper sentencing factors and unfounded factual findings. In this case, the inferences drawn by the district court were within the bounds of its discretion. Because defendant's sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Spencer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former assistant county attorney, was terminated from her employment after she was elected to the City Counsel. Plaintiff filed suit challenging the County Attorney's decision to terminate her employment, contending that the County Attorney's actions violated her rights under the federal and state constitution, as well as a county ordinance. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court explained that, although plaintiff claims her termination was in violation of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has made clear that public employers may permissibly bar their employees from participating in a wide array of political activities, including running for elective office. In this case, the record reflects multiple potential points of conflict that could face plaintiff as a member of the City Council and an attorney in the Fairfax County Attorney’s Office. Therefore, the court rejected plaintiff's First Amendment arguments. Because plaintiff's termination did not violate the First Amendment, her section 1983 claim was also properly dismissed. Finally, the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's state law claim under Virginia Code 15.2-1512.2 and Fairfax County Ordinance 3-1-19. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Loftus v. Bobzien" on Justia Law

Verisign filed suit against XYZ and its CEO Daniel Negari, alleging that defendants' statements regarding the scarcity of desirable .com domain names violated the Lanham Act's, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)(1)(B), false advertising provisions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of XYZ. The court agreed with the district court that Verisign failed to establish the elements of a Lanham Act claim. In regard to XYZ's self-promoting statements, the court held that Verisign failed to produce the required evidence that it suffered an actual injury as a direct result of XYZ’s conduct. Nor can Verisign establish that XYZ’s statements about the availability of suitable .com domain names were false or misleading statements of fact. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "VeriSign v. XYZ.com" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Applications Developer for the CIA, was a covert employee who suffered from narcolepsy. Plaintiff first filed suit against the Agency, alleging discrimination and ultimately termination based on his disability, failure to accommodate, and retaliation. While the motion for summary judgment was pending on the first suit, plaintiff filed suit against the same defendants, alleging disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 791 et seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. In this case, even if plaintiff establishes a prima facie case for his claims, the court found that its precedent nonetheless requires dismissal because any defense to these claims that the government could offer would undoubtedly rely on privileged information. Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that the information at issue is properly privileged and that litigation of the case would present an unjustifiable risk of disclosure of that information. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Abilt v. CIA" on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks review of the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief. Defendant argued that his petition was not time-barred because it was filed within one year of his discovery of his petitions' factual predicates -- his incorrect blood type and factual findings in the Zain III report -- which he argues could not have been discovered sooner. The court found, however, that had petitioner exercised due diligence, he would have discovered the factual predicates far earlier. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the petition. View "Gray v. Ballard" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, veterans who received medical treatment and health care at the Dorn VAMC, filed separate actions against the Secretary of Veterans Affairs and Dorn VAMC officials, alleging violations of the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552(a) et seq., and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq. Plaintiffs sought to establish Article III standing based on the harm from the increased risk of future identity theft and the cost of measures to protect against it. The district court dismissed based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, concluding that plaintiffs failed to establish a non-speculative, imminent injury-in-fact for purposes of Article III standing. View "Beck v. McDonald" on Justia Law