Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against law enforcement officers and others, alleging violation of her constitutional rights when she was arrested and held in police custody for eighty days. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding that the officers had probable cause to believe plaintiff illegally possessed and sold crack. The court concluded that the district court properly stylized plaintiff's false arrest claims against the investigating officers as malicious prosecution claims. The court also concluded that Officer Munday's application for an arrest warrant lacked probable cause and thus violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. In this case, Munday had no evidence about plaintiff's conduct whatsoever, let alone any evidence connecting her to the crime in question. Because it would be unreasonable for any officer to view Munday's dearth of evidence as sufficient to establish probable cause, he is not entitled to qualified immunity. The court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded to the district court to consider in the first instance plaintiff's state-law claims against all of the individual officers, and negligent-supervision and pattern-or-practice theories of liability against the Chief of Police and City of Lincolnton. The court affirmed as to the false arrest claim against Officers Greene and Lesassier because the officers merely executed the arrest as they were required to do, pursuant to a facially valid warrant. View "Smith v. Munday" on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty to one count of Hobbs Act robbery, one count under the carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. 2119, and one count of discharging a firearm during a carjacking. On appeal, defendant challenges the district court's ruling that the federal offense of carjacking qualified as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The court affirmed the judgment, agreeing with the district court that the carjacking statute qualifies as a crime of violence under Section 924(c), because the carjacking statute "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another." View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law

The Foundation agreed to lend $2 million pursuant to a loan agreement to Al-Harmoosh for a company headquartered in Iraq. After Mohammed Harmoosh, a managing partner of the company, refused to pay the loan, the Foundation filed suit for breach of contract in Maryland. Harmoosh moved to dismiss based on an arbitration clause in the loan agreement. The district court dismissed the Foundation's complaint. The Foundation later filed another suit against Harmoosh to collect on the promissory note, this time in the Court of First Instance for Commercial Disputes in Baghdad. After the Foundation and Harmoosh litigated their dispute to final judgment in Iraq, the Foundation filed suit in the District of Maryland, seeking recognition of the Iraqi judgment under the Maryland Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. 10-701 et seq. The Foundation also alleged that Harmoosh fraudulently conveyed some of his assets both before and after the Iraqi judgment was rendered. The district court granted summary judgment to Harmoosh on the Maryland Recognition Act claim, and granted Harmoosh's motion to compel arbitration. The court held that judicial proceedings in a foreign court are not "contrary to" an arbitration clause for the purpose of the Maryland Recognition Act if the parties choose to forego their rights to arbitrate by paricipating in those proceedings. The court also concluded that the Foundation raised genuine issues of material fact that preclude a summary judgment holding that Harmoosh preserved his arbitration rights. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Iraq Middle Market Development v. Harmoosh" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Nepal, challenges the BIA's finding of removeability under Section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). Section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) authorizes the removal of any alien who "is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years . . . after the date of admission." Petitioner was considered removeable based on the determination that his 2007 embezzlement conviction constituted a crime involving moral turpitude. The court accorded Chevron deference to the BIA's decision in Matter of Alyazji, to determine that petitioner's relevant "date of admission" was January 18, 2003: the date he was most recently admitted to the United States after taking a brief vacation abroad. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Sijapati v. Boente" on Justia Law

Howard and Nancy Nease filed a products liability suit against Ford, alleging that Howard sustained serious injuries in an accident caused by a design defect in the speed control system of his 2001 Ford Ranger pickup truck. The jury awarded plaintiffs over $3 million in damages. The district court denied Ford's post-trial motions. The court concluded that the expert testimony of Samuel Sero regarding the speed control cable should not have been admitted. The court explained that Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. applies to Sero's testimony and the district court did not perform its gatekeeping duties with respect to Sero’s testimony. In this case, Sero’s testimony should have been excluded under Daubert because it was unsupported. Without any other expert testimony to establish that the 2001 Ford Ranger was defectively designed and that there were safer alternative designs available that a reasonably prudent manufacturer would have adopted, the court concluded that the Neases cannot prove their case under West Virginia law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in Ford's favor. View "Nease v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

The Chapter 7 trustee of James Edwards Whitley's estate challenges the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgment for the Bank on the trustee’s claim that certain deposits and wire transfers to Whitley’s personal checking account at the Bank are avoidable as fraudulent transfers. The court found that the transactions at issue do not constitute transfers within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. The court explained that when a debtor deposits or receives a wire transfer of funds into his own unrestricted checking account in the regular course of business, he has not transferred those funds to the bank that operates the account. When the debtor is still free to access those funds at will, the requisite “disposing of” or “parting with” property has not occurred; there has not been a “transfer” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. 101(54). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ivey v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co." on Justia Law

Defendant appeals her conviction for one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud and mail fraud and ten counts of bank fraud for her role in originating and submitting fraudulent mortgage loan applications. Defendant raised several issues on appeal. The court concluded that defendant failed to establish any Sixth Amendment error where the district court allowed the government's pretrial seizure of defendant's assets where the seizure did not prevent defendant from being represented by her counsel of choice; the evidence was sufficient to support the conspiracy conviction; the court rejected defendant's evidentiary challenges; the evidence was sufficient to support the bank fraud convictions; the court rejected defendant's argument that the government constructively amended the indictment; the district court had jurisdiction to enter the preliminary and final forfeiture orders after the October 3 hearing; and the court rejected defendant's challenge to the district court’s substitute property order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Chittenden" on Justia Law

After defendant pled guilty to distribution of a quantity of cocaine base, he appealed the district court's application of the modified categorical approach when it determined that his prior state court attempt conviction qualified as a controlled substance offense under USSG 4B1.2. Defendant also argued that West Virginia’s general attempt statute criminalized more conduct than a generic controlled substance offense. The court concluded that the district court erred in applying the modified categorical approach to the West Virginia general attempt statute; held that sentencing courts must compare the state and generic elements of such statutes as well as the elements of the underlying substantive statutory offense when determining whether a prior attempt conviction qualifies as a controlled substance offense; and concluded that the district court failed to make these required comparisons. The court explained, however, that under the correct approach, defendant's attempt conviction properly constitutes a controlled substance offense under USSG 4B1.2. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Dozier" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, Sears, alleging misrepresentation, constructive fraud, and infliction of emotional distress. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that Sears improperly administered life insurance benefits. The district court dismissed the complaint. Sonoco Prods. Co. v. Physicians Health Plan, Inc. held that section 502(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a), preempts a state law claim when: the plaintiff has standing, the claim must fail under the scope of an ERISA provision that can enforce via section 502(a), and the claim must not be capable of resolution without an interpretation of the contract governed by federal law. Because plaintiff's claims meets all three prongs of the Sonoco test, the court concluded that ERISA completely preempts his claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Prince v. Sears Holdings Corp." on Justia Law

After defendant was charged with illegal reentry and failure to register as a sex offender, he argued that his underlying convictions for three counts of indecent liberties with a child under North Carolina law were unconstitutional in light of Padilla v. Kentucky. Padilla held that the Sixth Amendment requires a defense attorney to advise a non-citizen client of the immigration risks of a guilty plea. A North Carolina court, relying on Padilla, did vacate defendant's convictions in 2015. The court concluded that the alleged constitutional deficiency in defendant's state convictions had no effect on his subsequent prosecution for illegal reentry. The court explained that because Padilla does not apply retroactively to defendants like defendant, convicted before the case was decided, defendant's convictions remain valid today as a matter of federal law, and his attempt to collaterally attack his 2009 removal is unavailing on that ground alone. Because the district court properly denied defendant's motion to vacate the 2009 removal order and to withdraw his guilty plea to the charge of illegal reentry, and because there is no error in the district court’s reliance on the vacated state convictions in determining defendant's sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Moreno-Tapia" on Justia Law