Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 13 petition that included a mortgage claim held by PNC and secured by a deed of trust on debtor's primary residence. The anti-modification clause in 11 U.S.C. 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code protects a mortgagee from having its claim in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding modified, if the mortgage is secured “only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence.” The court held that reference in the Deed of Trust to escrow funds, insurance proceeds, or miscellaneous proceeds constitute incidental property, rather than additional collateral, which entitles debtor to anti-modification protection under section 1322(b)(2). In this case, the Deed of Trust on debtor's residence is secured only by real property that is also his principal residence. Escrow funds, insurance proceeds, and miscellaneous proceeds do not constitute additional collateral. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Birmingham v. PNC Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Defendant signed a plea agreement in which the government agreed to seek a sentence at the lowest end of the “applicable guideline range.” After the government recommended a sentence at the lowest end of the guideline range found by the district court, defendant appealed. The court held that, in this case, the phrase “applicable guideline range” only obligated the government to recommend a sentence at the lowest end of the guideline range found by the district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Tate" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Maryland Transit Administration, alleging violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. Plaintiff suffers from cerebral palsy and uses a walker or crutches. She alleges that on numerous occasions, bus operators refused to use an assistance lift or otherwise assist her in boarding the bus. The district court applied the two-year statute of limitations from Maryland’s Anti-Discrimination Law, Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t 20–1035, 20-1013, and dismissed the suit as untimely. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that, because the Maryland Law does not contain a cause of action for disability discrimination in the provision of public services, the closer state-law analog to plaintiff's claim is a general civil action, which is subject to a three year statute of limitations. In this case, the complaint alleges discrimination occurring within three years of its filing. View "Brilliant Semenova v. MD Transit Administration" on Justia Law

QinetiQ, the successor in interest to DTRI, contends that the stock issued to an executive employee of DTRI was issued in connection with the executive’s employment and was subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture until 2008. QinetiQ argues that it is entitled to a tax deduction for the value of the stock as a trade or business expense in the tax year ending March 31, 2009. The IRS issued a Notice of Deficiency concluding that QinetiQ had not shown its entitlement to the claimed deduction. The court concluded that the IRS complied with all applicable procedural requirements in issuing the Notice of Deficiency to QinetiQ; the tax court did not err in concluding that the stock failed to qualify as a deductible expense for the tax year ending March 31, 2009, because the stock was not issued subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture; and thus the court affirmed the judgment. View "QinetiQ US Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner of IRS" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to traveling in foreign commerce and engaging in illicit sexual conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2423(c). The district court agreed with defendant that, as a matter of law, he did not travel in foreign commerce in connection with his illicit sexual conduct and is thus actually innocent of the offense. The court concluded, however, that defendant is not actually innocent of the section 2423(c) offense because defendant was still traveling in foreign commerce from the time he departed the United States until the time of his illicit sexual conduct in Cambodia. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

After debtors filed for bankruptcy relief, the Bankruptcy Administrator, Marjorie Lynch, moved to dismiss the case as an abuse because debtors used the National and Local Standard amounts for certain categories of expenses rather than the actual amount of their expenses, which were less than the standardized amounts. The bankruptcy court denied the motion to dismiss. The court granted the appeal as to the issue of whether 11 U.S.C. 707(b)(2) permits a debtor to take the full National and Local Standard amounts for expenses even though the debtor incurs actual expenses that are less than the standard amounts. The court concluded that debtors are entitled to the full National and Local Standard amount for a category of expenses if they incur an expense in that category. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court. View "Lynch v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, several environmental groups, filed suit against the Fola Coal Company alleging that it had violated the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1251, and seeking injunctive relief. Plaintiffs alleged that the company discharged ions and sulfates in sufficient quantities to cause increased conductivity in the Stillhouse Branch tributary and waterway, which resulted in a violation of water quality standards. The district court found that the company had indeed violated the Act and ordered it to take corrective measures. The court concluded that, because the company did not comply with the conditions of its National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit, the permit does not shield it from liability under the CWA. Therefore, the district court properly ordered appropriate remedial measures. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. Fola Coal Company, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., alleging that Navy officers negligently allowed a training structure to remain in a dangerous condition and failed to warn her of the dangerous gap between the mats placed adjacent to the structure. Plaintiff, a sheriff's deputy, was seriously injured when she jumped from the structure onto the set of mats and landed in a gap between them. The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the challenged Navy conduct fell within the FTCA’s “discretionary function exception” and therefore that Congress had not waived sovereign immunity for plaintiff's claim. The court affirmed and concluded that the Navy’s decisions regarding the maintenance of its military bases for use by civilian law enforcement involved policy judgments that Congress sought to shield from tort liability under the FTCA. View "Wood v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendant, individually and in his official capacity as a state trooper, alleging federal claims of unlawful arrest, retaliatory arrest, and excessive force, and state claims of outrage/intentional infliction of emotional distress and battery. On appeal, defendant challenges the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court explained that, under West Virginia law, police officers have the authority to effect an arrest for minor traffic violations, including the one at issue here. The district court’s determination that defendant arrested plaintiff “in practicality” for assault and obstruction of justice, instead of an expired inspection sticker, is irrelevant. Therefore, the district court erred in failing to grant summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff's claim of unlawful arrest. The probable cause inherent in plaintiff's minor traffic violation also defeats his First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim. In this case, plaintiff claims abrasions minor enough that he treated them at home with Neosporin and peroxide and did not seek medical assistance. The court held that an efficient, lawful arrest of a resisting suspect that causes the suspect to suffer only de minimis injuries does not constitute excessive force. Because defendant's actions were objectively reasonable and he is entitled to qualified immunity, the court concluded that the district court erred in holding otherwise. Finally, the court concluded that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on the state claims. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions. View "Pegg v. Herrnberger" on Justia Law

Defendant Muldrow and Gomez were convicted of drug offenses in unrelated cases. In this appeal, defendants challenge the district court’s determination that the Guidelines commentary -- as amended by United States Sentencing Guideline Amendment 759 -- requires a district court at resentencing to calculate the “applicable guideline range” without applying any departures or variances from a defendant’s original sentencing range. The court concluded that Amendment 759’s clarifying definition is consistent with the text of USSG 1B1.10, and the court saw no inconsistency between the Guidelines and the commentary as revised by Amendment 759. The court joined its sister circuits and held that Amendment 759 binds sentencing courts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Muldrow" on Justia Law