Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Champion Pro filed suit against Impact Sports and others, principally alleging that Impact Sports engaged in deceptive and unfair practices in violation of the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Practices Act (UDTPA), N.C. Gen. Stat. 75–1.1, by their recruitment of a football player, Robert Quinn. The court affirmed the district court's denial in part of Champion Pro's motion for sanctions based on the alleged spoliation of evidence and grant of Impact Sports motion for summary judgment on all claims. The court agreed with the district court that Champion Pro's allegations, even when assumed to be true, are insufficient to establish a violation of the UDTPA. Likewise, Champion Pro's civil conspiracy claim fails as a matter of law. Finally, Champion Pro's claim that the district court erred in failing to award sanctions in the form of an adverse jury instruction is moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Champion Pro Consulting Group v. Impact Sports Football" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Army Reservist and fifth grade teacher, filed suit against the Board. Plaintiff claimed that she was improperly reemployed in violation of Section 4313 of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4313, because her mental state rendered her unqualified, and the Board’s allegedly hostile work environment triggered or exacerbated her disability. Plaintiff was reemployed by the Board after her deployment, but eventually terminated based on her deficient performance. The Board later discovered that plaintiff was disabled due to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The district court granted summary judgment to the Board. The court affirmed the judgment because Section 4313 cannot serve as a basis for claims involving acts occurring after reemployment, and because plaintiff has no available remedies. View "Butts v. Prince William County School Board" on Justia Law

Scottsdale are respondents in an ongoing disciplinary proceeding before FINRA for allegedly selling unregistered securities in violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77e, and FINRA Rule 2010. Scottsdale sought an injunction in federal district court before FINRA completed its proceedings, claiming the FINRA proceeding is unauthorized because FINRA may only discipline members for violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq. The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Because Scottsdale can obtain meaningful judicial review of its claim in this court following the appeal process outlined in the Exchange Act, the court held that its challenge to FINRA’s authority is the type of claim Congress intended to be reviewed within the statutory scheme. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and affirmed the judgment. View "Scottsdale Capital Advisors v. FINRA" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Securities and Exchange Commission instituted an administrative proceeding against Dawn Bennett and her law firm (collectively, Bennett) to determine whether Bennett had violated the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. The Commission assigned the initial stages of the proceeding to an ALJ, and the ALJ scheduled a hearing on the merits of Bennett’s case. Bennett subsequently filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the administrative enforcement proceeding. Specifically, the Complaint alleged that the SEC’s administrative enforcement proceedings violated Article II of the United States Constitution. The district court dismissed the suit on jurisdictional grounds. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that Congress has impliedly divested district-court jurisdiction over the agency action. View "Bennett v. U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission" on Justia Law

Police Chief Dixon revised a department policy governing officers’ use of social media platforms: “Negative comments on the internal operations of the Bureau, or specific conduct of supervisors or peers that impacts the public’s perception of the department is not protected by the First Amendment . … Officers may comment on issues of general or public concern (as opposed to personal grievances) so long as the comments do not disrupt the workforce, interfere with important working relationships or efficient work flow, or undermine public confidence in the officer.” The policy “strongly discourages employees from posting information regarding off-duty activities.” While off-duty, officers Liverman and Richards posted messages to Facebook, concerning “rookie cops” being given duties without adequate training, and referencing an unnamed supervisor who had not earned respect. Each received an oral reprimand and six months’ probation. Weeks later, Dixon altered another policy, excluding officers on probation from participating in the promotion process. The officers became ineligible to sit for the promotional exam. They indicated that they intended to challenge the disciplinary actions. Shortly thereafter, they were the subject of several complaints and investigations. Dixon decided to fire Liverman. The officers filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court found that Dixon was entitled to qualified immunity because the policy fell within a “gray zone” and concluded that the internal investigations were not retaliatory. The Fourth Circuit reversed in part, acknowledging need for discipline, but stating that the policy and the disciplinary actions taken pursuant to it would, if upheld, lead to an utter lack of transparency in law enforcement operations that the First Amendment cannot countenance. View "Liverman v. City of Petersburg" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Va. Code 24.2-643(B), the voter identification law enacted as part of SB 1256. Plaintiffs alleged that the statutory requirement that voters present photo identification when they vote or shortly thereafter violates the Voting Rights Act and the federal Constitution. Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed hat the photo identification requirement “unduly burdens the right to vote, imposes discriminatory burdens on African Americans and Latinos, and was enacted with the intent to discriminate against minorities, young voters, and Democrats.” Following a bench trial, the district court entered final judgment against Plaintiffs. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the substance of SB 1256 does not impose an undue burden on minority voting, and there was no evidence that there was racially discriminatory intent in the law’s enactment. View "Lee v. Virginia State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the proposed construction of a twenty-two-mile toll road in North Carolina called the Gaston East-West Connector. Two Conservation Groups brought suit against the North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT), the Federal Highway Administration (collectively, the Agencies), and others, challenging the environmental analysis conducted for the Connector. The district court granted summary judgment for the Conservation Groups, concluding that the alternatives analysis underlying the Connector violated National Environmental Policy Act and the Administrative Procedure Act and that the Agencies failed adequately to assess and disclose the Connector’s environmental impacts. NCDOT appealed. Before the district court ruled, however, the Connector was stripped of its funding, and the statute that expressly authorized its construction was repealed. Following the district court’s ruling, the Connector was removed from local and state transportation plans. The Fourth District vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions that the district court dismiss the action, holding that the appeal was moot where the Connector was no longer viable. View "Catawba Riverkeeper Foundation v. North Carolina Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

After a jury trial in 2009, Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base and a related firearms conspiracy. The district court applied the maximum base offense level for drug-trafficking crimes under the Guidelines given the quantity of cocaine base attributable to Defendant. Following the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines with respect to cocaine base offenses by increasing the minimum quantity of cocaine base necessary to trigger the maximum base offense level from 8.4 to 25.2 kilograms. In 2015, Defendant moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The district court denied the motion, concluding that the quantity of controlled substance in the offense of conviction rendered Defendant ineligible for a sentence reduction under the retroactive crack amendment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court adequately explained why it found Defendant ineligible; and (2) the district court did not err by finding Defendant responsible for at least 25.2 kilograms of cocaine base. View "United States v. Peters" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for unlicensed dealing in firearms and conspiracy to deal firearms without a license. After the district court denied defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, he timely appealed. The court held that the prohibition against unlicensed firearm dealing comports with the Second and Fifth Amendments both facially and as applied. The court also concluded that the unlicensed dealing of firearms, even in intrastate sales, implicates interstate commerce and may be constitutionally regulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Hosford" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, seeks review of the BIA's decision finding him removable based on his conviction for “Third Degree Sex Offense” under Maryland Criminal Law Article 3-307. The court concluded that the BIA erred as a matter of law, and held that petitioner's conviction does not constitute the aggravated felony of “sexual abuse of a minor” under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A), because Maryland Criminal Law Article 3-307 proscribes more conduct than does the generic federal offense. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the order of removal, and ordered his immediate release from DHS custody. View "Larios-Reyes v. Lynch" on Justia Law