Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves two companies, Skyline Tower Painting, Inc. (Skyline) and Television Tower, Inc. (TTI), which were sued by a group of plaintiffs for allegedly causing lead paint contamination in a Baltimore neighborhood. TTI owns a TV tower that was coated with lead-based paint, and Skyline was contracted to clean the tower using hydroblasting, a process that dislodged and dispersed the lead paint. The plaintiffs, who own property within a 4000-foot radius of the tower, claimed that the hydroblasting caused lead paint chips and dust to spread throughout their community, posing health risks and reducing property values.The plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit in Maryland state court, asserting claims for negligence, negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, and strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity. The defendants removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). The plaintiffs moved to remand the case to state court, invoking CAFA’s local-controversy exception. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted the motion to remand, finding that the local-controversy exception applied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court first determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, despite the defendants also filing petitions for permission to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1453. The court dismissed the § 1453 petitions as unnecessary. On the merits, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the local-controversy exception to CAFA applied. The court found that more than two-thirds of the proposed class members were Maryland citizens, and that TTI, a Maryland citizen, was a significant defendant from whom significant relief was sought and whose conduct formed a significant basis for the claims. View "Skyline Tower Painting, Inc. v. Goldberg" on Justia Law

Jonathan Alexander Colorado Navarro, a former MS-13 gang member, came to the United States after killing three people in El Salvador. He initially omitted this information in his asylum applications, only fully confessing during his testimony before an Immigration Judge (IJ). Despite these omissions and other lies, the IJ found him credible and concluded that he qualified for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), based on the likelihood of being tortured in El Salvador.The Department of Homeland Security issued Colorado a Notice to Appear, charging him with being in the country illegally. At his initial immigration court hearing, he admitted his illegal status and sought asylum and CAT protection. Colorado went through three asylum applications, each progressively revealing more information about his past crimes. The IJ granted him deferral of removal under CAT, finding his testimony credible and determining that he was likely to be tortured if returned to El Salvador.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reviewed the IJ's decision and reversed it, finding clear error in the IJ's credibility determination and the likelihood of torture analysis. The BIA noted inconsistencies and omissions in Colorado's applications and testimony, undermining his credibility. The BIA also found that the evidence did not support the IJ's conclusion that Colorado was likely to be tortured, either by Salvadoran officials or gangs, if returned.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision. The court found that substantial evidence supported the BIA's conclusions. The court agreed that Colorado's omissions and inconsistent explanations undermined his credibility and that the evidence did not establish a sufficient likelihood of torture. The court also noted that Colorado's claim that the BIA should have remanded the case for further testimony was unreviewable because it was not raised before the BIA. Consequently, the court denied Colorado's petition for review. View "Colorado Navarro v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The case involves Jane Roe, a student at Marshall University, who was sexually assaulted by her ex-boyfriend, John Doe, at an off-campus party following a football game in September 2022. Roe reported the incident to the police, who then informed the university. The university's Title IX office reviewed the case but determined it fell outside their jurisdiction as the incident occurred off-campus and was not part of a university-sponsored event. The matter was referred to the Office of Student Conduct, which investigated and disciplined both Doe and Roe for their respective violations of the Student Code.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, Roe filed a lawsuit against the Marshall University Board of Governors, alleging deliberate indifference and retaliation under Title IX. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the university, finding that the university's response did not amount to deliberate indifference and that the university did not retaliate against Roe for reporting the assault.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the university did not have substantial control over the context of the harassment, as the incident occurred at a private off-campus residence. Additionally, the court found that Roe failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that the university's reasons for disciplining her were pretextual. The court concluded that the university's actions were not retaliatory and upheld the summary judgment in favor of the university. View "Roe v. Marshall University Board of Governors" on Justia Law

Larry Antonio Burleigh, along with two accomplices, committed a violent carjacking and robbery in Richmond, Virginia. They forced the victim, D.O., to withdraw money from multiple ATMs at gunpoint, physically assaulted him, and threatened his life. Burleigh was arrested shortly after the incident. He pled guilty to carjacking and two counts of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia sentenced Burleigh to a total of 545 months in prison, including mandatory consecutive terms for the firearm charges. Burleigh later filed a motion for compassionate release, arguing that his rehabilitation, young age at the time of the offense, and the lengthy stacked sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction. The district court denied the motion, finding that Burleigh's arguments did not meet the threshold for extraordinary and compelling reasons and that the § 3553(a) factors did not support a sentence reduction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Burleigh's motion for compassionate release. The district court had adequately considered Burleigh's arguments, including the changes to § 924(c) under the First Step Act, his rehabilitation, and his age. The court found that the seriousness of Burleigh's crime, its impact on the victim, and his criminal history outweighed the factors in favor of release. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court's explanation was sufficient to allow for meaningful appellate review and that it had not acted arbitrarily or irrationally. View "United States v. Burleigh" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit in state court against Defendants, alleging violations of state securities laws. Defendants removed the case to federal court under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), arguing that the case involved covered securities. Plaintiffs amended their complaint to exclude any claims related to covered securities, leading the district court to remand the case to state court. After three years of state court litigation, Defendants removed the case again, citing an expert report that allegedly identified covered securities. The district court remanded the case again and awarded Plaintiffs $63,007.50 in attorneys' fees.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina initially denied Plaintiffs' motion to remand but later granted it after Plaintiffs amended their complaint. The court found that the amended complaint excluded any claims related to covered securities, thus SLUSA did not apply, and no federal question remained. After Defendants removed the case a second time, the district court remanded it again and awarded attorneys' fees, finding the second removal lacked a reasonable basis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's award of attorneys' fees. The court held that the second removal was improper because the amended complaint explicitly excluded claims related to covered securities, and thus SLUSA did not apply. Additionally, the court found that the removal was objectively unreasonable, as the district court had already addressed the issues in its first remand order. The Fourth Circuit also denied Plaintiffs' request for additional attorneys' fees for defending the appeal, stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) does not authorize fee awards on appeal. View "Black v. Mantei & Associates, Ltd." on Justia Law

Evy Orellana suffered serious injuries when a tactical canine bit her leg as a U.S. Marshals fugitive task force executed an arrest warrant for her boyfriend, Eric Trinidad. Orellana, Trinidad, and their baby lived in the basement of Trinidad’s mother’s home. The officers breached a sealed door to access the basement, and the dog bit Orellana during the search. Orellana sued the officers under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, claiming a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights due to unreasonable search and seizure.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied the officers' motion to dismiss, reasoning that the case was similar enough to Bivens to apply its cause of action. The court also denied the officers' motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that this case presented a new context for Bivens because the officers were part of a specialized federal-state task force operating under a warrant. The court emphasized that the Supreme Court has cautioned against extending Bivens to new contexts, particularly when Congress is better suited to create a cause of action. The court concluded that special factors, including federalism concerns and the existence of alternative remedial procedures, counseled against extending Bivens in this situation. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the district court's decision, denying Orellana a Bivens remedy. View "Orellana v. Deputy United States Marshal Godec" on Justia Law

James Gould was involuntarily committed to mental health facilities four times between May 2016 and July 2019. In February 2022, police found him in his West Virginia home with a twelve-gauge shotgun. A grand jury indicted him for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), which makes it unlawful for anyone who has been committed to a mental institution to possess a firearm. Gould pleaded guilty but appealed, arguing that the Second Amendment renders the statute facially unconstitutional.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia rejected Gould’s challenge, concluding that there is a historical basis for disarming individuals determined to be dangerous to themselves or the public. The court found that § 922(g)(4) is constitutional on its face. Gould then changed his plea to guilty and was sentenced to time served and three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that § 922(g)(4) is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court noted that historically, legislatures incapacitated those suffering from mental illness when they posed a danger to themselves or others. Additionally, the court found that legislatures had the authority to disarm groups of people considered dangerous. The court emphasized that disarmament under § 922(g)(4) is not categorically permanent, as individuals can petition for relief to restore their firearm rights. The court concluded that § 922(g)(4) is facially constitutional because it can be applied in situations consistent with the Second Amendment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed Gould’s conviction. View "United States v. Gould" on Justia Law

Columbia Gas Transmission operates a natural gas pipeline that crosses a parcel of land owned by RDFS, LLC. Columbia holds an easement to operate and maintain the pipeline on this parcel. When a coal company planned to mine beneath the parcel, Columbia sought access to mitigate potential harm to its pipeline. RDFS denied access, leading Columbia to file a lawsuit. The district court granted a preliminary injunction allowing Columbia to proceed with its mitigation efforts.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia first considered Columbia's motion for a preliminary injunction. The court applied the four factors from Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., concluding that Columbia was likely to succeed on the merits, would suffer irreparable harm without access, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored Columbia. The court also granted Columbia's motion for partial summary judgment to condemn a temporary easement under the Natural Gas Act, finding that Columbia met all necessary requirements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court's grant of the preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. The appellate court found that Columbia's easement provided broad authority to access the entire parcel for maintenance, including mitigation work. The court rejected RDFS's argument that the easement was vague and limited by Columbia's prior use. The court affirmed the district court's ruling, concluding that Columbia's right to access the parcel for mitigation was consistent with maintaining the pipeline and did not unreasonably burden RDFS's property. The ruling of the district court was affirmed. View "Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. RDFS, LLC" on Justia Law

Bank of America Corporation, after merging with Merrill Lynch in 2013, sought to recover interest on its pre-merger tax underpayments by netting them against pre-merger overpayments made by Merrill Lynch. The bank argued that the post-merger integration rendered it the "same taxpayer" as Merrill Lynch for purposes of the interest netting provision under 26 U.S.C. § 6621(d) of the Internal Revenue Code.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina initially held jurisdiction over all of the Bank's claims. However, the Federal Circuit determined that the Court of Federal Claims had exclusive jurisdiction over claims for overpayment interest exceeding $10,000, leading to the severance and transfer of those claims. The district court then addressed the remaining claims, granting partial summary judgment in favor of the government. The court concluded that the "same taxpayer" requirement applies at the time the payments were made, and since Bank of America and Merrill Lynch were distinct entities when the payments were made, the interest netting provision did not apply.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the interest netting provision under § 6621(d) requires that the same taxpayer must have made the underpayments and overpayments at the time they were made. Since Bank of America and Merrill Lynch were separate entities when the relevant payments were made, they could not be considered the "same taxpayer" for the purposes of interest netting. The court also rejected the Bank's arguments based on state merger law and legislative history, emphasizing that the statutory text was clear and did not support the Bank's interpretation. View "Bank of America Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

Robbie Plyler, a longtime farm worker, was injured when his leg became trapped in a running grain auger inside a grain bin on Cox Brothers Farms, resulting in the amputation of his right leg below the knee. The jury found that both Plyler and Cox Brothers Farms were negligent, but the farm had the last clear chance to avoid the injury. The jury awarded Plyler $2,000,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 for loss of consortium to his wife, Deborah. Cox Brothers Farms appealed the decision.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied Cox's pre-trial motions for summary judgment and its renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on Plyler’s negligence and gross negligence claims. The court also denied Cox's motion to bifurcate the trial into separate liability and damages phases and its motion to exclude testimony from Plyler’s farm safety expert.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the jury’s verdict. The court found that the district court did not err in denying Cox's motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law, as there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Cox had the last clear chance to avoid Plyler’s injury. The appellate court also upheld the district court’s decision to deny Cox's motion to bifurcate the trial and to admit the expert testimony, noting that the district court provided appropriate limiting instructions to the jury regarding the use of OSHA regulations as evidence. The court concluded that the district court acted within its discretion and that there were no exceptional circumstances warranting a new trial. View "Plyler v. Cox" on Justia Law