Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a citizen of Bolivia, seeks review of the BIA's decision finding him ineligible for cancellation of removal. The BIA determined that petitioner's Virginia conviction for forging a public record pursuant to Virginia Code Ann. 18.2-168 was an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(R). The court concluded that Virginia forgery is an aggravated felony under the INA because it is a categorical match with the federal generic definition of forgery. Thus, the state and federal forgery crimes necessarily relate to one another. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review and denied the Government's request to remand as moot. View "Alvarez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Relators filed suit against medical laboratory businesses in 2007 in state court, alleging that the labs had submitted false claims to the Commonwealth for Medicaid reimbursement. Defendants removed to federal court. After the Commonwealth entered into a settlement agreement with defendants, the district court awarded relators a share of the settlement proceeds. Relators appealed, contending that the district court's award was insufficient under state law. The court vacated and remanded to the state court, concluding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the qui tam action. In this case, by the plain terms of the complaint, relators could have prevailed on their state law claims by proving that defendants contravened the Commonwealth’s Medicaid regulations, without showing any violation of federal law. View "Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. Hunter Labs. v. Commonwealth of Virginia" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was severely beaten by a fellow inmate, plaintiff filed suit against correctional officers, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk to his safety in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied summary judgment to the correctional officers based on qualified immunity. In light of the facts as the court may view them, and drawing reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor, the court found that the district court correctly held that material issues of fact precluded summary judgment for the correctional officers on the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. The court also concluded that an objectively reasonable correctional officer would have known that these actions were unreasonable, ran afoul of clearly established law, and violated plaintiff's rights. Accordingly, the correctional officers are not entitled to qualified immunity and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cox v. Quinn" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Arab-American Muslim woman from Morocco, filed suit against Fairview, alleging claims, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1981, for race discrimination (Count I), hostile work environment (Count II), and retaliation (Count III); and pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000(e) et seq., claims for discrimination based on religion, national origin, and pregnancy (Count IV), hostile work environment (Count V), and retaliation (Count VI). The district court granted summary judgment for Fairview on all six counts. In regard to the discrimination and retaliation counts, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to meet plaintiff's burden to show pretext. In this case, the evidence supports plaintiff's argument that when she complained to her supervisor, who was also her alleged harasser, the supervisor decided to terminate her and immediately got the decision approved. Furthermore, the absence of any evidence to support Fairview’s lack-of-work explanation is also important. Although Fairview claims that there were discussions of eliminating plaintiff's position in the past, there is no record evidence to support that claim. Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated as to Counts III and VI. Likewise, the court reversed as to the remaining counts. By failing to address numerous comments that were open to a racially motivated interpretation, and by circumscribing its analysis to just one comment without reviewing the totality of the circumstances, the district court committed reversible error in its grant of summary judgment for Fairview. View "Guessous v. Fairview Property Investments" on Justia Law

Defendants, four commercial boat captains, were charged with violating the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. 3372(a)(1), after they caught Atlantic striped bass in federal waters and later sold them. The district court granted defendants' motions to dismiss the indictment. The court concluded that the text of the fishery management plan created by the Commission and referenced by the Atlantic Striped Bass Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. 5151, in fact regulates only state coastal waters, and accordingly does not regulate fishing in federal waters. Therefore, the court concluded that the Lacey Act does not except from prosecution defendants' conduct alleged in the indictments. The court also rejected the contention that the regulatory regime governing defendants' actions is unconstitutionally vague. Accordingly, the court reversed the orders of the district court dismissing the indictments and remanded the cases with instructions that the indictments be reinstated. View "United States v. Saunders" on Justia Law

In these consolidated cases, plaintiffs filed suit challenging two redistricting laws, alleging that some Wake County School Board and Wake County Board of County Commissioners districts have been over-populated, while others have been under-populated. Plaintiffs further assert that these discrepancies result in some votes counting more while others count less, and that the discrepancies stem from illegitimate redistricting factors. The court concluded that, to succeed on the merits, plaintiffs in one person, one vote cases with population deviations below 10% must show by a preponderance of the evidence that improper considerations predominate in explaining the deviations. In this case, plaintiffs have proven that it is more probable than not that the population deviations at issue here reflect the predominance of an illegitimate reapportionment factor, namely an intentional effort to create a significant partisan advantage. Therefore, the district court committed reversible error in granting judgment for defendants. For the same reasons that plaintiffs succeed with their federal claim, they also succeed with their North Carolina state one person, one vote claim. Finally, the district court did not commit clear error in rejecting plaintiffs' racial gerrymandering claim. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded in part, and affirmed in part. View "Raleigh Wake Citizens Ass'n v. Wake Cnty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Solers challenges the IRS’ response to its request for documents under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552. The district court granted summary judgment for the IRS. The court concluded that the issue of whether the IRS provided a Vaughn index sufficient to enable the district court to evaluate the IRS’ claimed exemptions became irrelevant and moot after the IRS complied with the district court’s order to produce the records for in camera review and the district court completed its own review of the records. The district court sustained the IRS' position that Exemptions 3, 5, 6, and 7(C) applied to the following four categories: (1) the agent’s handwritten notes; (2) the summary report, graph, and checksheet; (3) the activity record; and (4) the two emails. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Solers, Inc. v. IRS" on Justia Law

Thai Palace filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the First Amendment, challenging the Board's revocation of its alcoholic beverage license, as well as its orders imposing conditions on the license. At issue on appeal is whether the district court properly applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to dismiss this federal action challenging the actions of a state administrative agency that were reviewed in state court. The court concluded that, at bottom, this federal action qualifies as an independent, concurrent action that does not undermine the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments, and accordingly the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Thana v. Board of License Commissioners" on Justia Law

Plaintiff initially filed suit against defendants on June 4, 2010. Defendant then decided to voluntarily withdraw her complaint. On November 3, 2010, plaintiff dismissed her first action and filed a second complaint, which she served on defendants in February 2011. Defendants moved to stay the second action and for costs under FRCP 41(d). The magistrate judge awarded defendants' motion for attorneys’ fees and other expenses that had been incurred in defending the first action. The district court affirmed, finding that plaintiff's conduct amounted to vexatious litigation, for which fees could be recovered. In 2013, plaintiff appealed before this court before an amount could be determined and the court dismissed. On remand, the district court awarded $13,403.75 in attorneys’ fees to defendants and stayed the case pending payment. In 2015, plaintiff appealed without paying the costs and before the case was dismissed for nonpayment. On remand, the district court dismissed the second action for failure to pay the awarded attorneys’ fees. The court adopted the Seventh Circuit's reasoning and held that Rule 41(d) does not provide for an award of attorneys’ fees as a matter of right; instead, a district court may award attorneys’ fees under this rule only where the underlying statute provides for attorneys’ fees. A court may also, within its discretion, award attorneys’ fees where it makes a specific finding that the plaintiff has acted “in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons,” a well-established exception to the American Rule. In this case, the court found that plaintiff's conduct was not undertaken in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. Accordingly, the court reversed the order to pay attorneys' fees, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Andrews v. America's Living Centers, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against FRBR, alleging claims for interference and retaliation in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., and failure to accommodate and discriminatory discharge in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the FMLA retaliation claim and the ADA claims. The court concluded, however, that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether FRBR interfered with plaintiff’s FMLA rights by providing him defective notice that omitted his right to reinstatement at the conclusion of the medical leave term. Accordingly, the court held that the district court's grant of summary judgment as to that claim was not warranted. The court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Vannoy v. Federal Reserve Bank" on Justia Law