Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Verisign filed suit against XYZ and its CEO Daniel Negari, alleging that defendants' statements regarding the scarcity of desirable .com domain names violated the Lanham Act's, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)(1)(B), false advertising provisions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of XYZ. The court agreed with the district court that Verisign failed to establish the elements of a Lanham Act claim. In regard to XYZ's self-promoting statements, the court held that Verisign failed to produce the required evidence that it suffered an actual injury as a direct result of XYZ’s conduct. Nor can Verisign establish that XYZ’s statements about the availability of suitable .com domain names were false or misleading statements of fact. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "VeriSign v. XYZ.com" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Applications Developer for the CIA, was a covert employee who suffered from narcolepsy. Plaintiff first filed suit against the Agency, alleging discrimination and ultimately termination based on his disability, failure to accommodate, and retaliation. While the motion for summary judgment was pending on the first suit, plaintiff filed suit against the same defendants, alleging disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 791 et seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. In this case, even if plaintiff establishes a prima facie case for his claims, the court found that its precedent nonetheless requires dismissal because any defense to these claims that the government could offer would undoubtedly rely on privileged information. Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that the information at issue is properly privileged and that litigation of the case would present an unjustifiable risk of disclosure of that information. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Abilt v. CIA" on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks review of the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief. Defendant argued that his petition was not time-barred because it was filed within one year of his discovery of his petitions' factual predicates -- his incorrect blood type and factual findings in the Zain III report -- which he argues could not have been discovered sooner. The court found, however, that had petitioner exercised due diligence, he would have discovered the factual predicates far earlier. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the petition. View "Gray v. Ballard" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, veterans who received medical treatment and health care at the Dorn VAMC, filed separate actions against the Secretary of Veterans Affairs and Dorn VAMC officials, alleging violations of the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552(a) et seq., and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq. Plaintiffs sought to establish Article III standing based on the harm from the increased risk of future identity theft and the cost of measures to protect against it. The district court dismissed based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, concluding that plaintiffs failed to establish a non-speculative, imminent injury-in-fact for purposes of Article III standing. View "Beck v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against law enforcement officers and others, alleging violation of her constitutional rights when she was arrested and held in police custody for eighty days. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding that the officers had probable cause to believe plaintiff illegally possessed and sold crack. The court concluded that the district court properly stylized plaintiff's false arrest claims against the investigating officers as malicious prosecution claims. The court also concluded that Officer Munday's application for an arrest warrant lacked probable cause and thus violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. In this case, Munday had no evidence about plaintiff's conduct whatsoever, let alone any evidence connecting her to the crime in question. Because it would be unreasonable for any officer to view Munday's dearth of evidence as sufficient to establish probable cause, he is not entitled to qualified immunity. The court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded to the district court to consider in the first instance plaintiff's state-law claims against all of the individual officers, and negligent-supervision and pattern-or-practice theories of liability against the Chief of Police and City of Lincolnton. The court affirmed as to the false arrest claim against Officers Greene and Lesassier because the officers merely executed the arrest as they were required to do, pursuant to a facially valid warrant. View "Smith v. Munday" on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty to one count of Hobbs Act robbery, one count under the carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. 2119, and one count of discharging a firearm during a carjacking. On appeal, defendant challenges the district court's ruling that the federal offense of carjacking qualified as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The court affirmed the judgment, agreeing with the district court that the carjacking statute qualifies as a crime of violence under Section 924(c), because the carjacking statute "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another." View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law

The Foundation agreed to lend $2 million pursuant to a loan agreement to Al-Harmoosh for a company headquartered in Iraq. After Mohammed Harmoosh, a managing partner of the company, refused to pay the loan, the Foundation filed suit for breach of contract in Maryland. Harmoosh moved to dismiss based on an arbitration clause in the loan agreement. The district court dismissed the Foundation's complaint. The Foundation later filed another suit against Harmoosh to collect on the promissory note, this time in the Court of First Instance for Commercial Disputes in Baghdad. After the Foundation and Harmoosh litigated their dispute to final judgment in Iraq, the Foundation filed suit in the District of Maryland, seeking recognition of the Iraqi judgment under the Maryland Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. 10-701 et seq. The Foundation also alleged that Harmoosh fraudulently conveyed some of his assets both before and after the Iraqi judgment was rendered. The district court granted summary judgment to Harmoosh on the Maryland Recognition Act claim, and granted Harmoosh's motion to compel arbitration. The court held that judicial proceedings in a foreign court are not "contrary to" an arbitration clause for the purpose of the Maryland Recognition Act if the parties choose to forego their rights to arbitrate by paricipating in those proceedings. The court also concluded that the Foundation raised genuine issues of material fact that preclude a summary judgment holding that Harmoosh preserved his arbitration rights. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Iraq Middle Market Development v. Harmoosh" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Nepal, challenges the BIA's finding of removeability under Section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). Section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) authorizes the removal of any alien who "is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years . . . after the date of admission." Petitioner was considered removeable based on the determination that his 2007 embezzlement conviction constituted a crime involving moral turpitude. The court accorded Chevron deference to the BIA's decision in Matter of Alyazji, to determine that petitioner's relevant "date of admission" was January 18, 2003: the date he was most recently admitted to the United States after taking a brief vacation abroad. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Sijapati v. Boente" on Justia Law

Howard and Nancy Nease filed a products liability suit against Ford, alleging that Howard sustained serious injuries in an accident caused by a design defect in the speed control system of his 2001 Ford Ranger pickup truck. The jury awarded plaintiffs over $3 million in damages. The district court denied Ford's post-trial motions. The court concluded that the expert testimony of Samuel Sero regarding the speed control cable should not have been admitted. The court explained that Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. applies to Sero's testimony and the district court did not perform its gatekeeping duties with respect to Sero’s testimony. In this case, Sero’s testimony should have been excluded under Daubert because it was unsupported. Without any other expert testimony to establish that the 2001 Ford Ranger was defectively designed and that there were safer alternative designs available that a reasonably prudent manufacturer would have adopted, the court concluded that the Neases cannot prove their case under West Virginia law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in Ford's favor. View "Nease v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

The Chapter 7 trustee of James Edwards Whitley's estate challenges the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgment for the Bank on the trustee’s claim that certain deposits and wire transfers to Whitley’s personal checking account at the Bank are avoidable as fraudulent transfers. The court found that the transactions at issue do not constitute transfers within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. The court explained that when a debtor deposits or receives a wire transfer of funds into his own unrestricted checking account in the regular course of business, he has not transferred those funds to the bank that operates the account. When the debtor is still free to access those funds at will, the requisite “disposing of” or “parting with” property has not occurred; there has not been a “transfer” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. 101(54). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ivey v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co." on Justia Law