Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Defendant appealed his conviction for the murder of Special Agent James Terry Watson. Agent Watson - as an Assistant Attaché for the United States Mission in Colombia - was an internationally protected person (an IPP). Defendant, a citizen of Colombia, pleaded guilty to offenses of kidnapping conspiracy and murder of an IPP. Defendant argued that his prosecution in this country for offenses committed in Colombia contravened the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Applying the arbitrary-or-unfair framework, the court concluded that defendant's prosecution in this country was not fundamentally unfair where kidnapping and murder are "self-evidently criminal." Furthermore, the IPP convention alone gave defendant notice sufficient to satisfy due process. The court rejected defendant's contention that because the United States Code provisions implementing the IPP Convention require knowledge of the victim’s IPP status that Bello did not possess, those provisions cannot have put him on notice that he was subject to prosecution in this country. Accordingly, there is no merit to defendant’s mens rea contention - nor his broader claim that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause precluded his prosecution in this country - and the court must uphold his kidnapping conspiracy and murder convictions. View "United States v. Bello Murillo" on Justia Law

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Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of communicating a false distress message to the United States Coast Guard and was sentenced to 14 months in prison, as well as ordered to pay restitution for the costs incurred by the Coast Guard in responding to the specious communication. Defendant was drunk on a boat when the Coast Guard found him in a restricted marine area. Defendant told the Coast Guard that he had a fight with another man and threw him overboard. After the Coast Guard's rescue efforts could not find the man, defendant admitted that he had taken some medication that may have caused him to imagine that another man was on the boat. The rescue efforts cost the Coast Guard $117,913. The court rejected defendant's argument that the district court lacked the statutory authority to issue a restitution order. The court concluded that the text and all reasonable inferences from it provide a clear rebuttal to defendant's proposed construction of 14 U.S.C. 88(c)(3). The court held that an order of restitution may issue under section 88(c)(3) as part of a criminal sentence. The primary purpose of the statute was to preserve for legitimate purposes the Coast Guard’s finite budget. It would defeat that purpose to mandate that the Coast Guard expend even more resources in separate civil actions to recoup false distress call costs. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Serafini" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Plaintiffs, exotic dancers, filed suit alleging that their dance clubs failed to comply with the minimum wage standards pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., and corresponding Maryland wage and hour laws. The district court held that plaintiffs were employees of the defendant companies and not independent contractors. The court concluded that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the relationship between plaintiffs and defendants falls on the employee side of the spectrum. The court found that the many ways in which defendants directed the dancers rose to the level of control that an employer would typically exercise over an employee. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in rejecting defendants’ good faith defense for the period prior to September 2011 and awarding plaintiffs liquidated damages for that period; the trial court correctly excluded evidence showing plaintiffs’ earnings in the form of tips and performance fees; and the court found no grounds for reversal based on defendant's claims of error regarding jury instructions, the verdict sheet, or the denial of a new trial motion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "McFeeley v. Jackson Street Entm't" on Justia Law

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Movant seeks pre-filing authorization to pursue a successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition for habeas relief. Movant argued that the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Johnson produced a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive by that Court, and that he is entitled to seek relief under the new rule. The court granted the request for authorization to file a successive section 2255 motion because application of Johnson to 18 U.S.C. 16(b) as incorporated into the Sentencing Guidelines might render the career-offender residual clause that was applicable at the time movant was sentenced unconstitutional, and because the rule in Johnson is substantive with respect to its application to the Sentencing Guidelines and therefore applies retroactively. View "In Re: Creadell Hubbard" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against several correctional officers, medical personnel, and prison administrators for alleged violations of his constitutional rights after he underwent surgery to remove penile implants while incarcerated. Prior to his incarceration, plaintiff had marbles implanted in and tattoos drawn on his penis. Plaintiff alleged that prison officials threatened him with segregation for the remainder of his sentence and loss of parole eligibility if he did not consent to surgery to have the marbles removed. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged, among other things, physical injury and mental anguish. The court held that the Bell v. Wolfish factors weigh against reasonableness of the sexually invasive search and thus reversed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint. In this case, plaintiff pleaded sufficient facts to establish a Fourth Amendment claim plausibly entitling him to relief. The court also held that plaintiff's complaint plausibly satisfies both prongs of an Eighth Amendment claim. Furthermore, plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to state a class-of-one equal protection claim. The court rejected plaintiff's remaining claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part. Because the district court did not consider plaintiff's potential due process claim, the court remanded for reconsideration of this claim. View "King, Jr. v. Rubenstein" on Justia Law

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The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment charging him with illegal reentry by a deported alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a), (b)(2), concluding that the underlying removal order was invalid because DHS failed to explain to defendant in his native language either the removal charges against him or his right to contest the charges or obtain legal representation. The court agreed with the government that, even assuming the administrative removal proceedings were procedurally defective, defendant failed to establish prejudice. In this case, the government contends that even if DHS had provided defendant a Spanish language translation of the removal charges and his right to contest them, it would not have made a difference - he still would have been removed to Mexico. The court concluded that defendant failed to establish that his order of removal was “fundamentally unfair” under section 1326(d). Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Lopez-Collazo" on Justia Law

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Petitioner challenged the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2241 habeas petition. Petitioner appealed the computation of his federal sentence, and, more specifically, the refusal of the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to designate nunc pro tunc a state facility for service of his federal sentence. Although the court found no error in the district court’s analysis of the BOP’s sentencing calculation, the court concluded that the district court overlooked a two-pronged flaw in the BOP’s exercise of its broad discretion in denying petitioner’s requested nunc pro tunc designation. The court held that, in its consideration of the fourth statutory factor under 18 U.S.C. 3621(b), the BOP misapplied 18 U.S.C. 3584(a). That is, in the face of the federal sentencing judge’s silence as to the court’s intention, the BOP invoked a presumption that the unelaborated federal sentence should be deemed to run consecutively to the later imposed state sentence. The court concluded that the presumption relied on was inapplicable in this case. Because the court concluded that the BOP abused its discretion, the court affirmed the judgment in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions that the district court remand petitioner's request for a nunc pro tunc designation to the BOP for further consideration. View "Mangum v. Hallembaek" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Defendant conditionally plead guilty to one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug crime, and then appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search of his residence. The court concluded that defendant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the investigator omitted information from the search warrant affidavit - material information about the reliability of the confidential informant who was the primary source of the information used to establish probable cause - with at least a reckless disregard for whether these omissions made the application misleading. Because these omissions were material to a finding of probable cause, defendant has established a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights under Franks v. Delaware. Therefore, the district court erred in denying defendant’s suppression motion. The court reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress, vacated defendant's conviction and sentence, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Lull" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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After CSX charged plaintiff, one of its employees, with "serious" violations of the company's safety policy, plaintiff filed suit under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. 20109, alleging that he was disciplined in retaliation for his activities as local chairman of the transportation union. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CSX, concluding that plaintiff had failed to show that any CSX employee involved in the disciplinary process had also known about his union activities. The court held that the “knowledge” relevant for a retaliation claim under the FRSA must be tied to the decision-maker involved in the unfavorable personnel action. The court concluded that, because plaintiff does not present sufficient evidence that the relevant CSX decision-makers knew of his protected activities, his claims fail as a matter of law at the prima facie stage. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Conrad v. CSX Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, enrolled in Marshall University's Master of Arts in Teaching (MAT) program, filed suit against defendants raising various claims, including violation of her due process and equal protection rights, after she unsuccessfully pursued reconsideration through Marshall’s internal grade-appeals process. Plaintiff had left her student-teaching post in protest over differences with her supervising teacher. Consequently, plaintiff was not awarded credit and did not receive her MAT nor teaching license. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's order granting defendants' motion to dismiss. The court concluded that the district court properly determined both that sovereign immunity bars plaintiff's claims against the Marshall University Board of Governors, and that the allegations in plaintiff's pro se complaint against the other defendants failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kerr v. Marshall Univ. Bd." on Justia Law