Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, seeks review of the BIA's final order of removal affirming the IJ's conclusion that petitioner filed a frivolous asylum application and was therefore ineligible for adjustment of status. The court concluded that notice set forth in the I-589 application for asylum suffices to satisfy the requirement under 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(4)(A) that the applicant be notified of the consequences of filing a frivolous application. Although an immigration judge is free to give an applicant additional warnings during the hearing, there is no statutory requirement that he do so. Therefore, the court rejected petitioner's contention that he did not receive adequate notice. The court rejected petitioner's remaining claims and denied the petition for review. View "Ndibu v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon and was sentenced as an armed career criminal based on his three prior convictions for felony common law robbery in North Carolina. The court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress the handgun found in defendant's vehicle during a traffic stop, and the district court's denial of defendant's motion for a new trial. The court concluded, however, that defendant's prior offense of North Carolina common law robbery is not categorically a violent felony. Therefore, the court held that the district court erred in sentencing defendant as an armed career criminal. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Gardner" on Justia Law

After plaintiff went to the police station to report the theft of his cable services, he ended up involuntarily detained for six days for a mental-health evaluation. Plaintiff then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that he was unlawfully seized without probable cause in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court concluded that the claims against the mental-health evaluator and her employer were properly dismissed. However, as to the two officers who initially took plaintiff into custody, the court found that the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss. When the statements in the Incident Report are treated not as true, but as assertions made by the Officers, the court had little difficulty in concluding that plaintiff's claims against the Officers should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff alleged that he has no mental illness and the facts he describes in the complaint provided no basis for the Officers to have reasonably concluded otherwise. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd." on Justia Law

After registered nurses employed at the Hospitals elected the Union as their bargaining representative, the Hospitals challenged the election results and refused the Union’s requests to bargain. The Board issued a final decision concluding that the Hospitals violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq., by refusing to bargain with the Union. Determining that the Hospitals did not waive their argument regarding the Board's lack of quorum, the court gave deference to the Board's interpretation and concluded that the Regional Director’s authority to act was not abrogated during the period when the Board lacked a quorum. The court rejected the Hospitals' argument that the Regional Director was not validly appointed because the Acting General Counsel, was without authority to act at the time of Regional Director Harrell’s appointment. It is the Board - not the General Counsel - that retains final authority over the appointment of a Regional Director, and the Board approved the appointment of the Regional Director in this case. The court further concluded that there is no merit in the Hospitals' contention that the Board appointed the Regional Director after the Board lost a quorum and consequently, the appointment was invalid. Finally, the court concluded that the Hospitals’ sole challenge to the merits of the Board’s final decision was baseless. Accordingly, the court granted the Board's application for enforcement. View "NLRB v. Bluefield Hospital" on Justia Law

After defendant was convicted of charges related to the kidnapping of his estranged wife, the district court sentenced him to 295 months in prison and also required him to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. 16911 et seq. The court rejected defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel because such claims are not addressed on direct appeal; the district court did not err in admitting evidence of prior acts where the evidence was relevant to issues other than character or propensity and the probative value outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice; and, the district court did not err in requiring defendant to register as a sex offender under SORNA, because aggravated sexual abuse involves a sexual act or sexual contact with another and defendant thus was convicted of a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Faulls" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court's dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and challenges several aspects of his capital convictions and death sentence. The court rejected petitioner's claim that the Virginia circuit court’s refusal to appoint a prison-risk-assessment expert compels relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), because petitioner identified no clearly established federal law requiring the appointment of a nonpsychiatric expert. The court also rejected petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to counsel's investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence where the court found neither deficient performance or prejudice under Strickland v.Washington. The court concluded that petitioner's underlying claim was insubstantial under Martinez v. Ryan and therefore he has not shown cause to excuse his procedurally defaulted claim that counsel was ineffective for stipulating at the guilt phase of trial that petitioner was a prisoner in lawful custody at the time of the alleged capital murder. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Morva v. Zook" on Justia Law

As part of a joint effort to construct a Zoroastrian worship center, the parties signed a ninety-nine-year lease on a parcel of property owned by Rustam Guiv in the Vienna area of Fairfax County, Virginia. After Rustam Guiv terminated the lease, the Center filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment to reinstate the lease. After removal, the district court granted summary judgment to Rustam Guiv and awarded attorneys’ fees. The court concluded that Rustam Guiv presented sufficient evidence to show complete diversity between the parties, thereby establishing subject matter jurisdiction in federal court. The court also concluded that the undisputed material facts show that The Center breached the lease. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint in its entirety. The court concluded, however, that the attorneys' fee award must be vacated where the district court correctly identified Rustam Guiv as the prevailing party but made no effort to narrow the fee award to its successful claims. Under Virginia law governing contractual fee-shifting provisions, the prevailing party is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees for work performed only on its successful claims. View "Zoroastrian Center v. Rustam Guiv Found." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging claims for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and for malicious prosecution under state law. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, who are probation officers; denied supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim; and dismissed the malicious prosecution claim with prejudice. The court concluded that defendants violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights by seeking his arrest for alleged probation violations without reasonable suspicion. However, the court concluded that the standard required by the Fourth Amendment to arrest a probationer was not clearly established at the time defendants sought plaintiff’s arrest for allegedly violating the terms of his probation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. View "Jones v. Chandrasuwan" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to one count of aiding and abetting the theft of a firearm. On appeal, defendant contends that the government breached the plea agreement. In the plea agreement, the government agreed to advise the district court at sentencing that the parties had agreed that the 4-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b) (increasing a defendant’s offense level for use or possession of a firearm in connection with another felony offense)(6)(B) did not apply. At sentencing, however, the government advised the district court that it had changed its position on whether a North Carolina breaking and entering offense constituted a felony, concluding that it did, regardless of a defendant’s criminal history. Nonetheless, the government asked the district court to honor the plea agreement and not apply the enhancement to defendant. The district court concluded that the government, although acting in good faith, breached its undertaking in the plea agreement by stating that the enhancement did apply. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing before a different district judge pursuant to Santobello v. New York. View "United States v. Warner" on Justia Law

Debtors purchased a home from creditors. The purchase was financed via a loan from creditors. In exchange for the loan, debtors granted creditors a deed of trust on the property and executed a promissory note requiring monthly payments. Where the rate of interest on debtors’ residential mortgage loan was increased upon default, at issue was whether a “cure” under section 1322(b) of the Bankruptcy Code allows their bankruptcy plan to bring post-petition payments back down to the initial rate of interest. The court held that the statute does not allow this, as a change to the interest rate on a residential mortgage loan is a “modification” barred by the terms of section 1322(b)(2). The court affirmed the judgment of the district court insofar as it required that post-petition interest payments be calculated using the seven percent default rate of interest, but reversed that part of the judgment which applied only a five percent rate of interest to payments calculated “for the period between September 16, 2013 and the December 2013, effective date of the plan.” The court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Anderson v. Hancock" on Justia Law