Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, seeks review of the BIA's decision finding him ineligible for cancellation of removal because he is an aggravated felon. The court held that, based on the court's application of the categorical approach, a conviction under the second paragraph of 18 U.S.C. 659 is not a “theft offense (including receipt of stolen property)” under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G). Therefore, the BIA erred in finding petitioner to be an aggravated felon who is ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(3). Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mena v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to firearm and drug charges after the district court assured him that he was not waiving his right to appeal the court’s earlier denial of a suppression motion. At issue is whether defendant entered a valid conditional guilty plea. The court concluded that no valid conditional guilty plea was entered because the government-consent requirement was not satisfied. Insofar as defendant did not enter a valid conditional guilty plea, the question of whether the district court erred in denying his suppression motion is not properly before the court. Because the court has neither a valid conditional plea nor a valid unconditional plea, the court vacated the judgment. On remand, defendant can decide whether to plead guilty again or whether to proceed to trial. View "United States v. Fitzgerald" on Justia Law

Defendant and two companions participated in a crime spree that started with a pair of burglaries and ended with a high-speed police chase. At issue is whether the two burglaries served as part of the predicate for defendant’s Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), sentencing enhancement occurred on different occasions. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that the burglaries did in fact occur on different occasions. In this case, it was proper for the district court to note that defendant harmed 31 different victims during his many offenses; that defendant’s most recent pair of burglaries ended with a dangerous police chase; and that defendant appeared to be the leader in at least this latest chapter of his long history of criminal activity. View "United States v. Linney" on Justia Law

After the Board certified a collective bargaining unit consisting of all maintenance employees at an ice-cream production facility operated by Dreyers, the company contends that the Board petitioned for review. The court held that the Board acted within its broad discretion in certifying the Union’s petitioned-for unit where the Regional Director (RD), under the Specialty Healthcare & Rehabilitation Center of Mobile framework, applied the traditional community-of-interest factors to determine not only that the maintenance employees share a community of interest amongst themselves, but also that maintenance employees form a group distinct from production employees. By doing so, the RD did not allow the extent of organization to control his decision. The court rejected Dreyer's objections that focused on attacking Specialty Healthcare rather than on the Board's decision in this case. Accordingly, the court denied Dreyer's petition for review and granted the Board's cross-petition for enforcement. View "Nestle Dreyer's Ice Cream Co. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against employees of SCDC and others, alleging that the food served to him at a prison managed by the SCDC was so deficient as to violate his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), concluding that plaintiff's claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata because it is the same as a complaint filed against SCDC employees by a fellow inmate in 2010, which the district court dismissed on the merits. The court concluded that, because plaintiff was a nonparty to the earlier suit, he is not precluded from pursuing the same claims on his own behalf in the instant action unless the state defendants are able to demonstrate that at least one of the six exceptions to the general rule against nonparty preclusion applies pursuant to Taylor v. Sturgell. Because the state defendants have not demonstrated that any of the exceptions apply, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Duckett v. Fuller" on Justia Law

Maritime employed Elmer Escalante, an undocumented alien, at one of its two full-service carwashes. After Escalante filed a complaint against Maritime with the EEOC for discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., the EEOC issued a subpoena seeking information from Maritime related to Escalante’s charges. The parties disagree on how Escalante’s undocumented status affects the EEOC’s authority to investigate his charges. The district court denied the EEOC's application for subpoena enforcement. The court held that the EEOC’s subpoena, designed to investigate Escalante’s Title VII charges, is enforceable. In this case, the plain language of Title VII provides a "plausible" or "arguable" basis for the EEOC's subpoena where Title VII allows any "person claiming to be aggrieved" to file charges with the EEOC, and nothing explicitly bars undocumented workers from filing complaints. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "EEOC v. Maritime Autowash, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, trainees at the Casino, filed a putative class action against the Casino, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201-219; the Maryland Wage and Hour Law (MWHL), Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. 3-401 to -431; and the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law (MWPCL), Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. 3-501 to -509. The district court granted the Casino's motion to dismiss, holding that the trainees failed to show that the primary beneficiary of their attendance at the training was the Casino rather than themselves. The court concluded that the trainees alleged facts supporting their claim that the Casino, and not the trainees, primarily benefited from the training where the Casino received a very large and immediate benefit - an entire workforce of over 800 dealers trained to operate table games to the Casino’s specifications at the very moment the table games became legal. The trainees, in contrast, received very little because the training was unique to the Casino’s specifications and not transferable to work in other casinos. Moreover, there are charges that the training was either conceived or carried out in such a way as to violate the spirit of the minimum wage law. Finally, the trainees allege, and the Casino acknowledges, that the Casino paid all participants in the "dealer school" the minimum hourly wage for the last two days of the twelve weeks of training. Because the trainees have alleged sufficient facts to support their claims, the court reversed and remanded. View "Harbourt v. PPE Casino Resorts Maryland" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine and being a felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress drug and firearm evidence seized by police officers during a traffic stop. The court concluded that no constitutional violation occurred in this case. The officer did not unreasonably expand the scope of the stop by beginning an unjustified drug investigation. Furthermore, the officer did not conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle without probable cause when he stuck his head inside the car to examine its fraudulent inspection sticker where the officer's means of investigating the inspection sticker were appropriate and not unreasonably intrusive. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Palmer" on Justia Law

Defendants Hare, Williams, and Edwards appealed their convictions stemming from their participation in a plan to rob a cocaine "stash house," which was actually fabricated by undercover federal agents as part of a sting operation. The court concluded that defendants have received all the discovery to which they are entitled, and affirmed the district court’s denial of their motion for discovery. In this case, even assuming that defendants' evidentiary showing is sufficient to warrant discovery into selective enforcement, defendants have not shown that they are entitled to discovery beyond what the government has already produced. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of defendants' motion to dismiss the indictment because defendants' arguments, whether considered alone or collectively, do not establish outrageous government conduct. The court rejected defendants' challenge to their convictions for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime or a crime of violence; found defendant's remaining challenges to be without merit; and affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Hare" on Justia Law

The Committee filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Commonwealth, alleging that the Incumbent Protection Act, Va. Code Ann. 24.2-509(B), infringes on its First Amendment right to freedom of association by preventing it from determining the method of nomination in contravention of the terms of the Party's Plan of Organization. Senator Hanger and Moxley, who sought the Party’s nomination for Senator Hanger’s seat on the 24th District, both moved to intervene. The district court subsequently granted defendants’ motions to dismiss. The court affirmed the district court’s holding that the Committee lacks standing to bring this suit because the language of the Plan is clear and unambiguous: the Plan delegates to the Committee the authority to determine the nomination method unless Virginia law otherwise limits that authority. Because the Party has made a voluntary choice to limit the Committee’s authority in this way, plaintiffs have “no complaint that the party’s right to govern itself has been substantially burdened by” the Act because “the source of the complaint is the party’s own decision.” Because neither Virginia law nor the Plan gives Moxley “a legally protected interest” in determining the nomination method in the first place, he fails to establish that he has standing independent of the Party. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "24th Senatorial Dist. v. Alcorn" on Justia Law