Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants McNeal and Stoddard were convicted of conspiracy, armed bank robberies, and brandishing firearms during crimes of violence. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendants of the brandishing offenses; the evidence was sufficient to convict McNeal of conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery; the district court properly denied McNeal's motions to suppress evidence where the warrant was supported by probable cause; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence seized from McNeal's residence. The court also concluded that bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) is a crime of violence within the meaning of the force clause of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3), because it has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. Because bank robbery is a lesser-included offense of section 2113(d) armed bank robbery, armed bank robbery is also a crime of violence under the force clause. McNeal and Stoddard’s challenge to their brandishing convictions therefore fails at the first step of plain error review, in that the trial court did not err in concluding that armed bank robbery qualifies as a crime of violence. The court rejected each of defendants' contentions and affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. McNeal" on Justia Law

BBC, owner of the FLANAX trademark in Mexico, and its sister company, Bayer, filed suit against Belmora, owner of the FLANAX trademark in the United States, contending that Belmora used the FLANAX mark to deliberately deceive Mexican-American consumers into thinking they were purchasing BCC’s product. The court concluded that the Lanham Act’s, 15 U.S.C. 1125, plain language contains no unstated requirement that a section 43(a) plaintiff have used a U.S. trademark in U.S. commerce to bring a Lanham Act unfair competition claim; the Supreme Court’s guidance in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. does not allude to one, and the court's prior cases either only assumed or articulated as dicta that such a requirement existed; and therefore, the district court erred in imposing such a condition precedent upon Bayer’s claims. The court also concluded that BCC has adequately pled a section 43(a) false association claim for purposes of the zone of interests prong; BCC's allegations reflect the claim furthers the section 45 purpose of preventing the deceptive and misleading use of marks in commerce within the control of Congress; and BCC has also alleged injuries that are proximately caused by Belmora’s violations of the false association statute. Therefore, the court held that BCC has sufficiently pled a section 43(a) false association claim to survive Belmora’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Because these statements are linked to Belmora’s alleged deceptive use of the FLANAX mark, the court is satisfied that BCC’s false advertising claim, like its false association claim, comes within the Act’s zone of interests. The court inferred that the alleged advertisements contributed to the lost border sales pled by BCC, and that the claim also satisfies Lexmark’s proximate cause prong. Further, the court agreed with Bayer that the district court erred in overturning the TTAB’s section 14(3) decision because it read a use requirement into the section that is simply not there. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG" on Justia Law

BBC, owner of the FLANAX trademark in Mexico, and its sister company, Bayer, filed suit against Belmora, owner of the FLANAX trademark in the United States, contending that Belmora used the FLANAX mark to deliberately deceive Mexican-American consumers into thinking they were purchasing BCC’s product. The court concluded that the Lanham Act’s, 15 U.S.C. 1125, plain language contains no unstated requirement that a section 43(a) plaintiff have used a U.S. trademark in U.S. commerce to bring a Lanham Act unfair competition claim; the Supreme Court’s guidance in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. does not allude to one, and the court's prior cases either only assumed or articulated as dicta that such a requirement existed; and therefore, the district court erred in imposing such a condition precedent upon Bayer’s claims. The court also concluded that BCC has adequately pled a section 43(a) false association claim for purposes of the zone of interests prong; BCC's allegations reflect the claim furthers the section 45 purpose of preventing the deceptive and misleading use of marks in commerce within the control of Congress; and BCC has also alleged injuries that are proximately caused by Belmora’s violations of the false association statute. Therefore, the court held that BCC has sufficiently pled a section 43(a) false association claim to survive Belmora’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Because these statements are linked to Belmora’s alleged deceptive use of the FLANAX mark, the court is satisfied that BCC’s false advertising claim, like its false association claim, comes within the Act’s zone of interests. The court inferred that the alleged advertisements contributed to the lost border sales pled by BCC, and that the claim also satisfies Lexmark’s proximate cause prong. Further, the court agreed with Bayer that the district court erred in overturning the TTAB’s section 14(3) decision because it read a use requirement into the section that is simply not there. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, four Maryland consumers, filed suit against Santander and its agents, alleging that defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C.1692-1692p, by engaging in prohibited collection practices when collecting on plaintiffs’ automobile loans. The court affirmed the district court's grant of Santander's motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint did not allege facts showing that Santander qualified as a “debt collector” subject to the FDCPA. The court concluded that the FDCPA generally does not regulate creditors when they collect debt on their own account and that, on the facts alleged by plaintiffs, Santander became a creditor when it purchased the loans before engaging in the challenged practices. View "Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, four Maryland consumers, filed suit against Santander and its agents, alleging that defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C.1692-1692p, by engaging in prohibited collection practices when collecting on plaintiffs’ automobile loans. The court affirmed the district court's grant of Santander's motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint did not allege facts showing that Santander qualified as a “debt collector” subject to the FDCPA. The court concluded that the FDCPA generally does not regulate creditors when they collect debt on their own account and that, on the facts alleged by plaintiffs, Santander became a creditor when it purchased the loans before engaging in the challenged practices. View "Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, through her next friends and guardians, filed a complaint in state court against Matt Blair and Res-Care. Res-Care removed to federal court, asserting subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. The district court sua sponte remanded the case back to state court, determining that federal diversity jurisdiction has not been established because Res-Care did not allege the state in which it had its principal place of business. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction to review the district court's remand order because the district court based its remand order on a procedural defect in the removal notice. The court held that a district court exceeds its statutory authority when it remands a case sua sponte based on a procedural defect absent a motion from a party. In this case, the district court exceeded its statutory authority by remanding this case sua sponte. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Jane Doe #1 v. Blair" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate at a Virginia correctional facility, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendant's deliberate indifference to plaintiff's safety, and the resulting injuries, constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff was attacked by his cellmate after requesting a transfer from defendant, the Prison Housing Manager. The court concluded that genuine disputes of material fact underlie plaintiff's claim where plaintiff alleged specific facts describing the injuries he sustained as a result of the attack, and alleged two independent grounds for establishing defendant's subjective knowledge of the risk of assault. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant. The court vacated and remanded. View "Raynor v. Pugh" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the government on his petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241. Petitioner challenges his prior civil commitment as a “sexually dangerous person” under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 18 U.S.C. 4248. The court concluded that Congress sufficiently expressed its intent that the Adam Walsh Act apply to all persons in the BOP’s custody who would pose a current threat to the public if released. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the government on petitioner’s retroactivity claim. The court concluded that, although the BOP records submitted by petitioner, even if they had been authenticated, are insufficient to demonstrate that the BOP relinquished its legal authority over him prior to the government’s filing of the section 4248 certificate, they are also largely unexplained. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on petitioner's claim that he was not “in the custody” of the BOP when the section 4248 proceedings were initiated, and remanded for further proceedings on this issue. View "Matherly v. Andrews" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of charges related to his involvement in prostitution and drug rings. This appeal presents an issue of first impression in this Circuit: whether a defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel is violated when his counsel sleeps during trial. The court held that a defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when counsel sleeps during a substantial portion of the defendant’s trial. In this case, multiple witnesses testified that counsel was asleep during multiple occasions. The court concluded that the fact that counsel was sleeping during defendant's trial amounted to constructive denial of counsel for substantial periods of that trial. Furthermore, the facts of this case are equally -if not more - egregious than the facts presented in cases where other circuits have presumed prejudice. Accordingly, the court vacated the conviction and sentence, directed entry of judgment in favor of defendant on his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Ragin" on Justia Law

PHA filed suit against Wells Fargo, alleging that Wells Fargo falsely represented that it would forbear collection of the principal balance of a line of credit, ultimately causing PHA to default and enter bankruptcy. PHA subsequently filed suit in Virginia state court, which Wells Fargo removed to federal court. Along with repeating the claims made in the bankruptcy adversary complaint, PHA alleged new theories of lender liability. The district court dismissed the suit. The court rejected PHA's contention that the district court erroneously gave res judicata effect to various sale orders issued during PHA’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy, concluding that the elements of res judicata are satisfied. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Providence Hall Assoc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law