Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Commission determined that a fatal accident in a coal mine operated by Consol resulted from Consol's "unwarrantable failure" to ensure that certain equipment in the mine was maintained in a safe, working condition. Consol petitions for review and challenges the Commission's final order. The court concluded that Consol had fair notice that the failure to replace defective shutoff valves raised the possibility of sanctions, and MSHA is therefore not barred from seeking civil penalties in connection with this violation; the ALJ’s conclusion that Addington acted as Consol’s agent in responding to the damaged valves is amply supported by the evidence; the ALJ properly imputed his knowledge and negligence in connection with the accident to Consol; and the court affirmed the ALJ's findings that the challenged violations stemmed from Consol’s unwarrantable failure to comply with applicable MSHA health and safety regulations. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Consol Buchanan Mining Co. v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against three charitable organizations, alleging that they unlawfully refused to admit her to homeless shelters because of her alleged mental health disability. The district court dismissed the claims under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The court concluded that plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim cannot proceed because none of the defendants are state actors; plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1985 claim of civil conspiracy between the Salvation Army and Church in the City must also be dismissed because there are no allegations to support the existence of any conspiracy; plaintiff lacks standing to bring a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.; plaintiff's Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq., claim was properly dismissed because her complaint does not contain a plausible allegation of discrimination; and plaintiff's claim under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794, was also properly dismissed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of dismissal as modified to indicate that it be without prejudice. View "Thomas v. The Salvation Army" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against various Detention Facility officials, arguing that the imposition of disciplinary segregation without a hearing violated his procedural due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, concluding that due process requirements were satisfied by plaintiff's opportunity to file a written appeal after he was placed in disciplinary segregation. The court concluded, however, that as a pretrial detainee, plaintiff was entitled to a hearing before he was punished. In this case, defendants concede that no such hearing was afforded and thus the court directed that judgment be entered for plaintiff on his due process claim. The court remanded for consideration of plaintiff's excessive force claim under the proper standard. View "Dilworth v. Adams" on Justia Law

Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for a nonhomicide offense he committed at the age of sixteen. After Graham v. Florida was decided, petitioner sought postconviction relief but the state courts denied it. The court concluded that petitioner's state court adjudication constituted an unreasonable application of Graham where Virginia courts unreasonably ignored the plain language of the procedures governing review of petitions for geriatric release, which authorize the State Parole Board to deny geriatric release for any reason, without considering a juvenile offender’s maturity and rehabilitation. In light of the lack of governing standards, the court concluded that it was objectively unreasonable for the state courts to conclude that geriatric release affords petitioner with the “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” Graham demands. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of habeas relief and remanded so that petitioner can be resentenced in accordance with Graham and the Eighth Amendment. View "LeBlanc v. Mathena" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former federal prisoner, filed suit alleging a number of violations under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, against several federal prison officials pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff argues that, in dismissing three claims that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, the district court made credibility determinations and weighed the parties’ evidence, thus violating the summary judgment standard. The court reversed the district court's disposition of the two Eighth Amendment claims against Dr. Phillip and Administrator McClintock. In this case, the court concluded that there is sufficient evidence that plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care and freedom from officials’ deliberate indifference to his medical needs was violated and that the right was clearly established. The court affirmed the district court's resolution of the claim against Warden Stansberry. View "Scinto, Sr. v. Warden Stansberry" on Justia Law

CIT obtained a judgment against defendant in the Eastern District of Virginia. Under Virginia law, that judgment remained viable for 20 years. Roughly 10 years after the judgment had been entered, on August 27, 2003, CIT registered the judgment in the District of Maryland pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1963. Under Maryland law, made relevant by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a), judgments expire 12 years after entry. After CIT sold the judgment to Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo began collection efforts in April 2015. The district court concluded that the time limitation for enforcement of the judgment began with the date of its registration in Maryland, on August 27, 2003, and that therefore it was still enforceable against defendant. The court held that the registration of the Virginia district court judgment in the District of Maryland at a time when the judgment was not time-barred by Virginia law functions as a new judgment in the District of Maryland, and Maryland’s 12-year limitations period for enforcement on the judgment begins running from the date of registration. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Wells Fargo Equipment Finance v. Asterbadi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit in Virginia state court against Appellants and others, alleging that plaintiff's husband, Bernard W. Ripley, was exposed to asbestos contained in products Appellants manufactured for the Navy, and that Appellants are liable for failure to warn of asbestos hazards. Appellants removed the case pursuant to the federal officer removal statute to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The district court remanded to state court, citing longstanding precedent in the district that denies the government contractor defense in failure to warn cases. However, given the weight of opposing precedent and the rationales supporting the defense, the court held that the government contractor defense is available in failure to warn cases. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to consider whether Appellants have presented sufficient proof to warrant removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1442. View "Ripley v. Foster Wheeler LLC" on Justia Law

After the Board found that nurses could unionize and rejected the employer’s contention that they were ineligible supervisors within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 152(11), the employer refused to bargain with the union. When the Board ordered the employer to do so, the employer petitioned for review. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that the nurses are not supervisors because their duties do not require the exercise of independent judgment. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review and granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement. View "Palmetto Prince George Operating v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against United Airlines for retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment for United Airlines. United Airlines had discharged plaintiff for fraudulently taking FMLA leave and for making dishonest representations during the ensuing investigation. The court concluded that, even drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff as the nonmoving party, Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., plaintiff has failed to create an issue of triable fact that the explanation United Airlines provided for his discharge was a pretext for retaliation for taking FMLA leave. In this case, the evidence taken as a whole plainly paints the picture of an employee who used FMLA leave to avoid interrupting his vacation, and then gave a variety of inconsistent explanations for his behavior upon his return. The court explained that to hold otherwise would disable companies from attaching any sanction or consequence to the fraudulent abuse of a statute designed to enable workers to take leave for legitimate family needs and medical reasons. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Sharif v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

On March 8, 2012, as high school students were being released from school, Officer Church received a call for back-up and arrived to find juveniles running through the streets. Officer Jackson was struggling to arrest one of them. Smith was standing outside of her car with her phone up as if videotaping. Officer Church, over 50 feet away, yelled, “Ma’am, pull your car to the side or keep on going.” Smith replied, “I’m not going to let you hurt that young boy. I ain’t moving.” Church moved closer, told her this was a traffic stop, and asked for her license. Smith “ran back into her car.” A struggle ensued. The parties disagree about the details. Church arrested Smith. The charges were eventually dropped. Smith sued the police department and officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. At trial, the court allowed defense counsel to elicit testimony that Smith had been arrested three times before. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the officers on all counts. The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding Smith’s prior arrests not relevant to her claim for damages, which was the sole reason the court admitted them, and that any probative value of those arrests was far outweighed by prejudice to Smith, in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). View "Smith v. Baltimore City Police Department" on Justia Law