Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Relators filed suit under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, alleging that Academi knowingly submitted false claims to the United States in connection with a government contract to provide security services in Iraq and Afghanistan. The district court dismissed the complaint pursuant to the FCA's public-disclosure bar. The court concluded that the determination of when a plaintiff’s claims arise for purposes of the public-disclosure bar is governed by the date of the first pleading to particularly allege the relevant fraud and not by the timing of any subsequent pleading. The district court thus erred in holding the second-amended complaint was the relevant pleading by which to measure the public-disclosure bar. The court further concluded that the public-disclosure bar was inapplicable in this case where the article at issue on Wired.com was not a qualifying public disclosure that triggered the bar. Relators sufficiently pled the weapons qualifications scheme in their first-amended complaint that came well before the Wired.com article. Accordingly, the court vacated the portion of the district court’s order dismissing Relators’ weapons qualification claims under the public-disclosure bar and remanded for further proceedings. View "US ex rel. Beauchamp v. Academi Training Center" on Justia Law

Sie Giok Giang, a passenger on a Sky Express interstate, was killed when the driver fell asleep at the wheel and ran the bus off the side of a highway. About seven weeks before the crash, Sky Express had been given an “unsatisfactory” safety rating by the FMCSA. At issue is whether the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671-2680, bars an FTCA claim against the FMCSA for allowing Sky Express to continue to operate during a 10 day extension. The district court concluded that, pursuant to that exception, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the case. The court concluded that, considering that any waiver of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed, the FMCSA’s decision to promulgate a regulation permitting 10-day extensions for passenger carriers was a permissible exercise of judgment subject to the FTCA’s discretionary function exception and thus did not waive sovereign immunity. Therefore, the district court correctly dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Pornomo v. United States" on Justia Law

Appellants appealed a district court order granting summary judgment against them in their claims challenging the constitutionality of certain contribution limits established by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), see 52 U.S.C. 30101–30146. The court concluded that two of the three claims became moot before the district court granted summary judgment, and the court therefore vacated the merits judgment on those counts and remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss them for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In Count III the Fund and ARCC challenge the constitutionality of the annual $5,000 limit that applies to contributions from “multicandidate political committee” (MPCs) to state political party committees and their local affiliates, and the Fund challenges the constitutionality of the annual $15,000 limit on contributions from MPCs to national party committees. The court concluded that, because appellants cannot demonstrate that FECA discriminates against MPCs, there is no discrimination to be justified, and the court concluded that the FEC was entitled to summary judgment on Count III. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part with instructions to dismiss. View "Stop R.E.I.D. v. Federal Election Commission" on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Because the carrying of a concealed firearm is not itself illegal in West Virginia, and because the circumstances did not otherwise provide an objective basis for inferring danger, the court concluded that the officer who frisked defendant lacked reasonable suspicion that defendant was not only armed but also dangerous. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress the evidence uncovered by the unlawful search. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Haiti, seeks review of the denial of his application for deferral or removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and the denial of his motion to reopen removal proceedings. The BIA explained in In re J-E- that, as usually defined, “specific intent” constitutes “[t]he intent to accomplish the precise criminal act that one is later charged with.” The distinction between specific and general intent rests on the mens rea related to the consequences of a wrongful act. Haiti’s detention of criminal deportees under extremely substandard conditions constitutes the challenged wrongful act both here and in In re J-E-. On the record before it, the BIA found that “Haitian prison conditions are the result of budgetary and management problems as well as the country’s severe economic difficulties,” and not part of an intentional effort to punish criminal deportees. In re J-E- requires a CAT claimant to demonstrate that the state actor who mistreats him desires to cause his severe pain and suffering, and is not merely negligent nor reckless as to the risk. Petitioner argues that a claimant should be able to satisfy this requirement by demonstrating that an official acts with knowledge to a near certainty that he will cause severe pain and suffering. The court joined the majority of its sister circuits, who have considered the issue, in deferring to the BIA's interpretation of the CAT’s intent requirement as articulated in In re J-E-. The court rejected petitioner's contention that the IJ and BIA committed legal error in following the precedent established in In re J-E- to deny his application for deferral of removal under the CAT. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the petition for review from the order denying his motion to reopen. View "Oxygene v. Lynch" on Justia Law

After defendant pled guilty to failing to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. 16911(4)(A), the district court calculated defendant's Guidelines range as if he were a tier III sex offender. The court held that the categorical approach was applicable in this instance and, after comparing defendant's state court conviction for endangering the welfare of a child to the generic offenses enumerated in section 16911(4)(A), the court agreed with defendant that the district court erred in deeming defendant a tier III offender. Accordingly, the court vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Berry" on Justia Law

Perdue appealed the district court's dismissal of its breach of contract action against BRF for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court concluded that Perdue has alleged few facts to satisfy its prima facie burden in support of personal jurisdiction. In this case, the only fact that it alleges that indisputably weighs in favor of jurisdiction is that the agreement at issue includes a Maryland choice-of-law clause. On the contrary, many undisputed facts indicate that a Maryland court does not have personal jurisdiction over BRF: the company employs no Maryland officers or agents and owns no property in the state; BRF did not initiate the negotiations that led to the agreement; no BRF employee traveled to Maryland in connection with the agreement; and BRF conducts no business in Maryland. In this case, BRF’s alleged breach of the agreement occurred not in Maryland, but in foreign countries. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Perdue Foods LLC v. BRF S.A." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing defendant’s claim as barred by the waiver provision in the plea agreement. Furthermore, under the court's holding in United States v. Simmons, defendant was not a convicted felon at the time of the offense, and it was therefore not a violation of section 922(g)(1) for defendant to be in possession of a firearm. Therefore, the court concluded that defendant has shown factual innocence as contemplated by Bousley v. United States because he has shown that it is impossible for the government to prove one of the required elements of a section 922(g)(1) charge - that the defendant was a convicted felon at the time of the offense. The court also concluded that defendant has made the requisite showing of actual innocence. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Nigeria and the adopted son of a United States citizen, petitioned for review of the BIA's denial of his motion to reopen removal proceedings. At issue is the statutory phrase, “adopted while under the age of sixteen years.” 8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1)(E)(i). The court concluded that the plain meaning of “adopted” in section 1101(b)(1)(E)(i) forecloses the BIA’s summary disregard of facially valid nunc pro tunc orders relating to adoptions conducted by the various state courts. Here, it was contrary to law for the BIA not to recognize the nunc pro tunc order in petitioner's case and thus the BIA abused its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to reopen his removal proceedings. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review. View "Ojo v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1344. Defendant signed a waiver of appellate rights as part of her plea agreement. Nonetheless, defendant challenged the establishment of her Sentencing Guidelines range on appeal. The court concluded that her waiver provision quite specifically waives the right to appeal the sentence “on any ground, including any issues that relate to the establishment of the advisory Guideline range.” Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "United States v. McLaughlin" on Justia Law