Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Sherita Hicks was mistakenly identified and arrested for an assault she did not commit. Detective Gregory Pamer, leading the investigation, showed the victim, Devante Allen, a photo lineup that included Hicks, whom Allen incorrectly identified as the female assailant. Pamer also discovered that a van used in the assault was registered to Hicks and that the attack was retribution for a prior break-in at her home. Despite later receiving exculpatory information implicating another woman, Pamer proceeded with Hicks' arrest. Hicks was jailed for one night before posting bond, and the charges against her were eventually dismissed.Hicks filed a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against multiple parties, including Pamer and Anne Arundel County, alleging unlawful arrest, detention, and malicious prosecution. The case proceeded to trial against Pamer and the County on claims of malicious prosecution and gross negligence. During the trial, a juror was dismissed for violating court instructions by speaking to Hicks, despite objections from Hicks' counsel. The jury ultimately found in favor of Pamer on all counts, leading Hicks to file a motion for a new trial, which was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the juror for good cause under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 47(c). The court also found no reversible error in the jury instructions, which adequately stated the controlling law. The jury's verdict in favor of Pamer on all counts was upheld, and the court did not need to address issues related to punitive damages or the inclusion of the County on the verdict sheet, as there was no underlying liability. View "Hicks v. Anne Arundel County" on Justia Law

Randy Price was charged with possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number and possession of a firearm by a felon. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, Price moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that both statutes were facially unconstitutional. The district court denied the motion regarding the felon-in-possession charge but granted it for the obliterated serial number charge, finding that the analysis required under Bruen rendered the statute an impermissible restriction on the Second Amendment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia denied Price's motion to dismiss the felon-in-possession charge but granted it for the obliterated serial number charge. The court concluded that the conduct prohibited by the statute was protected by the Second Amendment and that there was no historical tradition of firearm regulation consistent with the statute. The Government appealed the dismissal of the obliterated serial number charge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the conduct regulated by the statute does not fall within the scope of the Second Amendment because a firearm with a removed, obliterated, or altered serial number is not a weapon in common use for lawful purposes. The court concluded that there is no compelling reason for a law-abiding citizen to possess such a firearm, and such weapons are primarily used for illicit purposes. Therefore, the statute's regulation of these firearms does not violate the Second Amendment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "United States v. Price" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to Maryland's Firearms Safety Act of 2013, which prohibits the sale and possession of certain military-style assault weapons, including the AR-15, AK-47, and Barrett .50 caliber sniper rifle. The plaintiffs, consisting of individual Maryland residents, gun rights organizations, and a firearms dealer, argued that the Act violates the Second Amendment's right to keep and bear arms.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, citing the Fourth Circuit's en banc decision in Kolbe v. Hogan, which upheld the same Maryland statute. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs' acknowledgment that their argument was foreclosed by Kolbe. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, noting that a panel could not reconsider an en banc holding. The plaintiffs then petitioned the Supreme Court, which remanded the case for reconsideration in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, upon reconsideration, upheld the district court's judgment. The court held that the assault weapons regulated by Maryland's statute fall outside the protection of the Second Amendment because they are military-style weapons designed for combat, not self-defense. The court also found that the Maryland law aligns with the nation's tradition of regulating excessively dangerous weapons. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, rejecting the plaintiffs' challenge to the statute. View "Bianchi v. Brown" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at Lee Marvin Harris, Sr.'s home, discovering a significant amount of cocaine in an old Cadillac parked in the yard. Harris, Sr. was arrested for possession with intent to distribute and spent five months in pretrial detention before charges were dismissed. He then sued the Town of Southern Pines and the officers involved, alleging malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment and fabrication of evidence under the Fourteenth Amendment, claiming officers omitted material evidence from prosecutors and grand juries.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that probable cause existed for Harris, Sr.'s arrest based on the discovery of cocaine on his property and dismissed the fabrication of evidence claim, reasoning that such claims are not viable if the plaintiff was not convicted. Harris, Sr. appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and found genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Harris, Sr. was arrested and charged without probable cause. The court held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity for the Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim. Additionally, the court determined that a plaintiff who was arrested and detained but not convicted could still state a Fourteenth Amendment fabrication of evidence claim. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim, vacated the summary judgment on the Fourteenth Amendment fabrication of evidence claim, and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment on the state law malicious prosecution claim, the failure to intervene claim, and the Monell claim against the Town of Southern Pines and the Chief of Police. View "Harris v. Town of Southern Pines" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, property owners in West Virginia, filed a lawsuit against the current and former owners of abandoned oil and gas wells on their properties. They sought damages for the defendants' failure to plug the wells, alleging common law nuisance, trespass, and negligence. The defendants argued that the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (WVDEP) was responsible for well plugging and that WVDEP had approved transactions between the defendants, which purportedly relaxed their statutory duty to plug the wells. They claimed WVDEP was an indispensable party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 and, because it could not be joined due to sovereign immunity, sought judgment in their favor under Rule 12(c).The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia denied the defendants' motion, ruling that WVDEP was not a necessary and indispensable party under Rule 19. The court concluded that it could grant the plaintiffs damages on their common law claims without implicating the State’s interests. The defendants then filed an interlocutory appeal, arguing that the district court's order was reviewable under the collateral order doctrine, as it effectively denied WVDEP sovereign immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the district court's order did not rule on any immunity issue but only on whether WVDEP was a necessary and indispensable party under Rule 19. The appellate court found that the order did not satisfy the requirements of the collateral order doctrine and was not a final decision. Consequently, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "McEvoy v. Diversified Energy Company PLC" on Justia Law

A power company based in Florida sued a North Carolina-based power company, alleging that the latter had monopoly power in the wholesale power market in the Carolinas and maintained that power through anticompetitive conduct, violating § 2 of the Sherman Act. The plaintiff presented evidence that the defendant devised a plan to exclude the plaintiff from competing for the business of Fayetteville, North Carolina, the only major customer whose contract was expiring soon enough for the plaintiff to compete.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court found that while there was a question of fact regarding the defendant's monopoly power, the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant engaged in anticompetitive conduct. The court concluded that the defendant's actions constituted legitimate competition to retain Fayetteville’s business.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred by compartmentalizing the defendant's conduct rather than considering it as a whole. The appellate court noted that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to show that the defendant's conduct, including a blend-and-extend strategy and interference with the plaintiff's interconnection efforts, could be seen as part of a coordinated anticompetitive campaign. The court held that genuine disputes of material fact existed regarding whether the defendant's actions were anticompetitive.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court also ordered that the case be assigned to a different judge, citing the principle that once a judge recuses himself, he should remain recused from the case. View "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. NTE Carolinas II, LLC" on Justia Law

In early 2022, FBI and IRS agents investigated John Doe and his businesses for suspected wire fraud, money laundering, and tax fraud. They obtained three search warrants to search Doe’s apartment, office, and vehicle. The warrants included a filter protocol to protect potentially privileged materials. During the searches, agents seized various paper materials and electronic devices. The government later contacted Doe to assist in segregating potentially privileged material, but Doe’s counsel did not respond. Negotiations between Doe and the government failed, leading Doe to file a motion to establish a filter protocol to protect his legal privileges.The magistrate judge granted Doe’s motion to intervene but denied his substantive motion for a new filter protocol, finding that Doe did not meet the requirements for a preliminary injunction. The district court reviewed the magistrate judge’s decision and also denied Doe’s motion, agreeing that Doe was not entitled to an injunction. Doe then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The Fourth Circuit dismissed Doe’s appeal, holding that it lacked appellate jurisdiction. The court explained that under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, it generally only has jurisdiction over final decisions of district courts. The court applied the DiBella test, which states that orders resolving pre-indictment suppression motions are not immediately appealable unless the motion is solely for the return of property and not tied to a criminal prosecution in esse. The court found that Doe’s motion was not solely for the return of property and was tied to an ongoing grand jury investigation. Therefore, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction under both § 1291 and § 1292(a)(1) and dismissed the appeal. View "United State of America v. Doe" on Justia Law

Ahmad Hashimi was indicted on four counts in the Eastern District of Virginia, including drug-related charges and charges involving violence against his ex-girlfriend. Hashimi and his court-appointed lawyer, Bruce Johnson, had a contentious relationship, with Hashimi repeatedly complaining about poor communication and the lack of a plea deal. Despite these issues, the district court did not replace Johnson. During the trial, Johnson attempted to negotiate a plea deal for the violence charges, but the court rejected it, and the case proceeded to the jury. In his closing argument, Johnson conceded Hashimi's guilt on the violence charges without Hashimi's explicit consent, focusing his defense on the drug charges. The jury found Hashimi guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to 300 months in prison.Hashimi appealed his conviction, arguing that Johnson's concession of guilt without his consent violated his Sixth Amendment rights. The Fourth Circuit initially affirmed the conviction but reconsidered after the Supreme Court's decision in McCoy v. Louisiana, which established a defendant's right to maintain innocence. On remand, the Fourth Circuit again affirmed but allowed Hashimi to raise his claim in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. Hashimi filed the motion, presenting evidence that he did not consent to the concession and highlighting his poor communication with Johnson.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Hashimi's § 2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing, reasoning that Hashimi did not explicitly object to the concession. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in denying the motion without a hearing. The appellate court held that the record did not conclusively show that Hashimi was informed of and consented to the concession, as required by McCoy. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further factual development. View "US v. Hashimi" on Justia Law

Kenneth Watkins, an Atlanta-based rap musician, was convicted of conspiracy to possess a controlled substance with intent to distribute. Investigators, suspecting drug activities linked to a Charlotte-based record label operated by Steven “Ziggy” Cloud, obtained a wiretap on Cloud’s phone. Evidence showed that Watkins was involved in drug transactions with Cloud, including three trips where couriers transported pills from Atlanta to Charlotte. The couriers, Jonquilla Sanders and Latisha Anderson, testified about their trips, with intercepted calls and other evidence linking Watkins to the drug deliveries.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina tried the case. Watkins was convicted by a jury and sentenced to ten years in prison, three years of supervised release, and a $100 fine. Watkins appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of his song lyrics as evidence, the jury instructions, the calculation of drug quantity, and the denial of a downward departure in sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support Watkins’s conviction, as a rational jury could infer his knowledge and participation in the conspiracy. The court also held that the district court did not err in allowing the prosecution to question Watkins’s wife about his song lyrics, as Watkins had introduced character evidence. The court affirmed the district court’s jury instructions, finding no abuse of discretion. The court upheld the drug quantity calculation and the use of the 1-to-380-gram conversion ratio for eutylone. Finally, the court ruled that the district court’s discretionary denial of a downward departure was not reviewable. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. View "US v. Watkins" on Justia Law

In August 2019, Eric Toon led Lieutenant Christopher Zerkle on a high-speed chase before returning to his home, where his girlfriend, Taylor Quinn, was sleeping. Zerkle and other officers, including Sergeants Paxton Lively and Rick Keglor, and Deputies Brandon Kay and Jamie Miller, arrived at Toon’s residence. The officers knocked on the door, which eventually opened outward, leading them to enter the home. Toon then broke a window, jumped out with an AR-15, and was fatally shot by Zerkle and another officer. Quinn, who followed Toon out of the window, was also injured.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia dismissed some claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the officers on the remaining claims. The court found that the officers reasonably believed they had consent to enter the home when the door opened and that Zerkle’s use of deadly force against Toon was justified. The court also concluded that Quinn’s injuries were accidental and not the result of intentional excessive force.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and found that factual disputes precluded summary judgment on the warrantless entry claims and Quinn’s excessive force, battery, and trespass claims. The court held that the officers could not assume consent to enter the home merely because the door opened. The court also determined that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Zerkle intentionally shot Quinn. The court affirmed the district court’s decision on the remaining claims, including the excessive force claim related to Toon and the failure to intervene claim against Zerkle. The case was reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Quinn v. Zerkle" on Justia Law