Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Stubbs is owed approximately $200,000 in legal fees from representing debtor in bankruptcy proceedings. Debtor is subject to nearly $1 million in secured tax claims, and the estate has insufficient funds to pay both Stubbs’ fees and the tax claim. At issue is which of these claims takes priority in a Chapter 7 liquidation under the Bankruptcy Code. Under the version of section 724(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 724(b)(2), in effect when the bankruptcy court rendered its decision, the court concluded that it is clear that debtor is not entitled to subordinate the IRS’s secured tax claim in favor of its unsecured claim to Chapter 11 administrative expenses. The court need not reach the issue of whether the same result would have been obtained under the pre-Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-327, 124 Stat. 3557, version of section 724(b)(2). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Angell v. Stubbs & Perdue, P.A." on Justia Law

Knox Creek challenged the Commission's determination that four uncontested violations of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. 814(d)(1), by Knox Creek were “significant and substantial.” In regard to the permissibility violations, the court concluded that the Commission should have applied the legal standard advocated by the Secretary, but that the outcome is unaffected when the proper standard is applied. In regard to the accumulations violation, the court concluded that the Commission applied the correct legal standard, one also endorsed by the Secretary. Further, the Commission did not improperly reweigh evidence in this case. On the contrary, the Commission’s decision with respect to both the permissibility and accumulations violations did not question even one of the ALJ’s factual findings. Accordingly, the court denied Knox Creek's petition for review. View "Knox Creek Coal Corp. v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit arguing that Virginia's certificate of need (CON) law, a program that governs the establishment and expansion of certain medical facilities inside the state, unconstitutionally violates the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause. The district court granted summary judgment to the Commonwealth. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that Virginia’s CON requirement violates the dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce in both purpose and effect, and rejected plaintiffs' argument that even if the program does not unconstitutionally discriminate, it nevertheless violates the dormant Commerce Clause because it places an undue burden on interstate commerce. Because the certificate requirement neither discriminated against nor placed an undue burden on interstate commerce, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Colon Health Ctrs. v. Hazel" on Justia Law

Defendants Moore and Latham appealed convictions for their participation in a murder-for-hire plot targeting Latham's estranged wife. The court held that the jury instructions did not constructively amend the indictment in this case where the jury could not reasonably have concluded that it was free to convict defendants under the uncharged, undefined facilities prong of the murder-for-hire statute. In regard to defendants' evidentiary challenges, the court concluded that there was no error in admitting a government witness's out-of-court statements, and there was no error in admitting certain character evidence where defendants elicited some of the testimony at issue and the district court required the government to correct any misperceptions engendered by the evidence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Wells Fargo, alleging that his mortgage agreement, providing him with a loan far in excess of his home’s actual value, was an “unconscionable contract” under the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act, W. Va. Code 46A–1–101 et seq. The court agreed with the district court that the amount of a mortgage loan, by itself, cannot show substantive unconscionability under West Virginia law, and that plaintiff has not otherwise made that showing. The court concluded, however, that the Act allows for claims of “unconscionable inducement” even when the substantive terms of a contract are not themselves unfair. Accordingly, the court remanded so that the district court may consider this issue in the first instance. View "McFarland v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from multi-district litigation involving transvaginal mesh medical devices used to treat pelvic organ prolapse and other pelvic issues. The jury awarded plaintiff $250,000 in compensatory damages, and the punitive damages award was split pursuant to a Georgia statute, with seventy-five percent going to the State of Georgia and twenty-five percent going to plaintiff. Both parties appealed. The court affirmed the district court's exclusion of evidence that Bard had complied with the FDA's 510(k) product safety process under F.R.E. 402 for lack of relevance; affirmed the district court's decision to admit evidence of a material data safety sheet pertaining to polypropylene, a material used in the construction of the Avaulta Plus implanted in plaintiff's body, as non-hearsay, finding that any use of the evidence by plaintiff that went beyond the limited purpose for which it was admitted as non-hearsay resulted in harmless error and was not prejudicial to Bard’s defense; and concluded that the district court did not err in giving the Georgia pattern jury instruction, in denying Bard’s request for a modified instruction, or in upholding the jury’s causation finding. The court also concluded that the punitive award was not constitutionally excessive. In regard to plaintiff's challenges, the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that Georgia's split-recovery statute garnishing seventy-five percent of any punitive damages award arising from a product liability judgment does not violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cisson v. C. R. Bard, Inc." on Justia Law

The Estate of Ronald H. Armstrong appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Village and members of the police department on its excessive force claims. The court held that defendants used unconstitutionally excessive force when seizing Armstrong. Had defendants limited themselves to permissible uses of force when seizing Armstrong, they would have had every tool needed to control and resolve the situation at their disposal. However, the court concluded that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity where Armstrong’s right not to be tased while offering stationary and non-violent resistance to a lawful seizure was not clearly established. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Estate of Ronald Armstrong v. The Village of Pinehurst" on Justia Law

After plaintiff flunked out of the FBI Academy by failing to perform the required amount of push-ups, he filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c). Plaintiff alleged that the FBI discriminated against him on the basis of sex, in that female New Agent Trainees were required to complete only fourteen push-ups. The district court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and the Attorney General appealed. The court held that an employer does not contravene Title VII when it utilizes physical fitness standards that distinguish between the sexes on the basis of their physiological differences but impose an equal burden of compliance on both men and women, requiring the same level of physical fitness of each. Because the FBI purports to assess physical fitness by imposing the same burden on both men and women, this rule applies to plaintiff’s Title VII claims. The court concluded that the district court erred in failing to apply the rule in its disposition of plaintiff's summary judgment motion. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bauer v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that HRFC violated the Maryland Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Provisions (CLEC), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 12-1001 et seq., breached a retail installment sales contract, and violated the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act (MCDCA), Md. Code. Ann., Com. Law 14-201 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to HRFC. The court held that HRFC’s mere failure to disclose an interest rate below CLEC’s statutory maximum is not a distinct violation of section 12-1003(a) for which liability may be imposed; HRFC complied with section 12-1020’s notice requirement and HRFC did not fail to properly cure its error; and the court rejected plaintiff's contention that because the contract incorporates CLEC’s provisions, HRFC is liable for breach of contract for any deviation from CLEC, “regardless of whether HRFC properly cured the failure to comply” with the statute. The court held, however, that a jury could find that HRFC's conduct, at least in the aggregate, could reasonably be expected to abuse or harass plaintiff. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order in regard to the MCDCA claim. The court affirmed as to the CLEC and breach of contract claims. View "Askew v. HRFC, LLC" on Justia Law

The Commissioner issued a Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA) indicating that Route 231 should have reported the $3,816,000 it received from Virginia Conservation, one of its members, as gross income and not a capital contribution. The Tax Court determined that the transaction was a “sale” and reportable as gross income in 2005. The court concluded that the Tax Court did not err in agreeing with the Commissioner that the money Route 231 received from Virginia Conservation was “income” for federal tax purposes. Further, the court concluded that the Tax Court correctly determined that the tax credit sale occurred in 2005 for federal tax purposes. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Route 231, LLC v. Commissioner" on Justia Law