Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In these consolidated cases, plaintiffs filed suit challenging two redistricting laws, alleging that some Wake County School Board and Wake County Board of County Commissioners districts have been over-populated, while others have been under-populated. Plaintiffs further assert that these discrepancies result in some votes counting more while others count less, and that the discrepancies stem from illegitimate redistricting factors. The court concluded that, to succeed on the merits, plaintiffs in one person, one vote cases with population deviations below 10% must show by a preponderance of the evidence that improper considerations predominate in explaining the deviations. In this case, plaintiffs have proven that it is more probable than not that the population deviations at issue here reflect the predominance of an illegitimate reapportionment factor, namely an intentional effort to create a significant partisan advantage. Therefore, the district court committed reversible error in granting judgment for defendants. For the same reasons that plaintiffs succeed with their federal claim, they also succeed with their North Carolina state one person, one vote claim. Finally, the district court did not commit clear error in rejecting plaintiffs' racial gerrymandering claim. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded in part, and affirmed in part. View "Raleigh Wake Citizens Ass'n v. Wake Cnty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Solers challenges the IRS’ response to its request for documents under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552. The district court granted summary judgment for the IRS. The court concluded that the issue of whether the IRS provided a Vaughn index sufficient to enable the district court to evaluate the IRS’ claimed exemptions became irrelevant and moot after the IRS complied with the district court’s order to produce the records for in camera review and the district court completed its own review of the records. The district court sustained the IRS' position that Exemptions 3, 5, 6, and 7(C) applied to the following four categories: (1) the agent’s handwritten notes; (2) the summary report, graph, and checksheet; (3) the activity record; and (4) the two emails. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Solers, Inc. v. IRS" on Justia Law

Thai Palace filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the First Amendment, challenging the Board's revocation of its alcoholic beverage license, as well as its orders imposing conditions on the license. At issue on appeal is whether the district court properly applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to dismiss this federal action challenging the actions of a state administrative agency that were reviewed in state court. The court concluded that, at bottom, this federal action qualifies as an independent, concurrent action that does not undermine the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments, and accordingly the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Thana v. Board of License Commissioners" on Justia Law

Plaintiff initially filed suit against defendants on June 4, 2010. Defendant then decided to voluntarily withdraw her complaint. On November 3, 2010, plaintiff dismissed her first action and filed a second complaint, which she served on defendants in February 2011. Defendants moved to stay the second action and for costs under FRCP 41(d). The magistrate judge awarded defendants' motion for attorneys’ fees and other expenses that had been incurred in defending the first action. The district court affirmed, finding that plaintiff's conduct amounted to vexatious litigation, for which fees could be recovered. In 2013, plaintiff appealed before this court before an amount could be determined and the court dismissed. On remand, the district court awarded $13,403.75 in attorneys’ fees to defendants and stayed the case pending payment. In 2015, plaintiff appealed without paying the costs and before the case was dismissed for nonpayment. On remand, the district court dismissed the second action for failure to pay the awarded attorneys’ fees. The court adopted the Seventh Circuit's reasoning and held that Rule 41(d) does not provide for an award of attorneys’ fees as a matter of right; instead, a district court may award attorneys’ fees under this rule only where the underlying statute provides for attorneys’ fees. A court may also, within its discretion, award attorneys’ fees where it makes a specific finding that the plaintiff has acted “in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons,” a well-established exception to the American Rule. In this case, the court found that plaintiff's conduct was not undertaken in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. Accordingly, the court reversed the order to pay attorneys' fees, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Andrews v. America's Living Centers, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against FRBR, alleging claims for interference and retaliation in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., and failure to accommodate and discriminatory discharge in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the FMLA retaliation claim and the ADA claims. The court concluded, however, that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether FRBR interfered with plaintiff’s FMLA rights by providing him defective notice that omitted his right to reinstatement at the conclusion of the medical leave term. Accordingly, the court held that the district court's grant of summary judgment as to that claim was not warranted. The court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Vannoy v. Federal Reserve Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and former Fairfax County fire captains, filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201-219, alleging that they are entitled to overtime pay. The court held that plaintiffs do not fall within the FLSA's exception for certain executive and administrative employees whose primary job duties are management-related. In this case, the County has not submitted evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find, under the clear and convincing standard, that plaintiffs’ primary duty is anything other than first response. Therefore, plaintiffs are entitled to overtime compensation under the FLSA. The court reversed and remanded. View "Morrison v. County of Fairfax, VA" on Justia Law

Movant seeks authorization to file a second or successive application for habeas relief. The court held that a convicted state prisoner, such as movant in this case, challenging the execution of his sentence is required to apply for authorization to file a second or successive habeas application. According to the plain language of the statutes at issue and the purpose and context of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), movant's petition, although styled as a 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition, is governed by 28 U.S.C. 2254, and as such, should be treated as an “application under section 2254.” Therefore, when a prisoner being held “pursuant to the judgment of a State court” files a habeas petition claiming the execution of his sentence is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, the more specific section 2254 “and all associated statutory requirements” shall apply, regardless of the statutory label the prisoner chooses to give his petition. In this case, movant must move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the second or successive application. Movant's petition is second or successive, and he does not meet the criteria for authorization. Accordingly, the court denied the motion. View "In Re: Terrence Wright" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 60-month sentence after pleading guilty to illegal reentry into the United States. The district court concluded that defendant's 1997 aggravated assault conviction under Texas Penal Code 22.02(a) constituted a predicate “crime of violence” under the reentry sentencing guideline, USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). The court concluded that the Texas legislature, in setting out alternative means of satisfying the mens rea element of the Texas statute, did not render the statute divisible such that the state law can be said to have created two offenses, one involving a reckless mens rea, the other involving a knowing or intentional mens rea. The court concluded that the Texas aggravated assault offense created in section 22.02(a) is broader than the federal generic “aggravated assault” offense qualifying under the reentry guideline as supporting an enhanced sentencing range, is not divisible, and therefore cannot support the application of a 16-level enhancement under the reentry guideline. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Barcenas-Yanez" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged the denial of her petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking relief as next friend of R.M.B., her minor son. R.M.B., a native of Guatemala, is being held as an unaccompanied alien child (a UAC) by the Office of Refugee Resettlement, an agency of DHHS. The court could not say that R.M.B.’s detention is based on an erroneous application or interpretation of the UAC definition where the Office found, after conducting a home study and gathering other evidence, that petitioner was incapable of providing for R.M.B.’s physical and mental well-being. The court rejected petitioner's contention that the Office lacks authority to detain R.M.B. now that his immigration proceedings have terminated. Even after R.M.B.'s immigration proceedings concluded, the Office was not entitled to release him to anyone unless it first determined that the proposed custodian was capable of providing for his physical and mental well-being. The court rejected petitioner's substantive due process claim, concluding that the Office's determination suffices to address any substantive due process concerns and renders inapposite those decisions involving challenges to state interference with control of children by fit parents. The court concluded, however, that the district court, in denying petitioner's procedural due process claim, did not utilize the proper Mathews v. Eldridge framework. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Beltran v. Cardall" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a political figure in the Libertarian Party of Virginia, filed suit challenging Virginia's three-tiered ballot ordering law, Virginia Code 24.2-613. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff principally argued on appeal that Virginia's three-tiered ballot ordering law advantages candidates from what he calls “major parties” and disadvantages candidates like him that hail from what he calls “minor parties.” The court noted that the text and history of the Constitution, well established Supreme Court precedent, and the structural principles inherent in our federal system counsel respect for the Virginia General Assembly’s power to administer elections in Virginia. With state legislatures’ longstanding authority to regulate elections in mind, the court employed the Supreme Court’s Anderson/Burdick decisional framework to distinguish those laws whose burdens are uniquely unconstitutional from the majority of laws whose validity is unquestioned. The court concluded that the three-tiered ballot ordering law imposes little burden on plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and Virginia articulates several important interests supporting the law. The ballot ordering law imposes only the most modest burdens on plaintiff's rights where the law is facially neutral and nondiscriminatory. Furthermore, the law is supported by important regulatory interests where the law may assist the voting process by reducing voter confusion and preserving party-order, as well as reduce multi-party factionalism and promote political stability. Therefore, the court concluded that it has no basis for finding the state statute unconstitutional and affirmed the judgment. View "Sarvis v. Alcorn" on Justia Law