Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Movant seeks authorization to file a successive habeas corpus application under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Movant alleged that despite multiple attempts over the years to obtain his entire case file from his trial and appellate counsel, it was not until May 2014 that he was provided with a particular document suggesting that his counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. The document is a proposed plea agreement. Movant claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to communicate this offer and that movant was prejudiced as a result. The court concluded that the plea offer would have no bearing on the deliberations of a reasonable factfinder regarding movant's innocence or guilt. Newly discovered evidence that a defendant may have lost out on a favorable plea offer fits neither of section 2244(b)’s exceptions to the bar on successive habeas applications. Accordingly, the court denied the motion. View "In re: John McFadden" on Justia Law

NAAMJP filed suit challenging the conditions placed on the privilege of admission to the Bar of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland in Local Rule 701. Among other things, the Rule contains requirements based on the state of licensure and, in some instances, the location of the attorney’s law office. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss and denied NAAMJP's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that Rule 701 does not violate the First Amendment where it qualifies as a general applicable licensing provision, prescribing which attorneys may practice in the District Court based on their state of licensure in relation to the location of their principal law office; Rule 701 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause where it does not infringe a fundamental right or disadvantage a suspect class; Rule 701 does not violate the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. 2071, where the Rule does not violate any Acts of Congress or any federal rules of practice and procedure adopted by the Supreme Court pursuant to section 2072; and Rule 701 does not violate the Supremacy Clause where it remains a federal rule prescribed pursuant to federal statute. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "NAAMJP v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Jamaica, seeks review of the BIA's denial of his motion to reopen as untimely and denial of his request for sua sponte reopening. Determining that it has jurisdiction, the court concluded that the Board conducted an appropriate, individualized inquiry into whether petitioner exhibited reasonable diligence to warrant equitable tolling. Having articulated and applied the correct standard in reviewing petitioner's claim for equitable tolling, the court concluded that the Board did not abuse its discretion. Nor did it abuse its discretion for either of the procedural deficiencies that Lawrence asserts. Because the Board appropriately analyzed and rejected petitioner’s request for equitable tolling, the court denied petitioner's motion to reopen as untimely. As to petitioner's request for sua sponte reopening, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review how the Board exercises its sua sponte discretion. View "Lawrence v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the denial of his applications for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI). Plaintiff sought disability benefits, alleging disability beginning December 8, 2006, due to uveitis; back pain, breathing and memory problems; anxiety; depression; and blackouts. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that the ALJ erred by not conducting a function-by-function analysis of plaintiff's limitations and by not adequately explaining his decision. View "Monroe v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Father petitioned for the return of his children to Mexico pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 19 I.L.M. 1501. The district court declined to order the children returned, and Father appealed. Reviewing the record facts as a whole, the court agreed with the district court that a preponderance of the facts establishes that Son has significant connections demonstrating a secure, stable, and permanent life in his new environment. Son is therefore “settled” within the meaning of the Convention. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s determination that Son is “settled” within the meaning of the Hague Convention and affirmed its decision not to exercise its discretion to order Son returned. View "Alcala v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for the murder of Special Agent James Terry Watson. Agent Watson - as an Assistant Attaché for the United States Mission in Colombia - was an internationally protected person (an IPP). Defendant, a citizen of Colombia, pleaded guilty to offenses of kidnapping conspiracy and murder of an IPP. Defendant argued that his prosecution in this country for offenses committed in Colombia contravened the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Applying the arbitrary-or-unfair framework, the court concluded that defendant's prosecution in this country was not fundamentally unfair where kidnapping and murder are "self-evidently criminal." Furthermore, the IPP convention alone gave defendant notice sufficient to satisfy due process. The court rejected defendant's contention that because the United States Code provisions implementing the IPP Convention require knowledge of the victim’s IPP status that Bello did not possess, those provisions cannot have put him on notice that he was subject to prosecution in this country. Accordingly, there is no merit to defendant’s mens rea contention - nor his broader claim that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause precluded his prosecution in this country - and the court must uphold his kidnapping conspiracy and murder convictions. View "United States v. Bello Murillo" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of communicating a false distress message to the United States Coast Guard and was sentenced to 14 months in prison, as well as ordered to pay restitution for the costs incurred by the Coast Guard in responding to the specious communication. Defendant was drunk on a boat when the Coast Guard found him in a restricted marine area. Defendant told the Coast Guard that he had a fight with another man and threw him overboard. After the Coast Guard's rescue efforts could not find the man, defendant admitted that he had taken some medication that may have caused him to imagine that another man was on the boat. The rescue efforts cost the Coast Guard $117,913. The court rejected defendant's argument that the district court lacked the statutory authority to issue a restitution order. The court concluded that the text and all reasonable inferences from it provide a clear rebuttal to defendant's proposed construction of 14 U.S.C. 88(c)(3). The court held that an order of restitution may issue under section 88(c)(3) as part of a criminal sentence. The primary purpose of the statute was to preserve for legitimate purposes the Coast Guard’s finite budget. It would defeat that purpose to mandate that the Coast Guard expend even more resources in separate civil actions to recoup false distress call costs. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Serafini" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, exotic dancers, filed suit alleging that their dance clubs failed to comply with the minimum wage standards pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., and corresponding Maryland wage and hour laws. The district court held that plaintiffs were employees of the defendant companies and not independent contractors. The court concluded that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the relationship between plaintiffs and defendants falls on the employee side of the spectrum. The court found that the many ways in which defendants directed the dancers rose to the level of control that an employer would typically exercise over an employee. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in rejecting defendants’ good faith defense for the period prior to September 2011 and awarding plaintiffs liquidated damages for that period; the trial court correctly excluded evidence showing plaintiffs’ earnings in the form of tips and performance fees; and the court found no grounds for reversal based on defendant's claims of error regarding jury instructions, the verdict sheet, or the denial of a new trial motion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "McFeeley v. Jackson Street Entm't" on Justia Law

Movant seeks pre-filing authorization to pursue a successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition for habeas relief. Movant argued that the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Johnson produced a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive by that Court, and that he is entitled to seek relief under the new rule. The court granted the request for authorization to file a successive section 2255 motion because application of Johnson to 18 U.S.C. 16(b) as incorporated into the Sentencing Guidelines might render the career-offender residual clause that was applicable at the time movant was sentenced unconstitutional, and because the rule in Johnson is substantive with respect to its application to the Sentencing Guidelines and therefore applies retroactively. View "In Re: Creadell Hubbard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against several correctional officers, medical personnel, and prison administrators for alleged violations of his constitutional rights after he underwent surgery to remove penile implants while incarcerated. Prior to his incarceration, plaintiff had marbles implanted in and tattoos drawn on his penis. Plaintiff alleged that prison officials threatened him with segregation for the remainder of his sentence and loss of parole eligibility if he did not consent to surgery to have the marbles removed. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged, among other things, physical injury and mental anguish. The court held that the Bell v. Wolfish factors weigh against reasonableness of the sexually invasive search and thus reversed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint. In this case, plaintiff pleaded sufficient facts to establish a Fourth Amendment claim plausibly entitling him to relief. The court also held that plaintiff's complaint plausibly satisfies both prongs of an Eighth Amendment claim. Furthermore, plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to state a class-of-one equal protection claim. The court rejected plaintiff's remaining claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part. Because the district court did not consider plaintiff's potential due process claim, the court remanded for reconsideration of this claim. View "King, Jr. v. Rubenstein" on Justia Law