Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After defendant was convicted of charges related to the kidnapping of his estranged wife, the district court sentenced him to 295 months in prison and also required him to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. 16911 et seq. The court rejected defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel because such claims are not addressed on direct appeal; the district court did not err in admitting evidence of prior acts where the evidence was relevant to issues other than character or propensity and the probative value outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice; and, the district court did not err in requiring defendant to register as a sex offender under SORNA, because aggravated sexual abuse involves a sexual act or sexual contact with another and defendant thus was convicted of a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Faulls" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court's dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and challenges several aspects of his capital convictions and death sentence. The court rejected petitioner's claim that the Virginia circuit court’s refusal to appoint a prison-risk-assessment expert compels relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), because petitioner identified no clearly established federal law requiring the appointment of a nonpsychiatric expert. The court also rejected petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to counsel's investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence where the court found neither deficient performance or prejudice under Strickland v.Washington. The court concluded that petitioner's underlying claim was insubstantial under Martinez v. Ryan and therefore he has not shown cause to excuse his procedurally defaulted claim that counsel was ineffective for stipulating at the guilt phase of trial that petitioner was a prisoner in lawful custody at the time of the alleged capital murder. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Morva v. Zook" on Justia Law

As part of a joint effort to construct a Zoroastrian worship center, the parties signed a ninety-nine-year lease on a parcel of property owned by Rustam Guiv in the Vienna area of Fairfax County, Virginia. After Rustam Guiv terminated the lease, the Center filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment to reinstate the lease. After removal, the district court granted summary judgment to Rustam Guiv and awarded attorneys’ fees. The court concluded that Rustam Guiv presented sufficient evidence to show complete diversity between the parties, thereby establishing subject matter jurisdiction in federal court. The court also concluded that the undisputed material facts show that The Center breached the lease. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint in its entirety. The court concluded, however, that the attorneys' fee award must be vacated where the district court correctly identified Rustam Guiv as the prevailing party but made no effort to narrow the fee award to its successful claims. Under Virginia law governing contractual fee-shifting provisions, the prevailing party is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees for work performed only on its successful claims. View "Zoroastrian Center v. Rustam Guiv Found." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging claims for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and for malicious prosecution under state law. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, who are probation officers; denied supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim; and dismissed the malicious prosecution claim with prejudice. The court concluded that defendants violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights by seeking his arrest for alleged probation violations without reasonable suspicion. However, the court concluded that the standard required by the Fourth Amendment to arrest a probationer was not clearly established at the time defendants sought plaintiff’s arrest for allegedly violating the terms of his probation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. View "Jones v. Chandrasuwan" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to one count of aiding and abetting the theft of a firearm. On appeal, defendant contends that the government breached the plea agreement. In the plea agreement, the government agreed to advise the district court at sentencing that the parties had agreed that the 4-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b) (increasing a defendant’s offense level for use or possession of a firearm in connection with another felony offense)(6)(B) did not apply. At sentencing, however, the government advised the district court that it had changed its position on whether a North Carolina breaking and entering offense constituted a felony, concluding that it did, regardless of a defendant’s criminal history. Nonetheless, the government asked the district court to honor the plea agreement and not apply the enhancement to defendant. The district court concluded that the government, although acting in good faith, breached its undertaking in the plea agreement by stating that the enhancement did apply. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing before a different district judge pursuant to Santobello v. New York. View "United States v. Warner" on Justia Law

Debtors purchased a home from creditors. The purchase was financed via a loan from creditors. In exchange for the loan, debtors granted creditors a deed of trust on the property and executed a promissory note requiring monthly payments. Where the rate of interest on debtors’ residential mortgage loan was increased upon default, at issue was whether a “cure” under section 1322(b) of the Bankruptcy Code allows their bankruptcy plan to bring post-petition payments back down to the initial rate of interest. The court held that the statute does not allow this, as a change to the interest rate on a residential mortgage loan is a “modification” barred by the terms of section 1322(b)(2). The court affirmed the judgment of the district court insofar as it required that post-petition interest payments be calculated using the seven percent default rate of interest, but reversed that part of the judgment which applied only a five percent rate of interest to payments calculated “for the period between September 16, 2013 and the December 2013, effective date of the plan.” The court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Anderson v. Hancock" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, seeks review of the BIA's decision finding him ineligible for cancellation of removal because he is an aggravated felon. The court held that, based on the court's application of the categorical approach, a conviction under the second paragraph of 18 U.S.C. 659 is not a “theft offense (including receipt of stolen property)” under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G). Therefore, the BIA erred in finding petitioner to be an aggravated felon who is ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(3). Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mena v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to firearm and drug charges after the district court assured him that he was not waiving his right to appeal the court’s earlier denial of a suppression motion. At issue is whether defendant entered a valid conditional guilty plea. The court concluded that no valid conditional guilty plea was entered because the government-consent requirement was not satisfied. Insofar as defendant did not enter a valid conditional guilty plea, the question of whether the district court erred in denying his suppression motion is not properly before the court. Because the court has neither a valid conditional plea nor a valid unconditional plea, the court vacated the judgment. On remand, defendant can decide whether to plead guilty again or whether to proceed to trial. View "United States v. Fitzgerald" on Justia Law

Defendant and two companions participated in a crime spree that started with a pair of burglaries and ended with a high-speed police chase. At issue is whether the two burglaries served as part of the predicate for defendant’s Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), sentencing enhancement occurred on different occasions. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that the burglaries did in fact occur on different occasions. In this case, it was proper for the district court to note that defendant harmed 31 different victims during his many offenses; that defendant’s most recent pair of burglaries ended with a dangerous police chase; and that defendant appeared to be the leader in at least this latest chapter of his long history of criminal activity. View "United States v. Linney" on Justia Law

After the Board certified a collective bargaining unit consisting of all maintenance employees at an ice-cream production facility operated by Dreyers, the company contends that the Board petitioned for review. The court held that the Board acted within its broad discretion in certifying the Union’s petitioned-for unit where the Regional Director (RD), under the Specialty Healthcare & Rehabilitation Center of Mobile framework, applied the traditional community-of-interest factors to determine not only that the maintenance employees share a community of interest amongst themselves, but also that maintenance employees form a group distinct from production employees. By doing so, the RD did not allow the extent of organization to control his decision. The court rejected Dreyer's objections that focused on attacking Specialty Healthcare rather than on the Board's decision in this case. Accordingly, the court denied Dreyer's petition for review and granted the Board's cross-petition for enforcement. View "Nestle Dreyer's Ice Cream Co. v. NLRB" on Justia Law