Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, Carilion, alleging wrongful termination for engaging in protected activity, including opposing an unlawful employment practice, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that no individual activity in which plaintiff engaged by itself constituted protected oppositional conduct and that the so called “manager rule,” in any event, prevented an employee whose job responsibilities included reporting discrimination claims from seeking protection under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision. The court held, however, that the proper test for analyzing oppositional conduct requires consideration of the employee’s course of conduct as a whole and that the “manager rule” has no place in Title VII jurisprudence. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic" on Justia Law

After charges against plaintiff were dismissed for alleged violations of South Carolina's anti-robocall statute, S.C. Code Ann. 16-17-446(A), plaintiff filed suit challenging the statute on First Amendment grounds. The statute prohibits only those robocalls that are “for the purpose of making an unsolicited consumer telephone call” or are “of a political nature including, but not limited to, calls relating to political campaigns.” The court found that, under the content-neutrality framework set forth in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, that the anti-robocall statute is a content-based regulation that does not survive strict scrutiny; plaintiff lacks standing to bring compelled-speech and vagueness challenges; and plaintiff's other claims fail due to the presence of probable cause to arrest him. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment except for the compelled-speech claim, which the court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss it. View "Cahaly v. LaRosa, III" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed separate class action complaints against GMAC, alleging violations of Maryland's Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Provisions (CLEC), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 12-1001 et seq.; breach of contract; declaratory and injunctive relief; restitution/unjust enrichment; and violation of Maryland's Consumer Protect Act, Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 13-101 et seq. At issue was whether borrowers may seek a remedy after their creditors violate the repossession notice requirements in the CLEC. The court concluded that the CLEC requires borrowers to have repaid more than the original principal amount of their loans before they are entitled to relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to GMAC. View "Gardner v. GMAC, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal stems from a franchise dispute between Dickey's and several of its franchisees in Maryland. At issue was whether the parties’ claims should be arbitrated, as Dickey’s argues, or heard in federal court in Maryland, as the franchisees contend. The court concluded that the clear and unambiguous language of the provisions in the parties' franchise agreement requires that the common law claims asserted by Dickey’s must proceed in arbitration, while the franchisees’ Maryland Franchise Law claims must proceed in the Maryland district court. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and instructed the district court to compel arbitration of the common law claims only. The court left it to the district court’s discretion whether to stay the franchisees’ Maryland Franchise Law claims pending conclusion of the arbitration. View "Chorley Enter. v. Dickey's Barbecue Restaurants" on Justia Law

Defendants Graham and Jordan appealed their convictions for several offenses arising from a series of armed robberies. Jordan separately challenged restrictions on his own testimony imposed by the district court, the denial of his motion for severance, the exclusion of certain out-of-court statements attributed to Graham, the admission of evidence seized during a search of his residence, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting several of his convictions.The court concluded that the government’s warrantless procurement of the cell site location information (CSLI) was an unreasonable search in violation of defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights. The court held, nonetheless, that the district court's admission of the challenged evidence must be sustained because the government relied in good faith on court orders issued in accordance with Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848, or the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. 2703(a), (c). The court rejected Jordan's separate challenges, finding no reversible error. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Graham" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and sentenced to life imprisonment, appealed the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241, seeking relief pursuant to United States v. Simmons. Had defendant been sentenced after Simmons, defendant would have faced a lower mandatory minimum sentence than the mandatory life term that he actually received. The court concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction under section 2255(e) to consider defendant’s section 2241 petition. The court noted that it was not unsympathetic to defendant's claim due to the gravity of the life sentence. However, Congress has the power to define the scope of the writ of habeas corpus, and Congress has exercised that power here to narrowly limit the circumstances in which a section 2241 petition may be brought. The petition, in this case, does not present one of the permitted circumstances. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Surratt, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, servers for hotels and restaurants at the National Harbor complex in Maryland, filed suit against their employers, alleging violations of the tip-credit provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 203(m), their collective bargaining agreement, and Maryland state law. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court found that the statutory requirements that an employer inform an employee of section 203(m) and permit the employee to retain all his tips unless the employee is in a tip pool with other regularly tipped employees does not apply to employees, like plaintiffs, who are seeking only the recovery of the tips unrelated to a minimum wage or overtime claim. In this case, plaintiffs, concede that their wages do not fall below the statutory minimum, and the “the statutory language,” of the FLSA, including section 203(m), “simply does not contemplate a claim for wages other than minimum or overtime wages.” Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Jahir v. Ryman Hospitality Properties" on Justia Law

John Doe 2 and Mother Doe, on behalf of John Doe 2's younger brother, filed suit against defendant, the president of the Citadel, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendant violated an affirmative duty to protect them under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Louis “Skip” ReVille provided childcare for the Doe family and sexually abused the two minor boys. ReVille, a graduate of the Citadel, previously worked as a counselor at the Citadel's youth summer camp. Plaintiffs contend that defendant did not report a complaint that a counselor at the summer camp - later identified as ReVille - had molested a child attending the camp. Plaintiffs argued that defendant's actions allowed ReVille to continue his abuse of Doe 2 and Doe 3. The court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant. The court affirmed, concluding that the state-created danger doctrine does not impose liability on defendant for ReVille’s ongoing abuse of the Does; while defendant's undisputed failure to act brought dishonor to him and The Citadel, it did not create a constitutional cause of action; and defendant's alleged conduct neither created nor increased the danger ReVille already posed to the Does, and in any event, did not constitute cognizable affirmative acts with respect to ReVille’s abuse of the Does. View "Doe 2 v. Rosa" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to illegally reentering the country and the district court applied a sixteen-level sentencing enhancement based on defendants previous conviction in North Carolina for discharging a firearm into an occupied building, which the district court concluded is a requisite “crime of violence.” The court concluded that the district court erred in ruling that defendant's offense necessarily involved the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force against a person when, in fact, under North Carolina law, there need be only the use of force against property to sustain a conviction. The court further concluded that this error was not harmless and therefore, the court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Parral-Dominguez" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to illegally reentering the country and the district court applied a sixteen-level sentencing enhancement based on defendants previous conviction in North Carolina for discharging a firearm into an occupied building, which the district court concluded is a requisite “crime of violence.” The court concluded that the district court erred in ruling that defendant's offense necessarily involved the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force against a person when, in fact, under North Carolina law, there need be only the use of force against property to sustain a conviction. The court further concluded that this error was not harmless and therefore, the court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Parral-Dominguez" on Justia Law