Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

S.B., by and through his mother, filed suit against the Board, alleging primarily that by allowing other students to harass S.B. based on his disability, the Board violated section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. S.B.'s father, a teacher and athletic director at the school, filed suit in his own right, claiming that the Board also violated section 504 by retaliating against him for advocating on S.B.’s behalf. The district court granted summary judgment for the Board. The court affirmed the judgment because no evidence support's the claims. In this case, S.B. has provided no evidence that the Board acted with the deliberate indifference necessary to hold it liable for student-on-student harassment. Nor does the record substantiate the father's allegation of a causal connection between his advocacy for S.B. and any adverse action taken by the Board. View "SB v. Board of Educ. of Harford" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Santander, seeking damages for breach of contract and alleging a violation of the Maryland Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Provisions (CLEC), Md. Code, Comm. Law 12-1001, et seq. The dispute stemmed from plaintiff's use of a loan she obtained through a retail installment contract (RISC) to finance the purchase of a vehicle. The court concluded that the district court correctly enforced the parties' arbitration agreement because the district court properly concluded that the arbitration agreement was a term of a contract that the parties entered into, and that the arbitration agreement was enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 2. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Galloway v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant Terry and others after he was pulled over, tased three times, and arrested. Plaintiff was charged with an excessive noise violation, no license in possession, and disorderly conduct, all of which were nol prossed. The parties filed a stipulation of dismissal as to all claims except for the 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim for excessive force against Terry in his individual capacity. The district court denied Terry summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court's analysis of the Graham v. Connor factors when measured against the level of force used by Terry against plaintiff leads the court to conclude that such force was not objectively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances in this case. Therefore, plaintiff has established that Terry's use of his taser constituted excessive force in violation of plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. Further, no reasonable officer would have believed that Terry’s use of the taser was justifiable at all and certainly not on three occasions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of Terry’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. View "Yates v. Terry" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant Terry and others after he was pulled over, tased three times, and arrested. Plaintiff was charged with an excessive noise violation, no license in possession, and disorderly conduct, all of which were nol prossed. The parties filed a stipulation of dismissal as to all claims except for the 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim for excessive force against Terry in his individual capacity. The district court denied Terry summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court's analysis of the Graham v. Connor factors when measured against the level of force used by Terry against plaintiff leads the court to conclude that such force was not objectively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances in this case. Therefore, plaintiff has established that Terry's use of his taser constituted excessive force in violation of plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. Further, no reasonable officer would have believed that Terry’s use of the taser was justifiable at all and certainly not on three occasions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of Terry’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. View "Yates v. Terry" on Justia Law

The Government filed a motion to transfer defendant, under 18 U.S.C. 5032, for prosecution as an adult for murder in aid of racketeering. Defendant was a juvenile at the time of the alleged offense. The district court denied the Government’s motion after concluding that the prosecution would be unconstitutional given that recent Supreme Court decisions have held that the United States Constitution prohibits sentencing juvenile offenders to either death or life imprisonment. The court agreed with the district court that defendant cannot be prosecuted for murder in aid of racketeering because his conviction would require the district court to impose an unconstitutional sentence. Because the district court did not err in denying the Government’s motion to transfer defendant for prosecution as an adult, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Under Seal" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from Roger and Mary Jo Carlson's attempt to arbitrate class action claims against Pulte under a sales agreement that contained an arbitration clause, and Pulte's efforts to limit arbitration to the claims between the three parties. Because the primary goal in enforcing an arbitration agreement is to discern and honor party intent, and because of the fundamental differences between bilateral and class arbitration - which change the nature of arbitration altogether - the court held that whether parties agree to class arbitration is a gateway question for the court. In this case, the parties did not unmistakably provide that the arbitrator would decide whether their agreement authorizes class arbitration. In fact, the sales agreement says nothing at all about the subject. Therefore, the district court erred in concluding that the question was a procedural one for the arbitrator. Accordingly, the court reversed the order denying Pulte's motion for partial summary judgment, vacated the judgment dismissing the petition, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Del Webb Communities, Inc. v. Carlson" on Justia Law

Defendants McNeal and Stoddard were convicted of conspiracy, armed bank robberies, and brandishing firearms during crimes of violence. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendants of the brandishing offenses; the evidence was sufficient to convict McNeal of conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery; the district court properly denied McNeal's motions to suppress evidence where the warrant was supported by probable cause; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence seized from McNeal's residence. The court also concluded that bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) is a crime of violence within the meaning of the force clause of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3), because it has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. Because bank robbery is a lesser-included offense of section 2113(d) armed bank robbery, armed bank robbery is also a crime of violence under the force clause. McNeal and Stoddard’s challenge to their brandishing convictions therefore fails at the first step of plain error review, in that the trial court did not err in concluding that armed bank robbery qualifies as a crime of violence. The court rejected each of defendants' contentions and affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. McNeal" on Justia Law

BBC, owner of the FLANAX trademark in Mexico, and its sister company, Bayer, filed suit against Belmora, owner of the FLANAX trademark in the United States, contending that Belmora used the FLANAX mark to deliberately deceive Mexican-American consumers into thinking they were purchasing BCC’s product. The court concluded that the Lanham Act’s, 15 U.S.C. 1125, plain language contains no unstated requirement that a section 43(a) plaintiff have used a U.S. trademark in U.S. commerce to bring a Lanham Act unfair competition claim; the Supreme Court’s guidance in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. does not allude to one, and the court's prior cases either only assumed or articulated as dicta that such a requirement existed; and therefore, the district court erred in imposing such a condition precedent upon Bayer’s claims. The court also concluded that BCC has adequately pled a section 43(a) false association claim for purposes of the zone of interests prong; BCC's allegations reflect the claim furthers the section 45 purpose of preventing the deceptive and misleading use of marks in commerce within the control of Congress; and BCC has also alleged injuries that are proximately caused by Belmora’s violations of the false association statute. Therefore, the court held that BCC has sufficiently pled a section 43(a) false association claim to survive Belmora’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Because these statements are linked to Belmora’s alleged deceptive use of the FLANAX mark, the court is satisfied that BCC’s false advertising claim, like its false association claim, comes within the Act’s zone of interests. The court inferred that the alleged advertisements contributed to the lost border sales pled by BCC, and that the claim also satisfies Lexmark’s proximate cause prong. Further, the court agreed with Bayer that the district court erred in overturning the TTAB’s section 14(3) decision because it read a use requirement into the section that is simply not there. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG" on Justia Law

BBC, owner of the FLANAX trademark in Mexico, and its sister company, Bayer, filed suit against Belmora, owner of the FLANAX trademark in the United States, contending that Belmora used the FLANAX mark to deliberately deceive Mexican-American consumers into thinking they were purchasing BCC’s product. The court concluded that the Lanham Act’s, 15 U.S.C. 1125, plain language contains no unstated requirement that a section 43(a) plaintiff have used a U.S. trademark in U.S. commerce to bring a Lanham Act unfair competition claim; the Supreme Court’s guidance in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. does not allude to one, and the court's prior cases either only assumed or articulated as dicta that such a requirement existed; and therefore, the district court erred in imposing such a condition precedent upon Bayer’s claims. The court also concluded that BCC has adequately pled a section 43(a) false association claim for purposes of the zone of interests prong; BCC's allegations reflect the claim furthers the section 45 purpose of preventing the deceptive and misleading use of marks in commerce within the control of Congress; and BCC has also alleged injuries that are proximately caused by Belmora’s violations of the false association statute. Therefore, the court held that BCC has sufficiently pled a section 43(a) false association claim to survive Belmora’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Because these statements are linked to Belmora’s alleged deceptive use of the FLANAX mark, the court is satisfied that BCC’s false advertising claim, like its false association claim, comes within the Act’s zone of interests. The court inferred that the alleged advertisements contributed to the lost border sales pled by BCC, and that the claim also satisfies Lexmark’s proximate cause prong. Further, the court agreed with Bayer that the district court erred in overturning the TTAB’s section 14(3) decision because it read a use requirement into the section that is simply not there. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, four Maryland consumers, filed suit against Santander and its agents, alleging that defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C.1692-1692p, by engaging in prohibited collection practices when collecting on plaintiffs’ automobile loans. The court affirmed the district court's grant of Santander's motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint did not allege facts showing that Santander qualified as a “debt collector” subject to the FDCPA. The court concluded that the FDCPA generally does not regulate creditors when they collect debt on their own account and that, on the facts alleged by plaintiffs, Santander became a creditor when it purchased the loans before engaging in the challenged practices. View "Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc." on Justia Law