Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff is a member of the nation of Gods and Earths (NOGE), a group whose adherents are also known as "Five Percenters." Plaintiff participated in a prison riot in 1995 with other Fiver Percenters and was placed in solitary confinement, where he has remained for 20 years. Plaintiff challenged his confinement under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1, claiming that a Department policy required him to renounce his affiliation with the NOGE, which he alleges is a religion, before the Department will release him from solitary confinement. Plaintiff also argued that defendants violated his rights to procedural due process. The district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court held that plaintiff's 20-year period of solitary confinement amounts to atypical and significant hardship in relation to the general population and implicates a liberty interest in avoiding security detention. Further, there is a triable dispute as to whether the Department’s process for determining which inmates are fit for release from security detention meets the minimum requirements of procedural due process. Accordingly, the court reversed as to this claim and affirmed as to the RLUIPA claim. View "Incumaa v. Stirling" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Maryland residents, filed suit against defendants, current and former owners of an industrial property in Baltimore, under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq., alleging that the property has been contaminated by hazardous waste. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. In granting the motion to dismiss as to CBAC Gaming, the district court did not state whether its ruling was based upon Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6). The court concluded that the district court's dismissal of the complaint under either Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6) was incorrect; it would have been error to dismiss the complaint against CBAC Gaming for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) because a defense to liability under RCRA based on section 6905(a) does not implicate jurisdiction; and, under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court failed to identify how the complaint’s RCRA allegations are “inconsistent” with the the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1251-1387. The court concluded that the complaint sufficiently alleged a claim against the City and Maryland Chemical. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment dismissing all of plaintiff's RCRA claims against CBAC Gaming, the City , and Maryland Chemical and remanded for further proceedings. View "Goldfarb v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an African-American flight attendant, filed suit alleging that United Airlines failed to adequately respond to a racist death threat left in her company mailbox. The district court concluded that plaintiff was subjected to a racially hostile work environment, but granted summary judgment to the airline after deciding that it was not liable for the offensive conduct. The court concluded that the district court properly concluded that a reasonable jury could properly construe the notes at issue as racially-tinged death threats so severe that it does not matter they were not pervasive. The court concluded that the anonymous nature of severe threats or acts of harassment may, in fact, heighten what is required of an employer, particularly in circumstances where the harassment occurs inside a secure space accessible to only company-authorized individuals. In this case, the conduct at issue is some of the most serious imaginable in the workplace – an unmistakable threat of deadly violence against an individual based on her race, occurring in the particularly sensitive space of an airport. Given the severity of the threat, a reasonable jury could find that United’s response was neither prompt nor reasonably calculated to end the harassment. Indeed, a reasonable jury could find that United’s response was instead reluctant and reactive, intended to minimize any disruption to day-to-day operations instead of identifying a perpetrator and deterring future harassment. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pryor v. United Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of two counts of capital murder, appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, contending that the Eighth Amendment prohibition on the execution of intellectually disabled persons, as set forth in Atkins v. Virginia, and Hall v. Florida, renders his two death sentences unconstitutional. The court could not conclude that after Hall, no reasonable juror would find petitioner eligible for the death penalty. Further, absent a showing that he is “actually innocent” of the death penalty, petitioner cannot overcome the procedural default that bars consideration on the merits of his Atkins claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Prieto v. Zook" on Justia Law

Timothy B. Johnson, a member of the Hunt Club, unintentionally shot and injured Danny Ray Marks, Jr. Marks filed suit against Johnson and the Hunt Club. Scottsdale, the insurer of the Hunt Club under a general liability policy, denied coverage, contending that the policy does not cover the Club members for their personal recreational activities but only for liability arising from some official action of the Club or actions undertaken on behalf of the Club. The magistrate judge granted summary judgment for Scottsdale. The court concluded that the policy unambiguously covered the Club members only with respect to their vicarious liability for the activities of the Club as an entity. In this case, Scottsdale has no duty to defend or indemnify Johnson where Marks alleges only that Johnson, a member of the Club, was on land leased by the Club and regularly used by Club members when he negligently fired his gun. As Marks concedes, that is not enough to bring his claim under the policy's Endorsement’s second clause, for member activities "on [the Club's] behalf." Nor does the complaint seek to hold Johnson vicariously liable "for [the Club's] activities" so as to trigger coverage under the first clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Marks, Jr. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After PSI stopped contributing to the Fund, a multiemployer pension benefit plan governed by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., the Fund informed PSI that it owed "withdrawal liability" pursuant to section 1381. The Fund filed suit against PSI after PSI failed to pay the sum owed. The court affirmed the judgment, finding that the district court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction, venue was proper in Virginia, and PSI bound itself to make contributions to the Fund. View "Trustees of the Plumbers v. Plumbing Svc." on Justia Law

Defendants Parker and Taylor appealed their convictions for engaging in illegal gambling. At issue was whether the prosecutors’ failure to disclose certain impeachment evidence, despite knowing of such evidence before trial, violated Brady v. Maryland. The central contested issue during the jury trial was the sufficiency of the evidence to satisfy the statutory requirement that the gambling operation involved at least five persons. The court concluded that the government violated Brady by failing to disclose certain impeachment information regarding a government witness who testified about Parker’s daughter-in-law's involvement in the gambling operation. Accordingly, the court vacated the convictions and remanded. View "United States v. Parker" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to distribution of cocaine and aiding and abetting in its distribution, and was sentenced to 240 months' imprisonment. The court concluded that the government did not breach the plea agreement where the Government is not obligated to explain its reasons for making a particular sentencing recommendation unless it agrees to do so in the plea agreement and where the prosecutor neither criticized the terms of the agreement nor expressed doubt about the legality or propriety of the recommended sentence. Further, the district court did not plainly err in ordering that defendant's sentence run consecutively to any future "State or Federal sentence." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Obey" on Justia Law

HPA filed suit against Lessard, Clark, Penrose, and Northwestern, alleging that the design, development, ownership, and construction of Two Park Crest, an apartment building in McLean, Virginia, infringed HPA’s architectural copyright embodied in Grant Park, a condominium building in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, primarily because no reasonable jury could find that the Grant Park and Two Park Crest designs are substantially similar. The court concluded that the district court did not err in considering expert reports where the reports were were sworn to in declarations; at bottom, HPA failed to carry its burden of identifying a specific similarity between the Two Park Crest design and the protected elements of its Grant Park design; because HPA failed to present nonconclusory evidence that the designs are extrinsically similar, the court rejected HPA’s claim that the district court failed to credit its extrinsic-similarity evidence; and the court rejected HPA's claims that the district court misapplied relevant copyright law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Humphreys & Partners Architects v. Lessard Design, Inc." on Justia Law

Columbus-America, acting as the agent for Recovery, discovered the wreck of the "S.S. Central America," which was loaded with tons of gold when it sank. The district court granted Columbus-America salvage rights. Robol represented Columbus-American in proceedings to establish salvage rights. Robol subsequently filed a claim in this in rem admiralty action to obtain a salvage award for himself, alleging that he had provided voluntary assistance to the Receiver in turning over files and documents related to the salvage operation, which proved useful in the continuing salvage of the sunken vessel. The district court dismissed Robol’s claim for failure to state a claim. The court affirmed, agreeing with the district court's conclusion that Robol had been obligated to return the files and documents to his former clients under the applicable rules of professional responsibility and principles of agency law and therefore that his act of returning the materials to his former clients was not a voluntary act, as would be required for him to obtain a salvage award. View "Robol Law Office v. Recovery Ltd. P'ship" on Justia Law