Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Hospital system filed suit seeking to obtain a writ of mandamus compelling HHS to adjudicate immediately its administrative appeals on claims for Medicare reimbursement. The parties agree that, as of February 2014, the Secretary had 480,000 appeals awaiting assignment to an ALJ, and the Secretary conceded in her brief that the number had by then climbed to more than 800,000 appeals, creating a ten-year backlog. The court concluded that the Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395 et seq., does not guarantee a healthcare provider a hearing before an ALJ within 90 days, as the Hospital System claims. Rather, it provides a comprehensive administrative process that a healthcare provider must exhaust before ultimately obtaining review in a United States district court. The court further concluded that the issuance of a judicial order now, however, directing the Secretary to hear the Hospital System’s claims in the middle of the administrative process, would unduly interfere with the process and, at a larger scale, the work of the political branches. Moreover, such intervention would invite other healthcare providers suffering similar delays to likewise seek a mandamus order, thereby effectively causing the judicial process to replace and distort the agency process. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Cumberland Cnty. Hosp. v. Burwell" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for knowingly and intentionally distributing heroin to Eric Thomas, causing Thomas' death from the use of the heroin distributed. The court concluded that, because there was no evidence in the record that Thomas could have died without the heroin, the jury’s verdict was necessarily consistent with the Supreme Court’s requirement of but-for causation; the district court’s decision not to elaborate on the meaning of the statutory results-in-death language did not amount to an abuse of discretion, let alone plain error, in light of that court’s legitimate concerns about confusing the jury; the court's decision in United States v. Patterson forecloses defendant's argument that the district court should have instructed the jury on the foreseeability of death; and the district court did not commit reversible error in admitting hearsay testimony that Thomas said he purchased heroin from “Fat Boy” because (1) even if the hearsay did not fall under a hearsay exception, its admission was harmless; and (2) the hearsay was not “testimonial” and therefore did not implicate defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Alvarado" on Justia Law

Victims of a massive ponzi scheme centered in South Carolina obtained a judgment of over $150 million against Derivium and others. Plaintiffs are now pursuing others whom they claim also participated in the scheme. The district court granted Vision International's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under FRCP 12(b)(2). The district court also granted Randolph Anderson, Patrick Kelley, and Total Eclipse's motion for judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffs' claim for aiding and abetting common law fraud. Plaintiffs filed separate appeals on the two rulings. The court consolidated the appeals. The court concluded that, because the parties engaged in full discovery on the jurisdictional issue and fully presented the relevant evidence to the district court, that court properly addressed Vision International’s Rule 12(b)(2) motion by weighing the evidence, finding facts by a preponderance of the evidence, and determining as a matter of law whether plaintiffs carried their burden of demonstrating personal jurisdiction over Vision International. Further, the court agreed with the district court’s conclusion that South Carolina has not recognized a cause of action for aiding and abetting common law fraud and that it is not the court's role as a federal court to so expand state law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment as to both appeals. View "Grayson v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit after her termination against her former employers for disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), and for other violations of state and federal law. The jury found in favor of plaintiff on certain state law claims and in favor of the employers on all other claims. The court concluded that the district court correctly applied a but-for causation standard to plaintiff's ADA claim; the court rejected plaintiff's claim that the district court erred in instructing the jury where the "prevents or significantly restricts" standard is too demanding under the ADA Amendments Act, Pub. L. No 110-325, section 5; even if the court assumes that the district court’s instruction was erroneous and that the error was plain, plaintiff has not shown that it affected her substantial rights; and the court rejected plaintiff's contention that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the “regarded as” prong of the definition of disability because she failed to show how she was prejudiced. Therefore, the court found no abuse of discretion and no serious prejudice to plaintiff that warrants vacating the verdict on her disability discrimination claims. Further, the court rejected plaintiff's challenge to the district court’s instruction on “record of” disability where she did not object to the instruction and on appeal did not explain how the omitted language applies to her case. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's challenges to the damages the jury awarded on her state law claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gentry v. East West Partners Club" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, diagnosed with leukemia, filed suit against CTS, alleging that CTS was responsible for dumping toxic solvents from an Asheville-area manufacturing plant into a local stream, and that childhood exposure to the contaminated stream water many years ago caused his leukemia. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that North Carolina General Statutes Section 1-52(16) barred his action. The court concluded that the Supreme Court of North Carolina has not yet directly resolved whether Section 1-52(16) applies to disease claims. Because the court understood that under North Carolina law a disease is not a “latent injury,” the court concluded that the Supreme Court of North Carolina would not find Section 1-52(16) applicable to plaintiff’s claim. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Stahle v. CTS Corp." on Justia Law

Almost five years outside the window to file a timely motion, defendant filed a motion seeking post-conviction DNA testing pursuant to the Innocence Protection Act (IPA), 18 U.S.C. 3600–3600A. Defendant was convicted of various crimes related to an attempted robbery and murder. The district court concluded that the motion was untimely and refused to grant a certificate of appealability (COA). The court concluded that a COA is not required to appeal the denial of an IPA motion and therefore defendant's appeal is properly before this court. Applying a deferential standard, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that neither of the exceptions to untimeliness are applicable in this case. Therefore, the court concluded that the motion was untimely and affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Cowley" on Justia Law

Relators filed suit under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, alleging that Academi knowingly submitted false claims to the United States in connection with a government contract to provide security services in Iraq and Afghanistan. The district court dismissed the complaint pursuant to the FCA's public-disclosure bar. The court concluded that the determination of when a plaintiff’s claims arise for purposes of the public-disclosure bar is governed by the date of the first pleading to particularly allege the relevant fraud and not by the timing of any subsequent pleading. The district court thus erred in holding the second-amended complaint was the relevant pleading by which to measure the public-disclosure bar. The court further concluded that the public-disclosure bar was inapplicable in this case where the article at issue on Wired.com was not a qualifying public disclosure that triggered the bar. Relators sufficiently pled the weapons qualifications scheme in their first-amended complaint that came well before the Wired.com article. Accordingly, the court vacated the portion of the district court’s order dismissing Relators’ weapons qualification claims under the public-disclosure bar and remanded for further proceedings. View "US ex rel. Beauchamp v. Academi Training Center" on Justia Law

Sie Giok Giang, a passenger on a Sky Express interstate, was killed when the driver fell asleep at the wheel and ran the bus off the side of a highway. About seven weeks before the crash, Sky Express had been given an “unsatisfactory” safety rating by the FMCSA. At issue is whether the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671-2680, bars an FTCA claim against the FMCSA for allowing Sky Express to continue to operate during a 10 day extension. The district court concluded that, pursuant to that exception, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the case. The court concluded that, considering that any waiver of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed, the FMCSA’s decision to promulgate a regulation permitting 10-day extensions for passenger carriers was a permissible exercise of judgment subject to the FTCA’s discretionary function exception and thus did not waive sovereign immunity. Therefore, the district court correctly dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Pornomo v. United States" on Justia Law

Appellants appealed a district court order granting summary judgment against them in their claims challenging the constitutionality of certain contribution limits established by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), see 52 U.S.C. 30101–30146. The court concluded that two of the three claims became moot before the district court granted summary judgment, and the court therefore vacated the merits judgment on those counts and remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss them for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In Count III the Fund and ARCC challenge the constitutionality of the annual $5,000 limit that applies to contributions from “multicandidate political committee” (MPCs) to state political party committees and their local affiliates, and the Fund challenges the constitutionality of the annual $15,000 limit on contributions from MPCs to national party committees. The court concluded that, because appellants cannot demonstrate that FECA discriminates against MPCs, there is no discrimination to be justified, and the court concluded that the FEC was entitled to summary judgment on Count III. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part with instructions to dismiss. View "Stop R.E.I.D. v. Federal Election Commission" on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Because the carrying of a concealed firearm is not itself illegal in West Virginia, and because the circumstances did not otherwise provide an objective basis for inferring danger, the court concluded that the officer who frisked defendant lacked reasonable suspicion that defendant was not only armed but also dangerous. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress the evidence uncovered by the unlawful search. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law