Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native of Haiti, seeks review of the denial of his application for deferral or removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and the denial of his motion to reopen removal proceedings. The BIA explained in In re J-E- that, as usually defined, “specific intent” constitutes “[t]he intent to accomplish the precise criminal act that one is later charged with.” The distinction between specific and general intent rests on the mens rea related to the consequences of a wrongful act. Haiti’s detention of criminal deportees under extremely substandard conditions constitutes the challenged wrongful act both here and in In re J-E-. On the record before it, the BIA found that “Haitian prison conditions are the result of budgetary and management problems as well as the country’s severe economic difficulties,” and not part of an intentional effort to punish criminal deportees. In re J-E- requires a CAT claimant to demonstrate that the state actor who mistreats him desires to cause his severe pain and suffering, and is not merely negligent nor reckless as to the risk. Petitioner argues that a claimant should be able to satisfy this requirement by demonstrating that an official acts with knowledge to a near certainty that he will cause severe pain and suffering. The court joined the majority of its sister circuits, who have considered the issue, in deferring to the BIA's interpretation of the CAT’s intent requirement as articulated in In re J-E-. The court rejected petitioner's contention that the IJ and BIA committed legal error in following the precedent established in In re J-E- to deny his application for deferral of removal under the CAT. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the petition for review from the order denying his motion to reopen. View "Oxygene v. Lynch" on Justia Law

After defendant pled guilty to failing to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. 16911(4)(A), the district court calculated defendant's Guidelines range as if he were a tier III sex offender. The court held that the categorical approach was applicable in this instance and, after comparing defendant's state court conviction for endangering the welfare of a child to the generic offenses enumerated in section 16911(4)(A), the court agreed with defendant that the district court erred in deeming defendant a tier III offender. Accordingly, the court vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Berry" on Justia Law

Perdue appealed the district court's dismissal of its breach of contract action against BRF for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court concluded that Perdue has alleged few facts to satisfy its prima facie burden in support of personal jurisdiction. In this case, the only fact that it alleges that indisputably weighs in favor of jurisdiction is that the agreement at issue includes a Maryland choice-of-law clause. On the contrary, many undisputed facts indicate that a Maryland court does not have personal jurisdiction over BRF: the company employs no Maryland officers or agents and owns no property in the state; BRF did not initiate the negotiations that led to the agreement; no BRF employee traveled to Maryland in connection with the agreement; and BRF conducts no business in Maryland. In this case, BRF’s alleged breach of the agreement occurred not in Maryland, but in foreign countries. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Perdue Foods LLC v. BRF S.A." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing defendant’s claim as barred by the waiver provision in the plea agreement. Furthermore, under the court's holding in United States v. Simmons, defendant was not a convicted felon at the time of the offense, and it was therefore not a violation of section 922(g)(1) for defendant to be in possession of a firearm. Therefore, the court concluded that defendant has shown factual innocence as contemplated by Bousley v. United States because he has shown that it is impossible for the government to prove one of the required elements of a section 922(g)(1) charge - that the defendant was a convicted felon at the time of the offense. The court also concluded that defendant has made the requisite showing of actual innocence. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Nigeria and the adopted son of a United States citizen, petitioned for review of the BIA's denial of his motion to reopen removal proceedings. At issue is the statutory phrase, “adopted while under the age of sixteen years.” 8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1)(E)(i). The court concluded that the plain meaning of “adopted” in section 1101(b)(1)(E)(i) forecloses the BIA’s summary disregard of facially valid nunc pro tunc orders relating to adoptions conducted by the various state courts. Here, it was contrary to law for the BIA not to recognize the nunc pro tunc order in petitioner's case and thus the BIA abused its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to reopen his removal proceedings. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review. View "Ojo v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1344. Defendant signed a waiver of appellate rights as part of her plea agreement. Nonetheless, defendant challenged the establishment of her Sentencing Guidelines range on appeal. The court concluded that her waiver provision quite specifically waives the right to appeal the sentence “on any ground, including any issues that relate to the establishment of the advisory Guideline range.” Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "United States v. McLaughlin" on Justia Law

Petitioner was arrested for sexually abusing his fourteen-year-old daughter and, during his first interview, he said he needed an attorney. Petitioner was reinterviewed three days later without an attorney present and confessed. With respect to petitioner's sexual abuse charges, the court found that petitioner has demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel under both the deficient performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland v. Washington, and reversed the district court’s dismissal of his habeas petition as to those convictions. The court remanded with instructions that the district court issue petitioner a writ of habeas corpus as to the sexual abuse charges unless the Commonwealth endeavors, within a reasonable period of time, to prosecute him in a new trial on those counts without utilizing the confession. With respect to petitioner's convictions on the child pornography charges, the court found that petitioner has not shown a reasonable probability that his confession altered the outcome of his trial, as required to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland, and therefore the court affirmed the district court order in that respect. View "Grueninger v. Director, VDOC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the City, alleging that the City, acting through it's Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA), violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., by denying plaintiffs' request for a variance to permit a certain property to be used as a church facility. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to state a claim that the BZA’s decision imposed a substantial burden on plaintiffs’ right of religious exercise. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ request to amend their complaint, because any such amendment would have been futile. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Andon, LLC v. The City of Newport News, VA" on Justia Law

Maryland allows any voter to vote via absentee ballot. Plaintiffs filed suit under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12132, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794, against state election officials under federal law, alleging that marking a hardcopy ballot by hand without assistance is impossible for voters with various disabilities, and that they have therefore been denied meaningful access to absentee voting. Defendants argue that even if absentee voting is not fully accessible, the full accessibility of Maryland’s in-person polling places provides disabled voters with meaningful access to voting. The court concluded that defendants’ proposed focus is overbroad and would undermine the purpose of the ADA and its implementing regulations. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that by effectively requiring disabled individuals to rely on the assistance of others to vote absentee, defendants have not provided plaintiffs with meaningful access to Maryland’s absentee voting program. The court also concluded that plaintiffs’ proposed use of the online ballot marking tool is a reasonable modification to Maryland’s absentee voting policies and procedures. The court agreed with the the district court that defendants have not met their burden to show that plaintiffs’ proposed modification - use of the online ballot marking tool - would fundamentally alter Maryland’s voting program. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "National Federation of the Blind v. Lamone" on Justia Law

IMP filed suit against LN, alleging that LN violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 et seq., by engaging in monopolization, tying arrangements, and exclusive dealing in the music concert industry. IMP and LN both promote concert tours and operate concert venues, but they differ in geographic reach. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to LN, concluding that IMP failed to define the relevant markets or to demonstrate any anticompetitive conduct. View "It's My Party, Inc. v. Live Nation, Inc." on Justia Law