Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, who had pled guilty to arson under Maryland's arson-in-the-first-degree statute, sought review of the BIA's dismissal of her appeal from the IJ's ruling that the arson conviction qualified as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(E), and order of removal. Applying Chevron deference, the court concluded that petitioner's state arson conviction unambiguously qualifies as an aggravated felony under section 1101(a)(43)(E), and even if an ambiguity existed, the BIA's interpretation was reasonable. The court rejected as meritless petitioner's alternative arguments that the BIA should have applied the rule of lenity and that the BIA's application of Matter of Bautista was impermissibly retroactive. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Espinal-Andrades v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a personal injury suit against East West after he was nearly killed in a bulldozer accident. Plaintiff's direct employer is Ashland and Ashland hired East West as a subcontractor. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) where plaintiff's action is barred by the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act (VWCA), Va. Code Ann. 65.2-307, because plaintiff's injury occurred in Virginia and East West is a statutory co-employee under Virginia law. View "Demetres v. East West Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Honduras, sought review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal of the IJ's order of removal. The BIA determined that petitioner was removable based on his past conviction under Virginia Code 18.2-102 for the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. The court concluded, however, that the Virginia offense did not constitute an "aggravated felony," where the full range of conduct covered by the Virginia crime of "unauthorized use" does not qualify as a "theft offense," as that term has been defined by the BIA. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and vacated the order of removal. View "Castillo v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss commitment proceedings arising from a 2007 insanity acquittal of a separate set of offenses, as well as the district court's order to delay those proceedings until he is released from prison. 18 U.S.C. 4243 provides a procedural framework for the evaluation and commitment of defendants adjudicated not guilty only by reason of insanity (NGI). Defendant is currently incarcerated for a crime unrelated to the one for which he was adjudicated NGI. The court concluded that the statute does not permit an NGI acquitee to nullify the statute's application by committing subsequent offenses and that delaying the hearing until defendant is released from prison is consistent with the statutory framework of section 4243. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Conrad, III" on Justia Law

Defendants Barker, Dunigan, and Hill plead guilty to aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute heroin and appealed the denial of their motions to suppress. Law enforcement officers, suspecting Barker of moving without notification while on federal supervised release, obtained a warrant for his arrest and executed it at his new home. The officers found Barker and Dunigan and Hill, also on supervised release, inside the home and conducted a walk-through of the apartment to look for contraband and other evidence of supervised release violations. After a drug-detection dog sniffed around the apartment, the officers sought a search warrant. The court concluded that the court's precedent required the officers in this situation to have a search warrant rather than merely reasonable suspicion to search Barker's home; held that the walk-through and dog sniff were unlawful searches; rejected the government's contention that the good-faith exception applies with respect to the evidence seized as a result of the dog sniff; and vacated the judgment and remanded for the district court to properly consider whether, under the "independent source" doctrine, the officers in this case would have sought a warrant even if they had not conducted the unlawful searches. View "United States v. Hill" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a radio manufacturing and repair business and two of its managers, filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the City's sign ordinance. The ordinance, which governs the placement and display of signs, was enacted by the city to enhance and protect the physical appearance of all areas of the city and to reduce the distractions, obstructions, and hazards to pedestrian and auto traffic. Plaintiffs' challenges to the ordinance relate to a protest of a certain adverse action taken against Central Radio by the Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, agreeing that the sign ordinance is a content-neutral restriction on speech that satisfies intermediate scrutiny. The court found no merit in plaintiffs' remaining constitutional challenges. View "Central Radio Co. Inc. v. City of Norfolk" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of India, petitioned for review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's denial of petitioner's renewed application for adjustment of status and order of removal, as well as petitioner's motion to reopen and reconsider. Joining the BIA and the Ninth Circuit, the court held that the deadline in 8 U.S.C. 1255(i) operates as a statue of repose that is not subject to equitable tolling. Therefore, the failures of petitioner's original counsel to file a timely labor certification to equitably toll the deadline under section 1255(i) is not a question the court need to consider. Because petitioner did not meet the deadline and because the deadline is a statute of repose not subject to equitable tolling, petitioner is not eligible for relief and his motion to reopen was properly denied on that basis alone. Accordingly, the court denied the petition in part and dismissed in part. View "Prasad v. Holder" on Justia Law

The Government appeals the dismissal of Counts I and II of its complaint under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1)(A) and 3729(a)(1)(B), against Triple Canopy. Triple Canopy contracted with the government to provide security services at the Al Asad Airbase in Iraq. The original relator also appeals the dismissal of his complaint. The court concluded that the Government has sufficiently alleged a false claim for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and Rule 9(b) where the complaint sufficiently alleged that Triple Canopy made a material false statement with the requisite scienter that resulted in payment (Count I). The district court also erred in finding that the original relator lacked standing to remain as a party on Count I. Further, the district court erred in dismissing Count II, the false records claim, where the Government has properly pled materiality as to this count. However, the court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed Counts II-V of the original relator's complaint for failing to comply with Rule 9(b). Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States ex rel. Omar Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc." on Justia Law

After plaintiff's daughter developed a condition known as dental fluorisis, plaintiff filed suit against the manufacturers of bottled water, infant formula, and baby food that her daughter consumed. At issue was whether federal law, which provides uniform labeling standards for the products at issue, preempts plaintiff's state-law claims. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's action, holding that federal law preempts plaintiff's bottled water claims and that her complaint as to the infant formula and baby food products fails to satisfy the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). View "Nemphos v. Nestle Waters North America" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer (ExxonMobil) and employees, alleging claims of fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, personal injury, and wrongful discharge. Plaintiff claimed that he was fired in retaliation for reporting illegal pharmacy practices, which caused him to suffer a heart attack and emotional stress. The court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion to remand the case to state court and the dismissal of all but one of plaintiff's tort claims. The court concluded that plaintiff sufficiently stated a wrongful discharge claim under Virginia's public policy exception to its at-will employment doctrine. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Weidman v. Exxon Mobil Corp." on Justia Law