Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellants sought to intervene as plaintiffs in a civil RICO action brought by CVLR Performance Horses against John Wynne and his businesses. The district court denied the motions and appellants appealed. The underlying suit between CVLR and Wynne settled and was dismissed by the district court approximately ten weeks later, while this appeal was pending. Wynne then moved to dismiss this appeal, arguing that the settlement of the underlying action rendered the appeal moot. The court rejected claims of mootness and concluded that it had jurisdiction over the appeal because a ruling in appellants’ favor on the merits of their appeal would provide them effective relief. The court concluded that the district court’s refusal to apply equitable tolling was not an abuse of discretion because appellants did not demonstrate diligent pursuit of their rights or extraordinary circumstances sufficient to excuse their delay. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Foster v. Wynne" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate, appealed from the dismissal of his pro se claims against the VDOC, alleging that defendants violated his free exercise rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., by prohibiting him from consuming wine during communion, requiring him to work on Sabbath days, and assigning him non-Christian cellmates. Plaintiff also alleged that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court dismissed sua sponte plaintiff's Sabbath claims, cell assignment claims, and deliberate indifference claim, and granted defendants summary judgment on the communion wine claim. The court reversed the district court's summary dismissal of the First Amendment wine communion claim where, as the parties agree, plaintiff did not have the opportunity to brief the issue of whether the wine ban substantially burdened his religious exercise and the record is insufficient to support the conclusion that the wine ban is the least restrictive means to address the government’s purported security interest. The court further concluded that plaintiff has successfully alleged facts supporting his remaining claims. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Jehovah v. Clarke" on Justia Law

Petitioner pled guilty to first-degree armed robbery and to malicious assault arising out of his shooting of a police officer who was investigating the robberies. The district court denied his petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. However, the district court granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance in advising petitioner regarding the applicability of the West Virginia recidivist statute. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the West Virginia state court’s rejection of this claim resulted from an unreasonable factual or legal determination, based upon the conflicting evidence presented to it. View "Christian v. Ballard" on Justia Law

Defendant, a native and citizen of Honduras, pleaded guilty to an illegal reentry offense that occurred after his removal for a felony conviction. Defendant appealed the three year term of his supervised release. The court concluded that the term of supervised release is procedurally reasonable where the district court is aware of U.S.S.C. 5D1.1(c), the district court considered defendant's specific circumstances and the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, and the district court determined that additional deterrence is needed in this case. Further, the term of supervised release is substantively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances and consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines. Finally, even if the district court inadequately advised defendant on the subject of supervised release at the plea hearing, defendant has not shown that such an error affected his substantial rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Aplicano-Oyuela" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against MBCC, alleging claims arising from MBCC's failure to timely release a lien placed on her residence after she satisfied her underlying debt obligation. The district court granted summary judgment to MBCC and plaintiff appealed. The court rejected plaintiff's claims for breach of contract; slander of title; violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.; violation of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act (VCPA), Va. Code 59.1-200; violation of Virginia Code 55-66.3; and declaratory judgment. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. The court noted the substandard nature of MBCC’s conduct in releasing the lien on plaintiff’s home. While the various statutory barriers cited negate plaintiff’s claims, had she acted diligently she may have had viable claims at least as to breach of contract and Va. Code 55-66.3(B). Finally, the court stated that MBCC would be well served to review its business practices to forestall such claims in future cases. View "Poindexter v. Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp." on Justia Law

The parties’ dispute involved various “credit repair” services provided to plaintiff consumers, for which some of the disclosure requirements of the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA, or the Act), 15 U.S.C. 1679 et seq., were not met. At issue was the district court's denial of a motion to vacate certain aspects of an arbitration award. The court held that the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law by determining that plaintiffs failed to prove actual damages under the Act; the court rejected plaintiffs’ various arguments regarding their request for additional attorneys’ fees and costs; and the arbitrator did not exceed the scope of his contractually delegated authority under section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Jones v. Dancel" on Justia Law

Relator filed a qui tam action against Tuomey under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-33, and the government intervened. The jury determined that Tuomey did not violate the FCA, but the district court vacated the verdict and granted the government's motion for a new trial after concluding that it had erroneously excluded excerpts of a Tuomey executive's deposition testimony. In this appeal, Tuomey contends that the district court erred in granting the government’s motion for a new trial, and Tuomey raised numerous other challenges. The court concluded that the district court correctly granted the government’s motion for a new trial, albeit for a reason different than that relied upon by the district court. The court affirmed the district court’s order granting a new trial on the alternative ground urged by the government - that it was prejudiced by the exclusion of the executive’s testimony and other related evidence of his warnings to Tuomey regarding the legal peril that the employment contracts posed. The court rejected Tuomey’s claims of error following the second trial. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "U.S. ex rel. Drakeford v. Tuomey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a member of the nation of Gods and Earths (NOGE), a group whose adherents are also known as "Five Percenters." Plaintiff participated in a prison riot in 1995 with other Fiver Percenters and was placed in solitary confinement, where he has remained for 20 years. Plaintiff challenged his confinement under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1, claiming that a Department policy required him to renounce his affiliation with the NOGE, which he alleges is a religion, before the Department will release him from solitary confinement. Plaintiff also argued that defendants violated his rights to procedural due process. The district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court held that plaintiff's 20-year period of solitary confinement amounts to atypical and significant hardship in relation to the general population and implicates a liberty interest in avoiding security detention. Further, there is a triable dispute as to whether the Department’s process for determining which inmates are fit for release from security detention meets the minimum requirements of procedural due process. Accordingly, the court reversed as to this claim and affirmed as to the RLUIPA claim. View "Incumaa v. Stirling" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Maryland residents, filed suit against defendants, current and former owners of an industrial property in Baltimore, under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq., alleging that the property has been contaminated by hazardous waste. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. In granting the motion to dismiss as to CBAC Gaming, the district court did not state whether its ruling was based upon Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6). The court concluded that the district court's dismissal of the complaint under either Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6) was incorrect; it would have been error to dismiss the complaint against CBAC Gaming for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) because a defense to liability under RCRA based on section 6905(a) does not implicate jurisdiction; and, under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court failed to identify how the complaint’s RCRA allegations are “inconsistent” with the the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1251-1387. The court concluded that the complaint sufficiently alleged a claim against the City and Maryland Chemical. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment dismissing all of plaintiff's RCRA claims against CBAC Gaming, the City , and Maryland Chemical and remanded for further proceedings. View "Goldfarb v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an African-American flight attendant, filed suit alleging that United Airlines failed to adequately respond to a racist death threat left in her company mailbox. The district court concluded that plaintiff was subjected to a racially hostile work environment, but granted summary judgment to the airline after deciding that it was not liable for the offensive conduct. The court concluded that the district court properly concluded that a reasonable jury could properly construe the notes at issue as racially-tinged death threats so severe that it does not matter they were not pervasive. The court concluded that the anonymous nature of severe threats or acts of harassment may, in fact, heighten what is required of an employer, particularly in circumstances where the harassment occurs inside a secure space accessible to only company-authorized individuals. In this case, the conduct at issue is some of the most serious imaginable in the workplace – an unmistakable threat of deadly violence against an individual based on her race, occurring in the particularly sensitive space of an airport. Given the severity of the threat, a reasonable jury could find that United’s response was neither prompt nor reasonably calculated to end the harassment. Indeed, a reasonable jury could find that United’s response was instead reluctant and reactive, intended to minimize any disruption to day-to-day operations instead of identifying a perpetrator and deterring future harassment. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pryor v. United Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law