Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a citizen of Sudan, sought review of the BIA's order of removal based on his conviction of two crimes involving moral turpitude. Petitioner was convicted under state law in 2010 for sexual battery and in 2011 for failing to register as a sex offender. The court did not defer to the BIA's decision in Matter of Tobar-Lobo because the BIA erroneously based its conclusion on the registration statute's purpose and not the nature of a conviction under the statute. The court concluded that, because petitioner's failure to register conviction was not a crime involving moral turpitude, the BIA erred as a matter of law in relying on that conviction as a basis to order petitioner's removal under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and reversed the BIA's decision, remanding with instructions. View "Mohamed v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Philippines, entered the United States on a K-2 visa as the minor child of his mother, but he turned 21 before he applied for an adjust of status to lawful conditional permanent resident. The IJ denied the application because petitioner did not qualify as a minor child under 8 U.S.C. 1255(d) and the BIA affirmed. The court found the BIA's determination of "minor child" status in Matter of Le well-reasoned and concluded that the BIA's analysis embraces the existing statutory and regulatory framework, reaching a result consistent with that framework. The BIA's interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act - that a K-2 visa holder seeking adjustment of status must be under 21 at the time of admission - is therefore a permissible construction and is owed Chevron deference. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Regis v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction, sentence, and the district court's restitution order for one count of making a false statement in connection with his receipt of federal workers' compensation benefits in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1920. The court rejected defendant's Brady v. Maryland claim, that his conviction should be vacated because the government failed to disclose evidence that undermined the government's theory that he willfully concealed certain work he performed, for numerous reasons. The court declined to follow the few decisions in other circuits that view loss amount as a punitive sentencing factor. The court concluded that defendant's felony conviction cannot stand because the jury made no finding that the amount of benefits falsely obtained exceeded $1000 and the court was unable to locate overwhelming evidence in the record to support such a conclusion. The court directed the district court to impose a misdemeanor sentence on remand. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing where the district court failed to apply the analysis required under United States v. Dawkins, and its loss amount calculation was therefore erroneous. The court also vacated the award of restitution and remanded for recalculation. View "United States v. Catone, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence and the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of drug trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The court concluded that the motion to suppress should have been raised prior to trial and, because it was not, it was waived. Further, the evidence was sufficient to support finding a nexus between the drug trafficking and firearms under section 924(c). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

After the Supreme Court lifted certain Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973c, restrictions that prevented jurisdictions like North Carolina from passing laws that would deny minorities equal access, North Carolina began pursuing sweeping voting reform with House Bill 589. Plaintiffs and the federal government filed suit against North Carolina, alleging that House Bill 589 violates equal protection provisions of the United States Constitution and the Voting Rights Act and seeking a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs' preliminary injunction and not preventing certain provisions of House Bill 589 from taking effect. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction as to House Bill 589's elimination of same-day registration and prohibition on counting out-of-precinct ballots. The court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction with respect to the following House Bill 589 provisions: the reduction of early-voting days; the expansion of allowable voter challenges; the elimination of the discretion of county boards of elections to keep the pools open an additional hour on Election Day in "extraordinary circumstances"; the elimination of pre-registration of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds who will not be eighteen years old by the next general election; and the soft roll-out of voter identification requirements to go into effect in 2016. View "Duke v. State of North Carolina" on Justia Law

The district court entered a Rule 60(a) clarifying order imposing sanctions on plaintiffs' attorney, Peter A.T. Sartin. Sartin hired the McNair Firm to represent him and to appeal the clarifying order, but the McNair Firm filed the notice of appeal two days late. The appeal was voluntarily abandoned. Sartin then filed a malpractice suit against the McNair Firm and the district court granted the Firm's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the district court's original intent was to impose sanctions on Sartin individually and, therefore, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving effect to that intent in its Rule 60(a) clarification order. Because the court concluded that the district court's earlier case properly employed Rule 60(a), the court affirmed the district court's conclusion in this case that the McNair Firm's failure to appeal the earlier Rule 60(a) clarification order caused Sartin no injury. The court disposed of Sartin's remaining arguments and affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Sartin v. McNair Law Firm PA" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for bank fraud and aggravated identity theft. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant and affirmed his conviction; the court found no due process violation; but, because the facts do not affirmatively demonstrate sophisticated means under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) in his attempt to commit bank fraud, the court vacated and remanded for resentencing.View "United States v. Adepoju" on Justia Law

Relator filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq., alleging that his former employer, NCED, along with other defendants, defrauded the government through various schemes in connection with contracts pursuant to the Javits-Wagner-O'Day Act, 41 U.S.C. 8501 et seq. After NCED and its former CEO settled, the district court dismissed relator's claims against the remaining defendants. The court held that the public-disclosure bar deprived the district court of jurisdiction over relator's claims against Defendants NISH, Green Bay, IPC, and Smurfit. With respect to these defendants, the district court properly determined that relator's proposed amendments to his first amended complaint were futile. The court held that relator's second amended complaint failed to adequately plead an FCA claim against Defendant Weyerhaeuser. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "US ex rel. Ahumada v. NISH" on Justia Law

Norfolk Southern appealed the district court's order remanding to state court a claim brought against it under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. 51-60. Norfolk also petitioned for a writ of mandamus vacating the district court's order and either dismissing the case, or alternatively, remanding to the district court to address the merits of its federal defense to the FELA claim. The court concluded that 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) barred review of the district court's order by appeal or via mandamus; Norfolk Southern has not established entitlement to mandamus relief because it has not shown a clear and indisputable right to such relief; and, accordingly, the court dismissed Norfolk Southern's appeal and deny its mandamus petition.View "In re: Norfolk Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law

The Government subpoenaed a 19-year-old man, (Doe Jr.) to testify with regard to potential federal charges against his father (Mr. Doe). Doe Jr. moved to quash the subpoena under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c)(2), claiming that his testimony was shielded by a purported parent-child privilege and the district court granted the motion. The court, concluded, however, that no federal appellate court has recognized a parent-child privilege and the court declined to do so in this case. Doe Jr. has not made a strong showing of need for the parent-child privilege and "reason and experience" did not warrant creation of the privilege in the face of substantial authority to the contrary. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.View "In re: Grand Jury Subpoena" on Justia Law