Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Petitioner, born in El Salvador, applied for special rule cancellation of removal under section 203 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2160, 2196. Petitioner subsequently sought review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal of the IJ's adverse credibility determination and denial of relief. The BIA determined that petitioner's admitted participation in a civil patrol, coupled with the government's evidence of human rights violations that occurred during the time and in the place that petitioner patrolled, was sufficient to trigger his burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the persecutor bar did not apply. The court held that the record contained evidence sufficient to trigger petitioner's burden, and the court agreed with the BIA and the IJ that petitioner did not meet his burden. Therefore, the court denied the petition for review. View "Pastora v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, a native and citizen of India, sought review of USCIS's denial of her application for naturalization. The district court granted summary judgment to USCIS finding that plaintiff was ineligible for naturalization because she had not been lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and that she failed to demonstrate good moral character. The court found that plaintiff failed to show that she was legally entitled to the grant of the LPR status she received and concluded that she was not lawfully admitted for permanent residence. Therefore, plaintiff was ineligible for naturalization and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on this ground. Accordingly, the court affirmed as to that portion of the district court's judgment. Because a failure to satisfy any one of the statutory prerequisites rendered an applicant ineligible for naturalization, the district court's finding of moral character was not essential to its grant of summary judgment. Accordingly, the court vacated that portion of the district court's judgment addressing plaintiff's good moral character. View "Injeti v. USCIS" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit against RAC after entering into a rental agreement with RAC for a wooden trundle bed and mattress infested with bedbugs. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's order compelling arbitration of their breach of warranty claim under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. 2301 et seq. Relying on regulation promulgated by the FTC under its authority to interpret the Act, plaintiffs argued that RAC could not require binding arbitration as part of a consumer warranty. The court concluded that the district court erred in holding that the FTC regulations contained no ban on binding arbitration. However, the FTC arbitration ban simply did not apply to plaintiffs' rental agreement with RAC. Because plaintiffs have not linked RAC's warranty to any sale, they failed to establish the existence of a written warranty under FTC regulations. Accordingly, the binding arbitration clause was enforceable and the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Seney v. Rent-a-Center, Inc." on Justia Law

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Respondent appealed the district court's civil commitment of him as a sexually dangerous person under 18 U.S.C. 4248. The court concluded that respondent, as a D.C. offender, was in the custody of the BOP of purposes of section 4248 certification as a sexually dangerous person. The court also concluded that respondent waived the argument that section 4248(d) required his release to the District of Columbia. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Savage" on Justia Law

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After a deputy sheriff broadly publicized the corrupt and unlawful practices occurring in the Office of the Sheriff, the Sheriff terminated his employment. A jury awarded $1.1 million in favor of the deputy on his claim of retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights. At issue was whether the district court erred in failing to grant qualified immunity to the Sheriff. The court found that the district court was right to conclude that the Sheriff violated the deputy's First Amendment right. The court concluded that it was clearly established at the time that an employee's speech about serious governmental misconduct was protected. Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not err in failing to grant qualified immunity to the Sheriff and affirmed the judgment. View "Durham v. Jones" on Justia Law

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The Union sought to amend its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the IRS to permit probationary employees to use the agreement's grievance procedures to challenge removals alleged to be in violation of statutory rights or procedures. After the IRS refused to negotiate on the grounds that the proposal would grant probationary employees greater procedural protections that were authorized under law and regulation, the Union appealed to the FLRA. The FLRA granted judgment in favor of the IRS and the Union appealed. The court declined to reverse the FLRA's judgment because such a decision would ignore the statutory and regulatory frameworks that Congress and the executive branch have put in place, create a stark circuit split, and overturn nearly thirty years of settled public-employee practice. View "National Treasury Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations Authority" on Justia Law

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Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to traffic in more than 50 grams of crack cocaine and was sentenced to the statutory minimum of 120 months' imprisonment. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to modify his sentence under the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA), 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the statutory minimum sentences in the FSA did not apply to a defendant sentenced before the Act's effective date. The court rejected defendant's argument that a section 3582(c)(2) proceeding conducted after the effective date of the FSA provided a vehicle by which to apply the reduced minimum sentences in the FSA to him. View "United States v. Black" on Justia Law

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Defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm after being previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Defendant was sentenced to 268 months' imprisonment after the district court concluded that defendant qualified as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Because the maximum possible prison sentence that defendant faced for his prior state convictions exceeded on year, and because that potential punishment was far from hypothetical, the court held that defendant's prior state convictions qualified as predicate felonies for sentencing under the ACCA. Therefore, the district court did not err in sentencing defendant as an armed career criminal. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to vacate his conviction and dismiss the indictment where defendant had the requisite predicate felony for his section 922(g)(1) conviction. Finally, the court concluded that defendant's contention that his prior appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to challenge his conviction on the basis that he lacked a predicate felony was moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Kerr" on Justia Law

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Defendant pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. Surrounded by police officers, defendant watched as every individual in a bus shelter next to him was handled by the police. Soon thereafter, defendant was confronted by a police officer who immediately sought to verify whether defendant was carrying anything illegal before waving him forward. The court concluded, given these facts, that defendant merely obeyed the police officer's orders without giving valid consent to a search. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Robertson" on Justia Law

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Sandlands and EDS challenged the validity of Horry County's Flow Control Ordinance. The Ordinance prohibits disposal of waste generated in the county at any site other than a designated publicly owned landfill. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the county, concluding that the Ordinance did not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause because the Ordinance provides the same types of benefits and imposes the same types of burdens as the ordinances upheld in United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority. Further, the Ordinance did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because Sandlands and EDS have failed to show that they have been intentionally treated differently from other similarly situated companies. View "Sandlands C&D LLC v. Horry County" on Justia Law