Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion challenging the jury instruction given in his underlying trial for witness tampering. Defendant argued that the instruction misstated the federal nexus required for the offense in light of Fowler v. United States. The court affirmed the district court's order denying defendant's section 2255 motion, concluding that the instructional error did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Town after the Town declared plaintiffs' cottages to be in violation of its nuisance ordinance. The cottages were considered nuisances as a result of storm or erosion damage. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs' procedural due process claims because plaintiffs' procedural due process rights were not violated where the Town never deprived plaintiffs of any property interest; affirmed the grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs' equal protection claims because plaintiffs' equal protection rights were not violated where the Town had a rational basis for its decision to declare plaintiffs' cottages nuisances under the Town's ordinance; and remanded the takings claims based on the court's conclusion that a state and its political subdivisions waived the state-litigation requirement by removing a case to federal court. View "Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head" on Justia Law

In this pre-enforcement challenge to a package of immigration laws known as Act 69, the district court preliminarily enjoined certain sections of the Act on preemption grounds. On the merits, the court concluded that the district court was correct to enjoin Sections 4(A) and (C) because they criminalized actions that Congress has, as a policy choice, decided were a civil matter. The court also concluded that Sections 4(B) and (D) created an obstacle to the smooth functioning of federal immigration law, improperly placed in the hands of state officials the nation's immigration policy, and stripped federal officials of the authority and discretion necessary in managing foreign affairs. Accordingly, the court concluded that these sections, along with Sections 5 and 6(B)(2), were all preempted by federal law and, therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction. View "United States v. State of South Carolina" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and former members of the armed forces, brought suit against defendants, two former Secretaries of Defense, alleging that they were victims of rape and sexual misconduct by fellow servicemembers during their military careers. Plaintiffs sought money damages pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The court held that no Bivens action will lie where special factors counsel hesitation in creating an implied right of action and special factors clearly counsel hesitation in implying a cause of action for injuries arising out of military service. The court concluded that judicial abstention was the proper course in this case pursuant to Chappell v. Wallace, United States v. Stanley, and Feres v. United States. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Cioca v. Rumsfeld" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of first-degree burglary and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury. On appeal, the state challenged the district court's grant of petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Petitioner cross-appealed. The court reversed the district court's judgment, concluding that counsel's failure to call an expert in eyewitness identification did not constitute ineffective assistance where there was at least reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland v. Washington's deferential standard. The court, however, affirmed the district court's rejection of petitioner's other claims for ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Moore, Jr. v. Hardee" on Justia Law

The government appealed the district court's order which altered the terms of a bond the Coast Guard had fixed for the release of a detained ship that was under investigation and restricted the types of penalties the government could seek for the ship's potential violations of certain ocean pollution prevention statutes. The ship at issue, the Pappadakis, an ocean-going bulk cargo carrier carrying a shipment of coal to Brazil, was detained by the Coast Guard because the vessel had likely been discharging bilge water overboard. The court reversed and remanded for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) where the matter was not subject to review in the district court because the Coast Guard's actions were committed to agency discretion by law. Consequently, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition. View "Angelex Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant, a former CIA agent, was indicted for illegally disclosing classified information about a covert CIA operation regarding an Iranian nuclear weapons operation to the intervenor for publication in a book written by the intervenor. In the majority opinion written by Chief Judge Traxler, the court reversed the district court's order holding that the intervenor had a reporter's privilege that entitled him to refuse to testify at trial concerning the source and scope of the classified national defense information illegally disclosed to him. In a separate majority opinion written by Judge Gregory, the court reversed the district court's order suppressing the testimony of the two government witnesses, and affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), 18 U.S.C. app. 3, ruling. View "United States v. Sterling" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of disorderly conduct under 36 C.F.R. 2.34, which prohibits conduct that is "obscene," "physically threatening or menacing," or "likely to inflict injury or incite an immediate breach of the peace." Defendant very briefly touched an undercover ranger's fully-clothed crotch area after the ranger approached defendant, as a part of a sting operation specifically targeted at gay men, and initiated a sexually suggestive conversation with defendant, expressly agreeing to have sex with defendant. The court held that the term "obscene" was unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant; no rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's brief touch of the ranger's crotch, in this instance, was "physically threatening or menacing" or "likely to inflict injury or incite an immediate breach of the peace;" and, therefore, the court reversed and remanded for a judgment of acquittal. View "United States v. Lanning" on Justia Law

The district court resentenced defendant, who pleaded guilty to possession of five grams or more of crack cocaine and to maintaining a dwelling for the use of cocaine, to an above-Guidelines sentence of 120 months' imprisonment and defendant appealed. The court concluded that the district court correctly determined that the mandate rule did not preclude it from considering the government's renewed U.S.S.G. 4A1.3 upward departure motion; while the district court erred in concluding that the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA), 21 U.S.C. 841, did not apply retroactively, that error was harmless as demonstrated by the district court's statements at sentencing; and defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable where the district court did not base the length of his sentence on his rehabilitative needs. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Alston" on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff, a longshoreman, slipped and fell on Oldendorff's ship during loading operations. On appeal, Oldendorff challenged the judgment entered on a jury verdict under section 5(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 905(b). The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's motions for judgment as a matter of law where a jury could reasonably find Oldendorff liable for simple negligence. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial where the district court properly informed the jury that a shipowner may be "liable for injury resulting directly from an unsafe condition on the ship of which it was aware and which it voluntarily agreed and undertook to remedy, but failed to do so." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Bunn v. Oldendorff Carriers GmbH & Co." on Justia Law