Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Relator filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq., alleging that his former employer, NCED, along with other defendants, defrauded the government through various schemes in connection with contracts pursuant to the Javits-Wagner-O'Day Act, 41 U.S.C. 8501 et seq. After NCED and its former CEO settled, the district court dismissed relator's claims against the remaining defendants. The court held that the public-disclosure bar deprived the district court of jurisdiction over relator's claims against Defendants NISH, Green Bay, IPC, and Smurfit. With respect to these defendants, the district court properly determined that relator's proposed amendments to his first amended complaint were futile. The court held that relator's second amended complaint failed to adequately plead an FCA claim against Defendant Weyerhaeuser. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "US ex rel. Ahumada v. NISH" on Justia Law

Norfolk Southern appealed the district court's order remanding to state court a claim brought against it under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. 51-60. Norfolk also petitioned for a writ of mandamus vacating the district court's order and either dismissing the case, or alternatively, remanding to the district court to address the merits of its federal defense to the FELA claim. The court concluded that 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) barred review of the district court's order by appeal or via mandamus; Norfolk Southern has not established entitlement to mandamus relief because it has not shown a clear and indisputable right to such relief; and, accordingly, the court dismissed Norfolk Southern's appeal and deny its mandamus petition.View "In re: Norfolk Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law

The Government subpoenaed a 19-year-old man, (Doe Jr.) to testify with regard to potential federal charges against his father (Mr. Doe). Doe Jr. moved to quash the subpoena under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c)(2), claiming that his testimony was shielded by a purported parent-child privilege and the district court granted the motion. The court, concluded, however, that no federal appellate court has recognized a parent-child privilege and the court declined to do so in this case. Doe Jr. has not made a strong showing of need for the parent-child privilege and "reason and experience" did not warrant creation of the privilege in the face of substantial authority to the contrary. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.View "In re: Grand Jury Subpoena" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's dismissal of his claim under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(a) and 2255(h), holding that defendant did not meet the requirements of a permissible second or successive motion to vacate. The court held that a numerically second section 2255 motion should not be considered second or successive under section 2255(h) where, as here, the facts relied on by the movant seeking resentencing did not exist when the numerically first motion was filed and adjudicated. Here, defendant's claim was unripe at the time his numerically first motion was adjudicated. Thus, in light of the subsequent vacatur of his state No Operator's License conviction, which contributed to the original guidelines calculation of his federal sentence, his motion was not successive. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Hairston" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court held that the law enforcement officer's search of defendant's car was unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because the probable cause on which the search was based was tainted. Defendant's discriminatory statements that gave rise to probable cause to search the car were elicited in response to the officer's manifestly false assertion that he had probable cause to search the car and his suggestion that, with our without defendant's consent, he would proceed with the search. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order denying the suppression motion, vacated defendant's conviction, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Saafir" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court concluded that defendant was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years' imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), due to his three prior state convictions for "breaking and entering" in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-54(a). The court concluded that N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-54(a), as interpreted by the North Carolina Supreme Court, sweeps no more broadly than the generic elements of burglary. The state court's clarification that the offense requires either breaking or entering without a building owner's consent brings it within Taylor v. United States's requirement of an "unlawful or unprivileged entry." This clarification also "excludes any case in which a person enters premises open to the public, no matter his intent" as required by Descamps v. United States. Accordingly, N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-54(a) qualifies as an ACCA predicate offense under section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "United States v. Mungro, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's denial of his motion for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A). The court affirmed the district court's determination that, although plaintiff prevailed in his lawsuit against the Commissioner, attorney's fees were unwarranted because the Commissioner had pursued a substantially justified position. Despite the oddity of the Commissioner's original position, his misstep did not merit a fee award.View "Meyer, III v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence stemming from several instances of criminal conduct that defendant was accused of undertaking between October 2001 and June 2002. The Superseding indictment charged defendant in Count One with conspiracy to receive, possess, conceal, store, barter, sell, and dispose of stolen firearms; in Count Two with the substantive 18 U.S.C. 922(j) offense; in Count Three with solicitation of another to assist in damaging and destroying by explosive the Johnston County Courthouse and Sheriff's office; in Count Four with receiving an explosive with the intent that it be used to kill, injure, or intimidate other persons and to damage and destroy buildings; in Count Five with a misdemeanor charge of improperly storing explosive materials; and in Count Six with distributing explosive materials to an individual under twenty-one years of age. The court affirmed defendant's convictions on Counts One through Four of the Superseding Indictment, but reversed his convictions on Counts Five and Six. Because the latter two convictions did not materially affect his sentence, the court did not remand for resentencing.View "United States v. Barefoot, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for two counts of Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1951(a) and one count of using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient for two independent reasons. Whether viewed through the lens of the effect of defendant's crimes (depletion of assets) or his intent (targeting), the government adduced sufficient evidence in this case to meet the jurisdictional element of the Hobbs Act. Therefore, the court upheld defendant's Hobbs Act convictions. Because defendant challenged his firearm conviction solely on the ground that the Hobbs Act predicate was infirm, that conviction too must be upheld.View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to wire fraud; money laundering; making a false statement on a loan application to a financial institution, the accounts of which are insured by the FDIC; and corrupt interference with the internal revenue laws of the United States. The court concluded that the district court did not err by increasing defendant's offense level under the Guidelines by 2 levels under U.S.S.G. 3B1.3 for abuse of a position of trust; by increasing his offense level under the Guidelines by 20 levels under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(1)(K); and by failing sua sponte to appoint various experts to assist in his defense at sentencing. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's sentence.View "United States v. Weiss" on Justia Law