Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, by and through her parents, sued the school principals and school board pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of her First Amendment right to free speech and expression and her Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. Defendants prohibited plaintiff from wearing and on one occasion punished her for wearing Confederate flag shirts at school. When, as here, student speech threatened to disrupt school, school officials could prohibit or punish that speech. The school officials therefore did not violate plaintiff's First Amendment right when they refused to allow her to wear Confederate flag shirts and protest shirts at school, and the dress codes and their enforcement did not infringe on plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. View "Hardwick v. Heyward" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting, inter alia, that Maryland's good-and-substantial-reason requirement for obtaining a handgun permit contravened the Second Amendment. The district court permanently enjoined enforcement of section 5-306(a)(5)(ii) of the Public Safety Article of the Maryland Code, to the extent that it conditions eligibility for a permit to carry, wear, or transport a handgun in public on having "good and substantial reason" to do so. Because the court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the good-and-substantial-reason requirement could not pass constitutional muster, the court reversed the judgment. Under the applicable intermediate scrutiny standard, the State had demonstrated that the good-and-substantial-reason requirement was reasonably adapted to Maryland's significant interests in protecting public safety and preventing crime. The court also rejected plaintiffs' facial challenge. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Woollard v. Gallagher" on Justia Law

After being fired by General Dynamics, plaintiff sued the local affiliate, the UAW and UAW's regional office, alleging that two local union officials violated the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. 101, 102, 609, by retaliating against her for reporting their supposed misconduct to the regional office. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. While the court thought that the district court ruled too broadly against the speech rights of union members under the LMRDA, the court nonetheless affirmed its judgment on narrower grounds. The content of plaintiff's speech - that the president and vice president viewed pornography on a Union computer on a single occasion - was not a matter of union concern. Plaintiff failed to point to a single action by the Union as a whole, let alone a Union action that was the result of an established Union disciplinary process. View "Trail v. Local 2850 UAW" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a retaliation action under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, alleging that defendants, IST and its parent company, EDO, fired plaintiff because he reported IST to the government for what he believed to be fraudulent conduct. IST is a New Hampshire corporation that designs and manufactures counter-improvised explosive devices (C-IEDs) for the government. Plaintiff, hired by IST as an engineer, made complaints regarding what he perceived as the failure of Mobile Multi-Band Jammer systems (MMBJs) devices to function properly at elevated temperatures. The court held that plaintiff's purported investigation activities did not raise a distinct possibility of a viable FCA action and were not protected; the court could not say that IST made a material false certification of compliance with government contracts; and plaintiff's complaint about IST did not raise a distinct possibility of a viable FCA claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Glynn v. EDO Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of numerous charges arising from a tax fraud scheme operated through his business of preparing income tax returns for private individuals. Defendant appealed. The court held that, although defendant's trial was affected by two errors - the prosecutor's improper statement and the district court's refusal to give the requested character evidence instruction - when considered both individually and cumulatively, did not warrant reversal of defendant's convictions. The court also held that the district court did not improperly restrict defendant's right to testify in his defense and correctly instructed the jury regarding the identity theft offenses. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Woods" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a qui tam lawsuit under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729, alleging that defendants fraudulently billed the United States for services provided to the military forces serving in Iraq. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of his complaint with prejudice. Because the court concluded that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction and the court found that the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act (WSLA), 18 U.S.C. 3287, applied to this action, the court reversed. Because it could be appropriate for the district court to make factual findings to consider the public disclosure claim urged by defendants the court remanded so the district court could consider this issue. View "United States ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co." on Justia Law

This case arose when Calvary's application to the City for a special use permit was denied. On appeal, Calvary challenged the district court's procedural rulings, contending that the district court abused its discretion in denying Calvary's motion for leave to amend its complaint, which was filed after the district court had dismissed its original complaint, and in denying its motion for reconsideration. The court concluded that Calvary failed to take account of the fact that it filed its motion to amend after its complaint had been dismissed, and there was simply no longer any complaint pending to amend. Calvary never made an effort to open or vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b), and the court rejected its argument that the district court should have construed its motion for reconsideration as a motion to vacate under Rule 60(b). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Calvary Christian Center v. City of Fredericksburg, VA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's denial of relief on her claims of discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment, brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, as well as wrongful discharge, assault, and battery, brought under Virginia law, against Huntington Ingalls, the successor to her former employer. According to plaintiff, Huntington Ingalls subjected her to an ongoing sexually hostile work environment and her claims centered on the actions of her supervisor. The court held that the district court properly declined to consider those allegations not included in plaintiff's EEOC charge; because the district court correctly determined that amending her complaint would be futile, it did not abuse its discretion in denying her leave to do so; because the department manager did not know of the protected activity, and because the supervisor, who allegedly influenced him, was not principally responsible for the decision to terminate plaintiff's employment, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Huntington Ingalls on the retaliatory discharge claim; and the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the assault and battery claims. View "Balas v. Huntington Ingalls Industries" on Justia Law

In a trademark infringement dispute between Georgia-Pacific and von Drehle involving paper towels and "touchless" paper towel dispensers, the court vacated the district court's award of summary judgment in von Drehle's favor, and remanded the case for a jury determination of whether von Drehle was liable for contributory trademark infringement. Over three months later, von Drehle sought for the first time to amend its answer to include affirmative defenses of claim preclusion and issue preclusion. The court subsequently held that the district court erred in vacating the jury verdict and in awarding judgment in von Drehle's favor because: (1) von Drehle waived the preclusion defenses by failing to assert them in a timely manner; and (2) the district court erred in alternatively considering the preclusion defense sua sponte. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's award of judgment in von Drehle's favor, and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to reinstate the jury's verdict in favor of Georgia-Pacific. View "Georgia Pacific Consumer Products, LP v. von Drehle Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of two offenses: the misdemeanor offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, in contravention of Virginia Code section 18.2-371; and the felony offense of violating the Commonwealth's criminal solicitation statute, found in section 18.2-29. The predicate felony for petitioner's criminal solicitation offense was Virginia Code section 18.2-361(A) ("the anti-sodomy provision"). The court subsequently granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether the anti-sodomy provision was unconstitutional either facially or as applied in petitioner's case, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas. The court held that the anti-sodomy provision did facially violate the Due Process Clause and therefore, reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for an award of habeas corpus relief. View "MacDonald v. Moose" on Justia Law