Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

John Doe (“Appellant”) filed this civil action alleging claims for defamation, abuse of process, tortious interference with contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy against Jane Doe (“Appellee”) after Appellee accused Appellant of sexual assault. When Appellant filed his complaint, he also filed an ex parte motion to proceed using the pseudonym “John Doe” rather than his real name. The district court denied the motion.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that in considering the district court’s entire analysis of the James factors, it concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion because it did not rely on incorrect factual or legal premises, nor did it give any indication that it was acting by general rule. Instead, the district court conducted a thorough, case-specific analysis when it exercised its discretion. The court wrote that the district court considered each of Appellant’s arguments, and it carefully balanced Appellant’s stated interests against the public’s interest in the openness of judicial proceedings as required by Public Citizen. It did not abuse its discretion in doing so. View "John Doe v. Jane Doe" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit granted the government’s motion to dismiss Defendant’s appeal based on the appeal waiver in Defendant’s plea agreement.Defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to conspiracy to communicate, transmit, or disclose Restricted Data of the United States Navy relating to Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines with the intent to injure the United States or to secure an advantage to a foreign nation. At sentencing, the district court calculated her Sentencing Guidelines range and sentenced Defendant to 262 months imprisonment, which was at the bottom of that range. Defendant contends that “the district court so severely infected the sentencing [and] the sentencing process that [her] due process rights were violated during the course of the sentencing hearing to an extent that could not have been contemplated by, and transcends, the appeal waiver.” She also contends that the government, in its appellate brief, breached the plea agreement and therefore that the agreement “is now void” and the “waiver in it is invalid.” The government filed a motion to dismiss the appeal based on the appeal waiver in Defendant’s plea agreement.   The Fourth Circuit granted the government’s motion to dismiss. The court concluded that Defendant had failed to make a sufficient showing to avoid the clear terms of her plea agreement, which she acknowledges she entered into knowingly and intelligently. The court also concluded that the government did not breach the plea agreement. Further, the court noted that the plea agreement provided further that once the district court exercised its authority to sentence Defendant, the government was authorized to advance arguments on appeal in support of that sentence. View "US v. Diana Toebbe" on Justia Law

Following a series of COVID-19-related continuances and other setbacks, Defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of fentanyl distribution. Defendant argued that these delays violated his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial. Defendant also argues the district court erred in denying his motion for acquittal.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that, in total, 357 days of 401 days were properly excluded. This means that, at most, only 44 days accrued towards Defendant’s speedy trial clock. The court concluded that Defendant’s rights under the Speedy Trial Act were not violated. Moreover, the court noted that Defendant has not “shown, or even argued, that any evidence was damaged or lost, that any witnesses could not be found, or that his case was harmed in any manner by the delay.” Further, the court wrote that substantial evidence supports Defendant’s convictions. Much of the evidence at trial came from the testimony of the confidential informant who purchased the drugs from Defendant. This informant testified that he knew Defendant because they had a mutual friend whose apartment they both frequented. He also testified that he and Pair had discussed doing business together prior to the informant cooperating with law enforcement. The court explained that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government as the prevailing party below, any reasonable finder of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was guilty of distributing fentanyl. View "US v. Quotez Pair" on Justia Law

Defendant sought post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 and, in the alternative, coram nobis relief. His Section 2255 motion and his coram nobis petition were both denied by the district court. In this appeal, Defendant challenged only the denial of his petition for coram nobis relief, asserting that the court erred and abused its discretion in so ruling. Defendant maintains that he is entitled to a writ of coram nobis because (1) he was convicted in that very court in 1993 under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c), (2) he has served his sentence for that offense, and (3) the sole predicate for his 1993 conviction — a violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 111 — is no longer a crime of violence.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the two issues involve (1) whether a violation of Section 111(b) constitutes a crime of violence and (2) whether Defendant has shown that his 1993 conviction does not rest on a Section 111(b) violation. The court wrote that an error of the most fundamental character has not been shown, Defendant is not entitled to a writ of coram nobis, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying coram nobis relief. The court explained that Defendant was obliged to show that his 1993 conviction rested solely on Section 111(a). Defendant has not carried that burden, and he therefore has not satisfied the fourth requirement for coram nobis relief. View "US v. Antonio McDaniel" on Justia Law

Plaintiff claimed that she suffered sex-based wage discrimination while working at Consolidated Shoe Company and, what’s more, was retaliated against when she complained about it. Before the district court, she sought to show wage discrimination by comparing her wages to those of a male co-worker at Consolidated Shoe. But the co-worker, a graphic designer, had a meaningfully different role at the company than Plaintiff, a content creator and part-time photographer. Because the two did not perform similar jobs, Plaintiff could not rely on the co-worker as a comparator to show wage discrimination. So the district court granted summary judgment to Consolidated Shoe. Plaintiff appealed but dropped her comparator argument. She instead argued that her complaint also included a broader theory that women at Consolidated Shoe were categorically paid less than men.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that to survive summary judgment Plaintiff must produce evidence that would allow a jury to find that she was discriminated against in violation of Title VII. But what Plaintiff provided would not permit a reasonable jury to find for her. And she did not suffer any materially adverse action because she raised concerns about the alleged sex discrimination. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Consolidated Shoe. View "Ashley Noonan v. Consolidated Shoe Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced Defendant to 240 months imprisonment, applying the sentencing enhancement provided by the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), after finding that Defendant had three qualifying predicate convictions for a “serious drug offense” or “violent felony.” But after the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, striking down the “residual clause” of ACCA’s violent-felony definition as unconstitutional, 576 U.S. 591, 606 (2015), Defendant filed a Section 2255 motion to vacate his ACCA sentence. He argued that Maryland first-degree assault—which formed the basis for two of his ACCA predicate offenses—was not a “violent felony” under ACCA. The district court denied Defendant’s motion, and he appealed.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s Section 2255 motion, vacated Defendant’s ACCA sentence. The court explained that it is quite plain from Maryland’s statutory scheme and from the case law interpreting it, that reckless conduct is included. Therefore, Defendant’s inability to point to a specific case is not dispositive. Rather, the terms of the statute and the decisions of Maryland courts show that a Maryland prosecutor could bring charges for first-degree assault against a defendant for recklessly committing an assault with a firearm. The court concluded that the Maryland first-degree-assault statute sets out an indivisible offense and that one of the modalities of that offense—assault with a firearm—can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness. View "US v. Garfield Redd" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a high-level high-school basketball player who wanted to play in the NBA. After graduating high school, Plaintiff committed to the University of Louisville. However, subsequently, Plaintiff's father accepted a bribe in relation to Plaintiff's decision to play for Louisville. As a result, Plaintiff lost his NCAA eligibility. Plaintiff filed RICO claims against the parties who were central to the bribery scheme. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants, finding that Plaintiff did not demonstrate an injury to his business or property, as required for a private civil RICO claim.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Congress made the civil RICO cause of action for treble damages available only to plaintiffs “injured in [their] business or property” by a defendant’s RICO violation. Without such an injury, even a plaintiff who can prove he suffered some injury as a result of a RICO violation lacks a cause of action under the statute. The Fourth Circuit rejected Plaintiff's claims that the loss of benefits secured by his scholarship agreement with Louisville; the loss of his NCAA eligibility; and the loss of money spent on attorney’s fees attempting to regain his eligibility constituted a cognizable business or property injury. View "Brian Bowen, II v. Adidas America Inc." on Justia Law

On July 6, 2023, the Fourth Circuit granted Petitioner's petition for review, reversed the agency’s denial of asylum and withholding of removal, and remanded with instructions to grant Petitioner's application. The Attorney General filed a petition for panel hearing, claiming that the Immigration and Nationality Act and implementing regulations require that the Attorney General make a discretionary judgment as to whether asylum should be granted, even where a noncitizen has met the statutory requirements.The Fourth Circuit agreed. The power to grant asylum is vested solely in the hands of the Attorney General and, even if a noncitizen is otherwise eligible, the Attorney General is empowered by statute to deny relief. While discretionary denials of asylum are exceedingly rare Petitioner's claim that there are no grounds to deny asylum as a matter of discretion must first be considered by the Attorney General. View "Shaker Ullah v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs hired Defendant o renovate their home in Washington, D.C. Because Defendant told Plaintiffs he was properly licensed, they thought everything was above board. Yet, delayed and defective, the renovations did not go well. And, as it turned out, Defendant was not properly licensed. So the Plaintiff sued him in D.C.’s Superior Court. But then Defendant filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Plaintiffs pursued him, filing a two-claim complaint against him in bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court rejected Count II, finding that, if a debt existed, it was dischargeable. So it partially dismissed the adversary proceeding. But it allowed Count I to proceed toward trial to determine whether Defendant owed the Plaintiffs any money. Plaintiffs then voluntarily dismissed the surviving claim without prejudice. They could then immediately appeal the court-dismissed claim and decide afterward whether it was worth further litigating the party-dismissed claim. Plaintiffs appealed their Count II loss to the district court, who affirmed it.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order. The court explained that bankruptcy courts are not Article III courts. So Article III constraints do not apply to them. They only apply if Congress said so in a statute. But it hasn’t. And that means whether Count I was constitutionally moot is beside the point. The bankruptcy court could still adjudicate it. Since Plaintiffs cannot argue that their adversary proceeding was constitutionally moot when Count II was dismissed, they have not shown the proceeding was legally doomed when they dismissed Count I. They are thus left arguing the order was final because Count I was practically over post-dismissal. View "Roee Kiviti v. Naveen Bhatt" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). At the time of his offense, Defendant had numerous prior felony convictions. The Government requested an enhanced sentence under ACCA. “ACCA mandates a 15-year minimum sentence for a defendant convicted of a firearms offense who has three or more prior convictions for either a ‘serious drug offense’ or a ‘violent felony.’” The Government argued that two of Defendant’s prior convictions qualified as serious drug offenses, which he does not dispute, and that his 2017 conviction for aggravated assault in violation of Tennessee Code Section 39-13-102 qualified as a violent felony. The district court agreed, overruling Defendant’s objection, and sentenced him to 210 months in prison. The only issue Defendant raised on appeal is whether his Tennessee conviction for aggravated assault qualifies as a violent felony.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s sentence. The court concluded that Defendant’s Tennessee conviction for aggravated assault is a violent felony within the meaning of the ACCA. Defendant argued that aggravated assault cannot be a violent felony because the second element of the crime—simple assault—requires only de minimis force. While it is true that “de minimis physical force, such as mere offensive touching, is insufficient to trigger the ACCA’s force clause,” the court explained that Defendant overlooks the third, aggravating element of the offense. Each of the aggravating circumstances listed in the statute involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent physical force. View "US v. Bryan Ogle" on Justia Law