Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The district court granted defendant's motion for a mistrial on the condition that she waive her rights under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161 - 3174. More than 70 days after the mistrial was declared, the district court conducted a second trial where the jury found defendant guilty of theft of government funds. The court held that although defendant's attempt to waive her rights under the Act was null and void, she was not entitled to assert for the first time on appeal that a violation of the Act occurred; the plain language of the Act required that a defendant asserting a violation of the Act move for dismissal of an indictment before a new trial begins, or be precluded from seeking such a dismissal; in view of this waiver imposed by statute, the court was not permitted to consider defendant's argument that her rights under the Act were violated; and, therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Mosteller" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's order of civil commitment under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 18 U.S.C. 4247-48. The court concluded that the district court lacked sufficient evidence to find that defendant met the standard for civil commitment under the Act where the Government did not present clear and convincing evidence that defendant's mental illnesses would cause him to have serious difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Antone" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a state prisoner housed at Red Onion State Prison (ROSP), filed suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000 cc et seq., and 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging ROSP's 2010 Ramadan policy. ROSP had devised a new eligibility policy for 2010 where, in addition to signing up to participate in Ramadan, inmates had to provide some physical indicia of Islamic faith. The court vacated the district court's summary judgment order granting defendants qualified immunity on plaintiff's claims for monetary relief where defendants have failed to establish as a matter of law that the 2010 Ramadan policy, as applied to plaintiff, did not violate his First Amendment rights and where their alleged actions violated plaintiff's clearly established rights; vacated the district court's decision that the prison's abandonment of the policy mooted the claims for equitable relief where defendants failed to meet their "heavy burden" of establishing that it was "absolutely clear" that the 2010 Ramadan policy would not be reinstated; and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wall v. Wade" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against ACS, alleging that ACS's collection notice violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. Plaintiffs argued that ACS's collection notice violated section 1692g(a)(3) by stating that debtors only could dispute the validity of their debt in writing. ACS argued that the collection notice complied with the FDCPA because section 1692g(a)(3) contained an inherent writing requirement. The court found, however, that section 1692g(a)(3) permitted consumers to dispute the validity of a debt orally, and it did not impose a writing requirement. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of ACS's motion to dismiss. View "Clark v. Absolute Collection Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an employee of MTA for four decades, filed suit against MTA alleging various forms of discrimination after her position was terminated due to budget cuts. The court concluded that, because summary judgment was granted before plaintiff had a chance to discover facts essential to her claim, and she alleged discrimination occurring before any legislative activity, the district court's Rule 56(d) denial was an abuse of discretion. The court concluded, however, that the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's age discrimination and disability discrimination claims were barred by sovereign immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "McCray v. Maryland Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted under the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2778, for attempting to export small-arms ammunition to Jordan without a license. Defendant, working as a financial-management Foreign Service Officer at the U.S. embassy in Jordan, sought to ship certain personal possessions, including 366 pounds of ammunition, from his parent's house in Alabama to Jordan via a government contract carrier. The court concluded that, under the relevant standard of willfulness, defendant's true belief as to the illegality of transporting the ammunition at issue was sufficient to establish culpability under the Act even if unaccompanied by knowledge of the contents of the United States Munitions List. The court also concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the district court's conclusion that defendant willfully violated the Act. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Bishop" on Justia Law

Shirley Gross filed suit against PLIVA after her long-term use of the generic drug metoclopramide, produced by PLIVA, caused her permanent injuries. On appeal, plaintiff, as the personal representative of the estate of Gross, challenged the district court's denial of Gross's request to amend her complaint and her state common law tort claims against PLIVA for injuries sustained as a result of her use of a drug it manufactured. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. 301 et seq. The court affirmed the district court's denial of leave to amend and held that none of plaintiff's claims regarding PLIVA's alleged failure to update its warnings were before the court on appeal; the court found that the complaint did not allege any violation of the federal misbranding laws or parallel state duties, and to the extent these claims were made on appeal, they were waived; and all of Gross's causes of action were preempted by the FDCA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Cobra sought appellate relief from a decision of the Commission temporarily reinstating a coal miner. At issue was whether a Commission decision granting temporary reinstatement to a coal miner was immediately appealable by the coal operator under the collateral order doctrine. The court concluded that the Commission's decision failed to satisfy the requirements of the collateral order doctrine and, therefore, the collateral order doctrine did not permit an interlocutory review of the proceedings. Accordingly, the court dismissed Cobra's petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. View "Cobra Natural Resources, LLC v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n" on Justia Law

These appeals concerned whether Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were exempt from the payment of state and local taxes imposed on the transfer of real property in Maryland and South Carolina. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac claimed that they were exempt from such transfer taxes under 12 U.S.C. 1723a(c)(2) and 1452(e) respectively. The district courts in Maryland and South Carolina rejected the Counties' claims, concluding that the general tax exemptions applicable to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, while not applicable to real property taxes, did cover real property transfer taxes, thus making a distinction between property and transfer taxes. The district courts also concluded that Congress acted within its Commerce Clause power. The court held that the real property exclusions from the general tax exemptions of section 1723a(c)(2) and 1452(e) did not include transfer and recordation taxes; in the absence of a particular constitutional right that would trigger heightened scrutiny, the court held that a congressional exemption from state taxation under the Commerce Clause was subject to rational-basis review; Congress could exempt Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from state and local transfer taxes, even though they were collected in the context of interstate transactions, because the taxes could substantially interfere with or obstruct the constitutionally justified missions of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in bolstering the secondary mortgage market; and the Counties' remaining arguments for finding the statutory tax exemptions unconstitutional were rejected. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district courts. View "Montgomery County, Maryland v. Federal National Mortgage Assoc." on Justia Law

Defendant moved to dismiss an indictment charging him with one count of traveling in interstate commerce and knowingly failing to update his sex offender registration in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2250. Defendant argued that his plea of nolo contendere to attempted sexual battery in Florida state court did not qualify as a conviction within the meaning of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. 16911 et seq. The court concluded that the district court correctly found defendant's plea of nolo contendere with adjudication withheld constituted a conviction for the purposes of SORNA because it resulted in a penal consequence. View "United States v. Bridges" on Justia Law