Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A Black woman who had worked for a community college for nearly two decades applied for a promotion to Assistant Dean of Workforce Solutions after serving as Director of Special Populations. The position required significant experience in workforce development, including knowledge of specific funding and grant-writing. The applicant pool included her and a Hispanic male colleague who had overseen larger programs and had more direct experience with the job’s requirements. A search committee interviewed candidates, with the final hiring decision made by the Vice President of Enrollment and Outreach Initiatives.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland initially dismissed her claims of race and gender discrimination under Title VII. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded in part, allowing her to pursue a disparate treatment claim focused on the college’s failure to promote her and its issuance of a corrective action letter for a payroll error. Following discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for the college, finding that the plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence of intentional discrimination, and that the employer’s stated reason—selecting the more qualified candidate—was not shown to be pretextual.Reviewing the case de novo, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The court assumed that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of discrimination but held that she did not meet her burden to show the employer’s justification was pretext. The court found that the selected candidate’s qualifications aligned more closely with the position, and that neither evidence of preselection, circumstantial evidence of discriminatory comments, nor disparate discipline sufficed to demonstrate intentional discrimination or pretext. The court thus affirmed the judgment in favor of the college. View "Hood-Wilson v. Board of Trustees, Community College of Baltimore" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty in 2020 to two counts of distributing a mixture containing heroin and fentanyl, in violation of federal drug laws. At sentencing, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia determined he qualified as a career offender, which substantially increased his advisory sentencing range under the Guidelines. The court ultimately imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment, followed by a five-year term of supervised release.Subsequently, the defendant moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that changes in the law meant he would not now be classified as a career offender, and, therefore, his Guidelines range would be much lower if sentenced today. He asked the court to reduce his sentence to time served. The district court found that the significant difference between his original and recalculated Guidelines ranges constituted an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for a sentence reduction. However, the court ultimately denied the motion, concluding that the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)—particularly the defendant’s lengthy and serious criminal history and the need to promote respect for the law—outweighed his arguments for release. The court also noted his rehabilitative efforts but found them insufficient to demonstrate a reduced danger to the public.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed only whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for compassionate release. Applying a deferential standard, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court had considered all relevant arguments and provided sufficient reasoning for its decision. The appellate court affirmed the denial of compassionate release, holding that the district court did not act arbitrarily or irrationally and satisfied all statutory requirements in its analysis. View "United States v. Washington" on Justia Law

Drug task force officers in West Virginia observed a car with expired registration, dark window tint, and a malfunctioning taillight, driven by Cornelious Johnson—an individual known to them from a prior drug conviction and currently on federal supervised release. The officers watched as Johnson and his passenger interacted with a man, Jackie Byrd, at an apartment complex previously associated with drug investigations. Although the officers suspected a drug transaction, they did not witness any exchange of items. Shortly after, Tremayne Hawkins entered the back seat, and the car left the complex. Officer Stanley, informed by the task force, stopped the car for the observed traffic violations and, suspecting drug activity, separated and questioned the occupants about their interaction with Byrd. Citing minor inconsistencies in their answers, Stanley called for a K9 unit, which alerted to drugs. A subsequent search yielded a firearm on Hawkins, who admitted to being prohibited from possessing one due to a prior conviction.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia denied Hawkins’ motion to suppress the firearm, holding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop based on the area’s reputation, Johnson’s prior conviction, the observed interaction with Byrd, and the inconsistent statements from the occupants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. The Fourth Circuit held that none of the cited factors—alone or in combination—provided reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. The court emphasized that presence in an area associated with prior investigations, a dated conviction, innocuous interactions, and minor, reconcilable inconsistencies in statements did not collectively amount to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "US v. Hawkins" on Justia Law

After divorcing in 2010, a former employee and his ex-spouse entered into a court-approved domestic relations order in North Carolina that divided his employer-sponsored retirement plan benefits. The order stipulated that the ex-spouse would be treated as a surviving spouse, entitling her to survivor benefits under the plan, and stated that her portion of the benefit "may be reduced as necessary" to cover the cost of the survivor annuity. Years later, when the employee retired and began receiving benefits, he argued that the plan administrator improperly reduced his monthly payment by factoring the cost of the survivor annuity into his share, rather than allocating the cost solely to his ex-spouse’s portion. He also claimed that the plan administrator failed to timely provide all requested plan documents, warranting statutory penalties.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina granted summary judgment for the employer and plan administrator. The court found that the plan administrator correctly interpreted the qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) to permit, but not require, allocating the cost of the survivor annuity to the ex-spouse’s share, and that the benefit calculation was consistent with the plan terms and not an abuse of discretion. Additionally, the court held that the plaintiff was not prejudiced by any delay in receiving plan documents and denied statutory penalties.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Fourth Circuit concluded that de novo review was appropriate for interpreting the QDRO, while the plan administrator’s benefit calculations were reviewed for abuse of discretion. The court held that the QDRO’s language was unambiguous and permissive, not mandatory, regarding who should bear the cost of the survivor annuity. The court also upheld the denial of statutory penalties, finding no prejudice or bad faith. The district court’s summary judgment for the defendants was affirmed. View "Gasper v. EIDP, Inc." on Justia Law

A dispute arose from the design and installation of cabinetry in a luxury home in Charleston, South Carolina. Design Gaps, Inc., owned by David and Eva Glover, had a longstanding business relationship with Shelter, LLC, a general contractor operated by Ryan and Jenny Butler. After being dissatisfied with Design Gaps’ performance, the homeowners, Dr. Jason and Kacie Highsmith, and Shelter terminated their contract with Design Gaps and hired Distinctive Design & Construction LLC, owned by Bryan and Wendy Reiss, to complete the work. The Highsmiths and Shelter initiated arbitration against Design Gaps, which led to the arbitrator ruling in favor of the homeowners and Shelter on their claims, and against Design Gaps on its counterclaims, including those for copyright infringement, tortious interference, and unfair trade practices.After the arbitration, Design Gaps sought to vacate the arbitration award in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, but the court instead confirmed the award. Concurrently, Design Gaps filed a separate federal lawsuit against several parties, including some who were not part of the arbitration. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that res judicata and collateral estoppel barred the new claims, or alternatively, that the claims failed on other grounds such as the statute of limitations and laches. The district court agreed, dismissing most claims based on preclusion or other legal bars, and granted summary judgment on the remaining claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. The court held that res judicata and collateral estoppel applied to bar most of Design Gaps’ claims, even against parties not directly involved in the arbitration but in privity with those who were. For the remaining claims, the court found they were properly dismissed on grounds such as the statute of limitations, waiver, or laches. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in full. View "Design Gaps, Inc. v. Distinctive Design & Construction LLC" on Justia Law

Christopher Arthur was investigated after founding a business that sold military gear and later provided training and manuals on tactics including the use of explosives. The FBI became involved after a customer, Joshua Blessed, died in a shootout and was found to possess pipe bombs and Arthur’s manuals. Subsequently, an undercover informant, “Buckshot,” sought training from Arthur, who instructed him on fortifying his home and making explosive devices, knowing Buckshot claimed he wanted to use such tactics against federal agents. Arthur was arrested in January 2022 and a search of his home revealed illegal firearms and improvised explosives.A grand jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina indicted Arthur under 18 U.S.C. § 842(p)(2)(B) for teaching explosives use with knowledge of criminal intent, and on additional firearms and explosives charges. Arthur moved to dismiss the primary count, arguing the statute was facially overbroad under the First Amendment. The district court denied the motion, finding the statute’s knowledge requirement limited its scope to conduct integral to criminal acts, not protected speech. After a three-day trial, the jury found Arthur guilty on all counts. At sentencing, the court applied the U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4 terrorism enhancement, increasing his guidelines range, and sentenced Arthur to a total of 300 months’ imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that 18 U.S.C. § 842(p)(2)(B) is not unconstitutionally overbroad, concluding that the statute targets speech integral to criminal conduct and does not criminalize a substantial amount of protected expressive activity. The Fourth Circuit also found no reversible error in applying the terrorism enhancement, and determined any alleged guidelines error was harmless given the district court’s alternative sentencing rationale. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "US v. Arthur" on Justia Law

The case centers on Jessie Glass, whose estranged wife, April, reported to law enforcement that she witnessed a significant quantity of child sexual abuse material on Glass’s phone. April provided specific details about the alleged material, the devices Glass owned, and information for accessing his online accounts. Detective Jason Lowrance investigated April’s claims, which included reviewing her prior allegations against Glass as well as Glass’s history of previous investigations for similar offenses. Some of these earlier investigations had been closed without charges or with findings labeled “[u]nfounded.” Lowrance then prepared affidavits for search warrants to search Glass’s home and electronics, securing evidence of child sexual abuse material.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied Glass’s motion to suppress, which argued that Lowrance recklessly omitted information in his warrant affidavits that would have undermined April’s credibility and thus probable cause. The district court found that any omissions were not made with intent to mislead or recklessness, and that the omitted facts would not have altered the probable cause determination. A jury later found Glass guilty on all counts, and the district court sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment and imposed financial penalties.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the appeal. It held that Lowrance’s affidavits contained sufficient detail to support probable cause, and that the omitted information about April’s credibility would not have defeated probable cause. The appellate court also rejected Glass’s double jeopardy argument, finding the convictions and sentences were based on distinct conduct. Finally, the court affirmed the district court’s imposition of a $5,000 special assessment, concluding the required statutory considerations were adequately addressed. The judgment was affirmed in all respects. View "US v. Glass" on Justia Law

An Indian professor employed at a public university in North Carolina applied for tenure after a probationary period, but his initial application was denied following negative evaluations from colleagues concerning his teaching, mentorship, and administrative performance. Several years later, the same professor reapplied and was granted tenure. After receiving tenure, he sued various university officials, alleging that the original denial was the result of racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as well as retaliation for his non-traditional teaching methods in violation of the First Amendment. His complaint focused on negative statements and actions by two specific colleagues, while also asserting that other officials enabled or failed to remedy alleged bias.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The court found that the plaintiff’s allegations of racial discrimination were unsupported by facts connecting any defendant’s actions to race, and that his First Amendment retaliation claim failed to identify protected speech or a causal link between such speech and the tenure decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s allegations did not plausibly suggest he was treated differently than similarly situated colleagues because of his race, as required for Equal Protection and § 1981 claims. The court also concluded that the complaint failed to plausibly allege protected speech or retaliation under the First Amendment. The Fourth Circuit emphasized the limited judicial role in reviewing academic tenure decisions and declined to address qualified immunity, as no plausible claim was stated. Thus, the district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Katti v. Arden" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a community advocate, posted a lengthy video—obtained from internal office security footage of a local police department—on his Facebook page. Only a few department employees had access to this footage. In response, a special agent from the Virginia State Police investigated how the plaintiff obtained the video, suspecting possible computer trespass under Virginia law. The agent sought and obtained warrants to search the plaintiff’s Facebook and Gmail accounts, believing these accounts might contain evidence relevant to the investigation. Although the plaintiff moved to quash both warrants for lack of probable cause, a state court denied the motions, and the Supreme Court of Virginia refused his appeal. Ultimately, the local prosecutor determined there was insufficient evidence to charge anyone with computer trespass.Following these events, the plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, alleging that the searches violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights and were conducted in retaliation for his criticism of local government. After amending his complaint once, the plaintiff sought to amend it a second time. The district court dismissed his claims, concluding that his failure to plead the absence of probable cause was fatal, and denied leave to amend as futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The Fourth Circuit held that, in order to state a First Amendment retaliatory search claim, the plaintiff was required to plead the absence of probable cause or show he qualified for a narrow exception, and he had done neither. The court further held that the same requirement applied to his Fourth Amendment claim. The court also agreed that denying leave to amend was proper, as the proposed amendment would not have stated a valid claim. View "Stanley v. Bocock" on Justia Law

After the death of her husband, who had worked in coal mining for nearly 28 years, a widow applied for survivor benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA). Her husband died in 2014 following a hospitalization, and she filed her claim shortly thereafter. The BLBA provides survivor benefits to eligible dependents if a miner’s death is due to pneumoconiosis (“black lung disease”) arising from coal mine employment. A key question in this case was whether the miner’s terminal arterial blood gas (ABG) studies, taken during his last hospitalization, could be used to establish that he was totally disabled due to a chronic respiratory or pulmonary condition at the time of his death.Initially, the District Director awarded benefits and identified the employer as the responsible operator. The employer requested a hearing before the Office of Administrative Law Judges. The first Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied benefits, finding that although the miner worked long enough to invoke a presumption that his death was due to pneumoconiosis, the ABG tests lacked an adequate physician’s report linking the results to a chronic condition, as required by regulation. The widow sought modification, arguing that a mistake of fact had been made. A second ALJ granted modification and awarded benefits, relying on a comprehensive report from one of the physicians that sufficiently connected the ABG results to the miner’s chronic lung disease. The Benefits Review Board (BRB) affirmed, holding that the widow established her entitlement to benefits and that the employer failed to rebut the statutory presumption.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and denied the employer’s petition. The court held that substantial evidence supported the BRB’s decision affirming the award of benefits. Specifically, the court found the physician’s report was sufficient to link the terminal ABG results to a chronic respiratory condition, thus satisfying regulatory requirements and entitling the widow to the statutory presumption. The court also concluded that the ALJ properly granted modification based on a mistake of fact. View "Clinchfield Coal Company v. Mullins" on Justia Law