Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

William Elam and his relatives, the Earlys, are in a dispute over the ownership of a set of Norman Rockwell drawings given to their grandfather, Stephen T. Early, by the artist in 1943. Elam claims sole ownership, while the Earlys assert they are part-owners. The drawings were allegedly gifted to Elam's mother, Helen, by her father upon her college graduation in 1949, but there is no documentary evidence of this gift. The drawings remained in the family home until 1956, then moved with Grandmother Early to a new house, and eventually to Helen's house in 1960. Helen later loaned the drawings to the White House in 1978.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of Elam, finding that his possession of the drawings created a presumption of ownership under Virginia law, which the Earlys failed to rebut. The court determined that Helen had actual possession of the drawings from 1960 to 1978, and the Earlys' evidence, including hearsay testimony, was insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the presumption of ownership applied due to Helen's possession and that the Earlys did not provide sufficient evidence to establish superior title. The court also upheld the dismissal of the Earlys' common law counterclaims for conversion, detinue, and breach of bailment, as well as their conspiracy claim, as these claims could not survive without establishing superior title to the drawings. View "Elam v. Early" on Justia Law

Samuel Joseph was convicted of drug and firearm offenses. He appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during two encounters with law enforcement. The first encounter occurred in Charleston, West Virginia, where an officer, after receiving a tip about possible drug activity, observed Joseph's suspicious behavior and items consistent with drug distribution in a motel room. Joseph was apprehended after fleeing from officers, and a search of his duffel bag, which he abandoned during the chase, revealed drugs and firearms.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia denied Joseph's motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the encounters. Joseph argued that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him and that the search and seizure violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion based on their observations and Joseph's behavior, and that the subsequent search and seizure were lawful.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Joseph based on their observations and his unprovoked flight. The court also found that the officers' actions following the stop, including the use of a drug-detection dog and obtaining a search warrant for the duffel bag, were permissible and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, the court rejected Joseph's arguments regarding the lack of bodycam footage and the reliability of the initial tip, as well as his claim that the traffic stop in Parkersburg was impermissibly prolonged. The court concluded that the district court's factual findings were not clearly erroneous and upheld the denial of the motion to suppress. View "United States v. Joseph" on Justia Law

Towers Watson & Co. (Towers Watson) was insured under a directors and officers (D&O) liability policy by National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA (National Union) and had excess coverage from other insurers. Following a merger with Willis Group Holdings plc (Willis), Towers Watson shareholders filed class actions alleging that the merger consideration was inadequate due to a conflict of interest involving Towers Watson’s CEO. The shareholders settled for $90 million, and Towers Watson sought indemnity coverage under the D&O policy. The insurers denied coverage, citing the policy’s “bump-up exclusion,” which excludes coverage for settlements that effectively increase the consideration paid for an acquisition.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia initially granted summary judgment in favor of Towers Watson, finding that the merger did not involve an acquisition within the meaning of the bump-up exclusion. The insurers appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded, clarifying that the merger did involve an acquisition. On remand, the district court held that the bump-up exclusion applied, barring indemnity coverage for the settlement, and granted summary judgment in favor of the insurers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the settlements represented an effective increase in the consideration paid for the merger, thus triggering the bump-up exclusion. The court also upheld the district court’s application of the common fund doctrine, concluding that the entire settlement amount, including the portion allocated to attorneys’ fees, fell within the exclusion. Consequently, Towers Watson was not entitled to indemnity coverage under the D&O policy. View "Towers Watson & Co. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Hanan Elatr Khashoggi brought a lawsuit following the assassination of her husband, Jamal Khashoggi, alleging that her cell phone was unlawfully surveilled using spyware developed by NSO Group Technologies. She claimed that this surveillance, conducted by agents of Saudi Arabia and the UAE using NSO's Pegasus spyware, led to her husband's death. NSO, an Israeli company, moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over it.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted NSO's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court found that Khashoggi had not sufficiently alleged that NSO had directed any conduct at Virginia. The court noted that Khashoggi's claims did not establish a significant connection between NSO's actions and the state of Virginia, as the alleged surveillance was directed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, not NSO itself.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit agreed that NSO had not purposefully availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities in Virginia. The court found that Khashoggi's allegations did not demonstrate that NSO had directed any conduct at Virginia, as the surveillance was carried out by third parties. Consequently, the court held that the district court correctly dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "Khashoggi v. NSO Group Technologies Limited" on Justia Law

Edwin Leo Brown was indicted in October 2016 on four counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The government had evidence of Brown selling cocaine base and discovered a firearm upon his arrest. Brown faced up to 90 years in prison. His attorney, Frank Harper, initially advised him that he was likely facing up to 120 months’ imprisonment and presented two plea agreements limiting his prison exposure to ten years. Brown, skeptical of Harper’s advice, did not trust him and Harper withdrew as counsel. Brett Wentz then became Brown’s attorney and erroneously advised him that his sentencing exposure would be the same whether he accepted a plea deal or not. Brown rejected the plea offers and later pleaded guilty to all counts, receiving a 210-month sentence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina found that Brown’s attorney performed deficiently but concluded that Brown failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by his attorney’s advice. The magistrate judge recommended denying Brown’s motion to vacate his sentence, stating that Brown presented no contemporaneous evidence to support his claim that he would have accepted the plea agreement if properly advised. The district court adopted this recommendation and denied Brown’s motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and found that the district court erred in applying the standard from Lee v. United States, which concerns accepted plea deals, to Brown’s case involving a rejected plea deal. The Fourth Circuit held that Brown demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea offer if properly advised, given the significant disparity between the plea offer and the sentence he received. The court reversed the district court’s denial of relief, remanded the case, and required the government to re-offer Brown the same plea agreements. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Eugene Kritter, an experienced helicopter pilot, owned and operated Kritter Cropdusting. While crop dusting over a farm in North Carolina, his helicopter collided with a low-hanging steel wire, resulting in his death. Kritter Cropdusting and Kritter’s estate filed a negligence lawsuit against the farm owners and operators, as well as Nutrien, the pesticide company that hired Kritter Cropdusting for the job.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court concluded that the farm owners and operators owed no duty of care to Kritter to remove or warn about the wire, as the risk was not reasonably foreseeable to them. The court also found that neither Nutrien nor its employee, Elmore, owed Kritter a duty of care. Additionally, the court rejected the argument that Kritter was contributorily negligent and found that the wire was not an open and obvious condition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that summary judgment was inappropriate because material questions of fact remained regarding whether the defendants owed a duty of care to Kritter. The court noted that under North Carolina law, issues of negligence are generally for the jury to decide, especially when facts are disputed or multiple reasonable inferences can be drawn. The court also found that the district court erred in concluding that the risk posed by the wire was not foreseeable and that Kritter’s death was incident to his work. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kritter v. Mooring" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case are parents of children with special needs attending public schools in Fairfax County, Virginia. They allege that the transition to remote learning during the COVID-19 pandemic constituted an unconstitutional "taking" of their children's Fifth Amendment property interest in public education. The plaintiffs argue that Virginia law establishes a fundamental right to public education, which they claim is a protected property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and, by extension, should be considered private property under the Takings Clause.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The court reasoned that while the right to public education in Virginia may be a protected property interest under the Due Process Clause, it does not necessarily qualify as private property under the Takings Clause. The court noted that federal courts have long interpreted property interests protected by the Takings Clause as narrower than those protected by the Due Process Clause. The district court concluded that the right to public education is subject to regulation and revision by the Virginia government and cannot be bought or sold, distinguishing it from private property.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's judgment. The Fourth Circuit agreed that the plaintiffs' children may have a property interest in public education under the Due Process Clause but held that this does not extend to the Takings Clause. The court emphasized that the Takings Clause applies only to private property and that public education, being subject to government regulation and not possessing the characteristics of private property, does not qualify. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a plausible claim for compensation under the Takings Clause. View "Chollet v. Brabrand" on Justia Law

The case involves the City of Myrtle Beach's response to a surge in violent crime in an area known as "the Superblock." Between 2015 and 2016, eleven people were shot, and dozens more were sexually assaulted, battered, or robbed in the Superblock, primarily around a small cluster of bars. The City increased police presence and investigated these establishments for compliance with safety regulations. Despite these measures, crime persisted, leading the City to shut down two bars for repeated legal violations, while a third bar closed due to lack of business. Years later, the bars and the landlord sued the City and the City Manager, alleging violations of the Takings Clause, Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985, claiming the City unlawfully targeted them because their owners and clientele were predominantly racial minorities.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina granted directed verdicts for the City on all claims during a jury trial. The court held that the appellants did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in the right to conduct their business. It found that the City's enforcement actions were within the legitimate bounds of state police power and rejected the § 1985 civil conspiracy claims based on the intra corporate conspiracy doctrine, which states that corporate and government agents cannot conspire with themselves.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the City acted within its lawful authority to address serious public safety threats and enforce compliance with state and local regulations. The appellants' claims were deemed speculative and unsupported by the evidence presented at trial. The court found no discriminatory intent or violation of due process, and it upheld the application of the intra corporate conspiracy doctrine, concluding that the City officials did not possess a personal stake independent of their relationship to the City. View "Brady v. City of Myrtle Beach" on Justia Law

Lisa Barnhill, a white woman, sued the U.S. Attorney General, alleging racial and gender discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Barnhill claimed she faced discrimination from her African American supervisor and others while employed by the DEA. Some of her claims were dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and others were resolved on summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed Barnhill's race and gender discrimination claims, finding she failed to allege facts showing discriminatory animus. The court also dismissed her retaliation claims related to promotion denials and a five-day suspension, concluding she did not plausibly allege a connection between her EEO proceeding and these adverse actions. However, the court allowed her retaliation claims related to a management review and temporary duty reassignment, as well as her hostile work environment claim, to proceed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of Barnhill's discrimination claims, agreeing she did not plausibly allege discriminatory animus. The court also affirmed the dismissal of her retaliation claims related to promotion denials and the suspension, finding no causal connection to her EEO proceeding. On summary judgment, the court found that the management review was initiated by a supervisor without discriminatory animus and that the temporary duty reassignment was justified by legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons. The court also concluded that Barnhill's hostile work environment claim failed because the adverse actions she experienced were responses to her own behavior, not severe or pervasive harassment.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Barnhill failed to establish the necessary elements for her claims. View "Barnhill v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Vincent Deritis was convicted by a jury of four offenses involving child sexual abuse material. Count One involved using a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for producing a visual depiction, based on a video of his stepdaughter showering. Counts Two and Three involved similar charges based on photographs of his stepdaughter while she was sleeping. Count Four involved possession of child sexual abuse material. The district court sentenced him to 600 months of imprisonment and imposed a special assessment of $117,000.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied Deritis's motion to suppress evidence obtained from his Google account, finding that the evidence was obtained from an independent source. The court also denied his Rule 29 motion for acquittal on Counts One and Two, finding substantial evidence supported the convictions. Additionally, the court excluded exculpatory testimony from Deritis's ex-wife, which Deritis argued was impermissible hearsay. The district court instructed the jury on the definition of "lascivious exhibition" using the Dost factors, which Deritis challenged as erroneous.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress, since the evidence was obtained from an independent source. The court found that the jury instruction on "lascivious exhibition" was proper and consistent with precedent. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the convictions on Counts One and Two. The exclusion of the exculpatory testimony was deemed harmless error. However, the court found that the district court plainly erred by imposing a special assessment without considering the mandatory statutory factors on the record.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions but vacated the special assessment and remanded for resentencing on that issue. View "U.S. v. Deritis" on Justia Law