Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted—and issued three concurrent life sentences—for conspiracy to commit murder for hire resulting in death and aiding and abetting carjacking resulting in death, and one count of aiding and abetting murder with a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. The first two convictions served as the predicate offenses for Defendant’s third conviction. Defendant now appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion to vacate his conviction. He argued that following the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), and United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022), his predicate offenses no longer qualify as crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(3).   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that because aiding and abetting carjacking resulting in death remains a valid predicate offense under Section 924(c)(3)(A), Defendant’s 924(j) conviction must stand. The court wrote that that predicate, alone, is sufficient to support his Section 924(j) conviction. Moreover, the court concluded that post-Davis and Taylor, aiding and abetting carjacking resulting in death remains a crime of violence under either Sections 924(c)(3)(A)’s force or elements clause. Due to this, the court wrote, it need not reach the validity of Defendant’s conspiracy to commit murder for hire resulting in death predicate, and the court held that his Section 924(j) conviction stands irrespective of the ambiguity in the general verdict form. View "US v. Michael Draven" on Justia Law

These consolidated cases present weighty and important questions involving the separation of powers as it relates to a project of national interest. Petitioners are environmental groups challenging federal agency actions that will enable the final construction and initial operation of the Mountain Valley Pipeline, a 300-plus-mile underground pipeline that will transport natural gas from West Virginia to Virginia. But during the pendency of this matter before the Fourth Circuit, Congress proactively intervened by legislation and enacted the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023. Section 324 of that Act purports to ratify the agencies’ actions regarding the Mountain Valley Pipeline and remove our jurisdiction over the underlying petitions. Respondents—the federal agencies and the Mountain Valley Pipeline—moved in for the dismissal of the petitions.   The Fourth Circuit granted Respondents’ motions to dismiss. In sum, with Section 324, Congress removed our jurisdiction in a way that mandates the dismissal of the underlying petitions, which challenge agency actions that grant necessary approvals for the completion of the Mountain Valley Pipeline. The court explained that “no court” has jurisdiction to review these approvals, including the DC Circuit, whose jurisdiction is limited to “claims alleging the invalidity of [Section 324] or that an action is beyond the scope of authority conferred by [Section 324].” But Congress left in place the general grant of jurisdiction to this Court under the Natural Gas Act over challenges to future pipelines or other natural gas facilities in this circuit, as well as future challenges to operations of the Mountain Valley Pipeline not covered by the express terms of Section 324. View "Appalachian Voices v. United States Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder for hire resulting in death, aiding and abetting carjacking resulting in death, and aiding and abetting murder with a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. The first two convictions served as the predicate offenses for Defendant's third conviction.Defendant filed a motion to vacate, arguing that following the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), and United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022), his predicate offenses no longer qualify as crimes of violence.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that aiding and abetting carjacking resulting in death remains a valid predicate offense under 18 USC 924(c)(3)(A). View "US v. Michael Draven" on Justia Law

Two companies that operate in the real estate development industry have spent years embroiled in a dispute over their shared name: “Dewberry.” Dewberry Engineers sued Dewberry Group to quell the latter’s use of several new insignias it developed as part of its rebrand. Dewberry Engineers owns federal trademark rights to the “Dewberry” mark and claims Dewberry Group’s rebranding efforts infringe that mark and breach an agreement struck between the sparring corporations over a decade ago. The district court sided with Dewberry Engineers in the proceedings below, assessing a nearly $43 million profit disgorgement award against Dewberry Group for its infringement, enjoining it from further breaches of its agreement with Dewberry Engineers, and ordering it to pay attorneys’ fees for forcing Dewberry Engineers to litigate an exceptional case of trademark infringement.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the parties share an identical, arbitrary dominant word and disclaim different suffixes (and prefixes in some cases) in the marks at issue. The record shows they also employ those marks in related, overlapping, and complementary services. Those details go some distance toward creating a likelihood of confusion as to the origin of either party’s “Dewberry” mark. Moreover, the court explained that despite Dewberry Group’s failure to calculate exact figures or provide evidence of deductions from infringement revenues for losses and expenses, the court equitably reduced the requested award by twenty percent to $42,975,725.60.  The court finds no error of fact or law suggesting the district court’s conclusions were an abuse of its discretion. View "Dewberry Engineers Inc. v. Dewberry Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant robbed the CresCom Bank in Conway, South Carolina. During the robbery, Council fatally shot the bank teller and the bank manager. Defendant was convicted of (1) bank robbery resulting in death (Count One); and (2) using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in a manner causing death (Count Two). The government filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. The jury found Defendant guilty on both charges. The jury unanimously recommended a sentence of death on each count. On appeal, Defendant raised four challenges to the district court’s handling of the guilt phase.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. First, the court held that the district court fulfilled its obligations under Sections 4241 and 4247. The court raised the issue of competency on its own initiative several times, including before and during a pretrial conference held roughly a year and a half before trial. Further, the court explained that Defendant’s arguments about his need for more time and the preferability of alternatives to denying his motion outright asked the court to second-guess the district court’s case-specific judgments in “areas where the district court’s comparative expertise is at its zenith and ours its nadir.” Thus, the court held district court made no reversible error in denying Defendant’s fifth continuance motion. Finally, the court explained that B at least one of Defendant’s current arguments—that the Federal Death Penalty Act makes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority by incorporating state law execution practices—was plainly available when Defendant filed his first Rule 33 motion. View "US v. Brandon Council" on Justia Law

After receiving a long suspension, Jacob Doe sued Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (“Virginia Tech”) and several university officials, alleging that Virginia Tech’s Title IX investigation, hearing, and appeal process denied him due process of law. The district court dismissed Doe’s complaint, holding that he hadn’t alleged a cognizable liberty or property interest in his continuing education.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed for a different reason. The court held that even assuming Doe has such an interest, he hasn’t alleged that he was deprived of it without sufficient process. The court wrote that Doe complains that his witnesses couldn’t appear in person at the hearing because it was held during the summer. But he doesn’t allege that the witnesses weren’t able to provide testimony by phone, video, or in writing. Nor does Doe claim he sought to continue the hearing until his witnesses were available. And Doe admits that the investigator interviewed his witnesses during her investigation into Roe, and the allegations against Roe were adjudicated at the same hearing. So these allegations too, don’t rise to the level of a due-process violation.   Moreover, the court explained that to find that Doe alleged a due-process violation on this sparse record, the court would have to hold that university students have a right—in effectively every disciplinary hearing—to advance notice of the evidence to be presented against them. The ask is even more striking here because Doe doesn’t allege that he sought a continuance or that Virginia Tech relied on the surprise testimony. Therefore, the court rejected Doe’s claim of error. View "Jacob Doe v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Universit" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for Tug Hill Operating, LLC, for approximately a year and a half at rig sites in West Virginia. He commenced an action against Tug Hill under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), alleging that while Tug Hill formally classified him as an independent contractor, he actually qualified as an employee for purposes of the FLSA based on the degree of control that Tug Hill exercised over his work. He, therefore, claimed that Tug Hill was required to pay him overtime for those weeks in which he worked more than 40 hours. Tug Hill filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s action on the ground that Plaintiff was contractually required to arbitrate his claim against it. In addition, RigUp itself filed a motion to intervene in order to seek the action’s dismissal in favor of arbitration. The district court granted both motions.   The Fourth Circuit reversed both rulings and remanded. The court explained that the numerous provisions in the Agreement preclude any conclusion that the Agreement was entered into solely or directly for the benefit of Tug Hill, such that Tug Hill could enforce it as a third-party beneficiary. Accordingly, the district court erred in granting Tug Hill’s motion to dismiss and compelling Plaintiff, under the arbitration agreement between him and RigUp, to proceed to arbitration with respect to his FLSA claim against Tug Hill. Moreover, the court explained that because RigUp’s agreement with Plaintiff expressly disclaimed any interest in any litigation, Plaintiff might have with a company in Tug Hill’s position RigUp cannot now opportunistically claim that intervention is necessary. View "Lastephen Rogers v. Tug Hill Operating, LLC" on Justia Law

Fisheries Reform Group alleges that shrimp trawlers operating in North Carolina’s Pamlico Sound are violating the Clean Water Act by engaging in two types of unpermitted activity: throwing bycatch overboard and disturbing sediment with their trawl nets.   The Fourth circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Fisheries’ complaint. The court explained that though the Clean Water Act’s includes the term “biological materials” in its definition of “pollutant,” that is not clear authorization for the EPA to regulate bycatch under the Act. So Fisheries Reform Group’s first claim— that shrimpers are violating the Clean Water Act by discarding bycatch overboard without a Section 1342 permit—was properly dismissed. The court further explained that Fisheries’ second claim—that shrimpers are violating the Act by using trawl nets without a permit—fares no better. The shrimpers are not “dredging” the Pamlico Sound with their nets, so they cannot be discharging “dredged spoil.” And the dirt and sand that their nets kick up is not “added”—and thus not “discharged”—into the Sound. View "North Carolina Coastal Fisheries Reform Group v. Capt. Gaston LLC" on Justia Law

A Virginia statute required the automatic suspension of residents’ driver’s licenses if they failed to pay certain court fines and fees. in 2016, a group of indigent Virginians who lost their licenses when they were unable to pay court debts initiated a putative class action against the Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (“Commissioner”), alleging that the Commonwealth’s license-suspension scheme was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs raised several claims under the Fourteenth Amendment: that the statute’s requirement of automatic suspension without notice or a hearing violated their procedural due process rights; and that the statute’s enforcement against those who were unable, not unwilling, to pay violated both their substantive due process rights and their equal protection rights. As relief, the plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunctions preventing the statute’s enforcement and requiring license reinstatement to the “hundreds of thousands of Virginians” with suspended licenses. Plaintiffs then petitioned for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. Section 1988(b), which provides that the district court, “in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party” in Section 1983 actions “a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of attorney’s fees and remanded. The court held that Plaintiffs here prevailed” in every sense needed to make them eligible for a fee award. The court explained that the named plaintiffs sought not only reinstatement of their own licenses but also class certification, a declaratory judgment that Section 46.2-395 was unconstitutional, and hence permanent license reinstatement for hundreds of thousands of Virginians. Those are precisely the kinds of considerations that bear on the “extent of a plaintiff’s success” – a critical factor in assessing a reasonable fee award in any fee litigation under Section 1988. View "Damian Stinnie v. Richard Holcomb" on Justia Law

John Telly King was murdered by a fellow inmate. King’s estate sued the South Carolina Department of Corrections prison guards on duty and their supervisors, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to King’s safety and medical needs and, therefore, responsible for his death. A magistrate judge disagreed, granting summary judgment to the defendants, and King appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the prison guards on duty failed to violate a clearly established right so are entitled to qualified immunity. And Plaintiff failed to allege, or raise a disputed material fact of, any individual involvement by the supervisor Defendants. The court explained that nowhere does Plaintiff identify how each defendant violated the constitution. This is a prerequisite to a supervisory-liability claim. Nor does Plaintiff present a material dispute about any individual Defendant’s knowledge. Instead, Plaintiff only claims that Defendants “either maintained actual or constructive knowledge of the risk” (whatever that risk may be). The court wrote that this boilerplate conclusion—lacking defendant specificity and factual support— does not state a claim for relief or allow a plaintiff to get past summary judgment. View "David King v. Timothy Riley" on Justia Law