Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant is fifteen years into his twenty-year prison sentence for conspiring to distribute crack cocaine. A few years after he was sentenced, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act, which reduced the crack-to-powder cocaine disparity. If sentenced today, Smith’s mandatory minimum would be half his current sentence. Under the retroactivity provisions of the First Step Act, Defendant moved for a sentence reduction to time served. The district court denied his motion, determining that twenty years remained appropriate. Defendant appealed, claiming among other things that the district court miscalculated his Guidelines range and that our recent decision in United States v. Swain, 49 F.4th 398 (4th Cir. 2022), reveals substantive errors in the district court’s analysis.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that “The Fair Sentencing Act and First Step Act, together, are strong remedial statutes, meant to rectify disproportionate and racially disparate sentencing penalties.” The district court considered these remedial aims, as well as all other nonfrivolous arguments, before exercising its broad discretion to deny sentencing relief. Further, while the court recognized the disparity between Defendant’s new Guidelines range and his current sentence, the district court properly explained why it remained substantively reasonable. View "US v. Danny Smith" on Justia Law

Brothers pleaded guilty to conspiring to participate in a racketeering enterprise, in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act. The district court ordered the forfeiture of various real properties and financial accounts linked to the RICO conspiracy. Several third parties came forward to claim an interest in one or more of the forfeited assets, including the brothers’ sister, Ilana Bangiyeva (“Bangiyeva”), and one brother’s wife, Irina Alishayeva (“Alishayeva”). The court rejected most of Bangiyeva’s claimed ownership interests. As to Alishayeva the court granted a life estate in and the exclusive use of one of the properties after finding that she owned a one-third interest in that property as a tenant in common with the Government, which owned the remaining two-thirds interest. Bangiyeva appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the final order of forfeiture in that respect. Additionally, the Government cross-appealed, asserting that the district court erred as a matter of law in granting Alishayeva a life estate in the relevant property at the expense of the Government’s majority ownership interest. The court agreed with the Government and vacated that part of the final order of forfeiture and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that in granting Alishayeva full and exclusive use of the 110-37 69th Ave. property for the remainder of her life and marriage, the district court accorded the Government less than the full bundle of property rights that it would otherwise be entitled to as a tenant in common under New York state law. The district court was without legal authority to do so. View "US v. Ilana Bangiyeva" on Justia Law

Defendant received a 13-year sentence for Hobbs Act robbery and a related firearm offense. The Fourth Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence on procedural grounds and remanded for resentencing. At resentencing, the district court increased Defendant’s sentence by six months and ran that term consecutively to an intervening state sentence on unrelated charges. Defendant argued that he was resentenced vindictively as punishment for successfully exercising his right to appeal.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court expressly based its increased sentence on objective information post-dating Defendant’s initial sentencing – namely, Defendant’s new state convictions and his lengthy disciplinary record while incarcerated. The district court provided a careful explanation of its decision to increase Defendant’s sentence and run it consecutively to a newly imposed sentence. And it grounded this decision in objective developments post-dating Defendant’s initial sentencing. That suffices to dispel any presumption of vindictiveness that otherwise would arise. View "US v. Christopher Singletary" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in Virginia state court asserting federal claims against his former employer, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (“Virginia Tech”). Plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit of that action, as was his right under Virginia law, and refiled the action in federal district court about ten days later. The district court granted Virginia Tech’s motion to dismiss the case on statute of limitation grounds. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that under Virginia law, a voluntary nonsuit tolls the limitations period as long as the action is refiled within six months after the nonsuit was granted.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remand for further proceedings on Plaintiff’s complaint. The court concluded that the Virginia court where Plaintiff originally filed his complaint had statutorily granted subject-matter jurisdiction over the class of claims asserted in Plaintiff’s complaint. The order granting Plaintiff’s motion for voluntary nonsuit was therefore valid under Morrison and triggered the tolling provisions of Va. Code Section 8.01-229(E)(3). Because Plaintiff refiled his case in federal court within six months of the date of the nonsuit order, this action was timely filed under Section 8.01- 229(E)(3), and the district court therefore erred by dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint. View "John Massey, Jr. v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the district court’s judgment sentencing as a career offender under Sentencing Guidelines section 4B1.1(a), in that Defendant had seven prior South Carolina felony convictions supportive of such an enhancement (including, as relevant here, four South Carolina felony convictions for distribution of cocaine base). The court then sentenced Defendant to 120 months in prison for the distribution offense — plus 60 consecutive months for the firearm offense — for an aggregate prison term totaling 180 months. On appeal, Defendant pursued four challenges to his convictions and sentence.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the “distribution” offense of South Carolina Code section 44- 53-375(B) does not criminalize the attempt offense of “attempted distribution,” but rather the completed offense of “attempted transfer” Accordingly, the court ruled that a section 44-53-375(B) distribution offense is not categorically disqualified from being treated as a Guidelines “controlled substance offense.” As a result of that ruling, Defendant’s contention that four of his prior drug distribution convictions — as punished by section 44-53-375(B) of the South Carolina Code — is without merit. The district court thus did not err by deeming Defendant to be a Guidelines career offender. View "US v. Quintin Davis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in Virginia state court asserting federal claims against his former employer, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (“Virginia Tech”). Massey took a voluntary nonsuit of that action, as was his right under Virginia law, and refiled the action in federal district court about ten days later. The district court granted Virginia Tech’s motion to dismiss the case on statute of limitation grounds. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that under Virginia law, a voluntary nonsuit tolls the limitations period as long as the action is refiled within six months after the nonsuit was granted.   The Fourth Circuit agreed with Plaintiff and vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings on Plaintiff’s complaint. The court concluded that the Virginia court where Plaintiff originally filed his complaint had statutorily granted subject-matter jurisdiction over the class of claims asserted in Plaintiff’s complaint. The order granting Plaintiff’s motion for voluntary nonsuit was therefore valid under Morrison and triggered the tolling provisions of Va. Code Section 8.01-229(E)(3). Because Plaintiff refiled his case in federal court within six months of the date of the nonsuit order, this action was timely filed under Section 8.01- 229(E)(3), and the district court therefore erred by dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint. View "John Massey, Jr. v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of two crimes arising out of an elaborate ploy to intimidate an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agent into halting her efforts to collect his delinquent tax debt. On appeal, Defendant challenged the validity of both convictions along with three enhancements the district court imposed at sentencing.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that it found no reversible error in the district court’s analysis. Although Section 2J1.2(b)(1)(B) requires any personal injury to be “physical,” the Guideline does not limit the term “property damage” in the same way. And the Guideline explicitly encompasses “threatening” to cause property damage. Thus, we will not disturb the district court’s determination that, by filing a lien against the property, because Defendant “caused or threatened to cause” damage to their property. Finally, Reed contends the district court erred by applying a two-level enhancement to Count 2 for conduct “otherwise extensive in scope, planning, or preparation.” The district court relied on Defendant’s efforts to convince Nelson not to garnish his wages, his numerous frivolous legal filings in multiple States, and his “campaign of serving notarized documents on the agent” purporting to show she “personally wronged him” and owed him “millions of dollars.” View "US v. Jeffrey Reed" on Justia Law

A collective-bargaining agreement between the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) and the United States Maritime Alliance (USMX), an association of carriers and other employers, earmarks all container loading and unloading work on the East and Gulf Coasts for the union’s members. So when USMX-affiliated ships docked at a new South Carolina terminal that used non-union lift operators, the union sued USMX and its carrier members for damages. Soon enough, USMX’s carrier members stopped calling at that terminal. At issue is whether the ILA’s lawsuit—and a separate provision of its contract with USMX—violate the National Labor Relations Act. The National Labor Relations Board held that they don’t, and the South Carolina State Ports Authority petitioned for review.   The Fourth Circuit agreed with the Board and denied the petition. The court agreed that USMX and the ILA haven’t made an agreement that violates Section 8(e). Moreover, the court explained that the Board rationally held that the ILA’s lawsuit against USMX sought to preserve its coastwide jurisdiction over loading and unloading work, so it didn’t violate the Act. And the Board and ALJ correctly concluded that Section 7(b) of the Master Contract didn’t constitute an illegal hot-cargo provision, whether by its text or by tacit agreement. View "South Carolina State Ports Authority v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Albania, entered the United States in 2001. He remained in the country until 2008 when he was ordered removed. In 2015, Petitioner was charged with federal bank fraud and aggravated identity theft. In 2016, he was convicted of those charges after pleading guilty and sentenced to 44 months in prison. Based on Petitioner’s convictions, in August 2019, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) began removal proceedings against Petitioner. And also, because of those convictions, in September 2019, DHS moved to terminate his asylum status. Petitioner conceded he was removable based on the bank fraud and identity theft proceedings but requested the IJ waive those grounds for his removal. Petitioner also applied to adjust his status to lawful permanent resident. And he separately sought withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The IJ denied Petitioner’s request for a waiver. Petitioner asked the Fourth Circuit to grant his petition for review and vacate the BIA’s decision determining that the termination of his asylum status renders him ineligible to seek an adjustment of status to a lawful permanent resident under Section 1159(b).   The Fourth Circuit denied the petition. The court concluded that Section 1159(b) unambiguously precludes an alien whose asylum status has been terminated from adjusting to lawful permanent resident status. On that basis, Petitioner’s argument fails at step one of the Chevron test. Since Petitioner’s asylum status had been terminated at the time he sought to adjust to lawful permanent resident status, he was not eligible for that adjustment. View "Tiger Cela v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case are three sales representatives who alleged that their employer, a food-products distributor, did not pay them the overtime wages to which they were entitled under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA” or “Act”). Their employer defended on the ground that the plaintiffs fell within the Act’s “outside sales” exemption, which excuses overtime pay for employees who work outside the office and whose primary duty is making sales. The district court found that Plaintiffs were owed overtime pay because their employer had failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that they came within the outside sales exemption. The court also awarded liquidated damages to Plaintiffs, finding that the employer had not shown objectively reasonable grounds for the challenged pay practices. The court concluded, the Plaintiffs had not shown that their employer willfully violated the Act. Both parties appealed: The employer challenged the district court’s liability finding and its award of liquidated damages, and Plaintiffs cross-appealed the court’s willfulness finding and attendant application of the two-year statute of limitations.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there is ample evidence in the record to support the court’s finding that the defendants had only an “aspirational” and not a “concrete” sense of what their sales representatives did and, specifically, their ability to make sales at chain stores. Further, the court explained that the FLSA clearly contemplates as much, establishing as the default rule both the award of liquidated damages – predicated on the absence of objective reasonableness – and a two-year statute of limitations – predicated on a non-willful violation. View "Faustino Carrera v. E.M.D. Sales Inc." on Justia Law